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RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 26

JAN.—JUNE 1936

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXVI

JANUARY TO JUNE 1930

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CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXVI.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 1/1/91]

No. 1.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 1, 1930.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, December 30, 1929.

ON the 24th December Ibn Mashhur, with following of 200, including thirty women, having entered Iraq and refused to leave under threat of force, surrendered unconditionally to Iraq police, who were supported by Royal Air Force armoured cars. They were disarmed and escorted to Busaiyah post.

On 29th December Dawish and his following were routed by loyalist Harb force, who were assisted by some Iraqi tribesmen, near Riqai, close to Iraq frontier. Mutair (Dawish's own people) fugitives on foot, mainly women, are collecting on the Iraq frontier. Iraq police on the frontier met fugitives, who claimed to be Dawish's. They refused to parley.

In the meantime, the Royal Air Force armoured cars are evicting Ajman rebels, who crossed the Nejd frontier some days ago and camped on Kuwait-Iraq boundary. It is probable that the latter will refuse to go, and will surrender to the armoured cars in view of Dawish's defeat.

Disposal of refugees presents problem which I am actively discussing with Iraq Government, and I will telegraph further on this subject as soon as possible.
(Repeated to Bushire, Kuwait, Jedda and Jerusalem.)

[E 1/1/91]

No. 2.

High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 2, 1930.)

(Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

December 31, 1929.

MY telegram of 30th December [see No. 1].

Regarding disposal of Ibn Mashhur and his following: They are not Najdis but belong to Ruwallah tribe from Syria. Undertaking given by His Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government to Ibn Saud does not therefore appear to apply to them. Moreover, Ibn Mashhur states that Ibn Saud has excluded them from the offer of terms made to the rebels on the grounds that he does not want them. I suggest, therefore, that the Iraq Government, having settled their own account with them, should let them return to Syria. Please telegraph whether I may

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Iraq—
(Communicated to Foreign Office January 5)*

(Telegraphic)

January 4, 1930

MY telegram of 2nd January and your telegram of 31st December. [See Nos. 2 and 3]

This extremely difficult question has now been considered by His Majesty's Government, who have reached following tentative conclusions:—

(a.) In the first place, while recognising force of your argument, based on demands 4 and 5, contained in aide-memoire enclosed in Jedda despatch No. 306 of 30th November, they do not feel that they can in fact confidently take their stand on this. As will be seen from Jedda telegram No. 174 of 27th November, repeated to you, a letter from Ibn Saud written immediately before Fuad Hamza's communication was received simultaneously with it, in which His Majesty asked specifically that rebels crossing the frontier should be arrested and handed over. Though no specific guarantee to this effect was given by His Majesty's Government in replying, they did inform the King that instructions had been given to concert the necessary military measures for the ejection of any of the contending forces that might enter Koweit or Iraqi territory, and for the interception, wherever possible, of any of the forces of Ibn Saud and his party for the purpose of merging with local tribes. While not committing themselves on the question of handing over, they did not qualify these assurances by any reference to Fuad Hamza's demands. It was for these reasons that the instructions in my telegram No. 1 of 2nd January were sent you.

(b.) As regards the question of Ibn Saud's status, His Majesty's Government have considerable doubt whether they can take their stand on his Syrian status. Not only was he repudiated by his paramount chief in 1926, and has severed all connexion with Syria and embraced Wahabism, but his close association with rebels and references made to this position by Ibn Saud in recent correspondence (cf. Jedda telegrams of 17th May and 25th May, Nos. 63 and 68, repeated to Bagdad), make it, in their view, doubtful whether he should not be considered as part of the contending forces. But I am prepared to leave it to Ibn Saud to make representations regarding the disposal of himself and his party. In any case His Majesty's Government could not, however, agree that he should return to Syria except after reference to the French Government and with their consent. For the moment I suggest that Iraq Government should take such action against him as may be justified by the circumstances. I am sure that the High Commissioner for Transjordan will no doubt consider whether Transjordan Government should similarly take action against him in respect of raid against Beni Sakhr in February 1928. You will, of course, appreciate that whole party must be kept under close surveillance.

(c.) His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn approximate numbers, if any, of rebels who have surrendered on explicit understanding that they will not be handed over to Ibn Saud against their will, and whether they include any of the leaders. If they do, it will, however, be necessary to furnish an explanation regarding it to Ibn Saud and they propose, subject to any observations you may offer, to inform him that while the pledge given precludes surrender of these people against their will, they will be interned at a safe distance until the end of hostilities, when their disposal will be settled in negotiation with him.

(d.) As regards rebels who may, after receipt of these instructions, offer to surrender they should be warned that they will be disarmed, and that question of their disposal will depend on negotiations with Ibn Saud. Do you consider that if they refuse voluntarily to surrender their arms, it would be possible forcibly to disarm them?

(e.) Subject to any observations which you may have to offer and which they will be glad to receive as early as possible, His Majesty's Government now propose to communicate with Ibn Saud on lines set out above, and to invite him to state conditions on which he would be prepared to take over the refugees from the Iraq Government, when, provided conditions were satisfactory, arrangements for their handing over could be concerted with Ibn Saud.

(f.) What exactly is covered by the term "settle accounts" in your telegram of 31st December? Please telegraph explicit statement of action contemplated in this respect.

(g.) Since foregoing paragraphs were drafted His Majesty's Government have received Jedda telegram No. 2 repeated to you. This shows that His Majesty's Government are exercising greatest care in dealing with refugee rebels if His Majesty's Government are to avoid charge of failing to implement assurances given to Ibn Saud. They must therefore retain complete freedom, except in so far as they may already be committed by pledges referred to in paragraph (d) above, to negotiate with Ibn Saud as to disposal of refugees.

(Repeated to Bushire, Jedda, Koweit and Jerusalem)

E 63 1 91

No. 8

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 6)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 4, 1930

Additional surrenders have been communicated to the local Royal Air Force commander who is attempting in co-operation with Iraq police to expel rebels who have crossed Nejd frontier and camped on Koweit-Iraq border. Latest report indicates that Mutair leaders, Dawish and Ibn Hithlain, are in Koweit territory and refuse either to surrender unconditionally or to return to Nejd.

Presence of women and children with the rebels precludes air action by the Royal Air Force. In the meantime, messages received from Ibn Saud grow more threatening. In the circumstances Royal Air Force commander proposes to attempt to effect arrest of the two leaders to-morrow. I have given instructions that he should hand over prisoners to Iraq police if arrested in Iraq, and to concert measures for their disposal with political agent at Koweit if arrested in Koweit territory.

E 81 1 91

No. 9

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 6)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 5, 1930

YUSUF YASIN, secretary to Ibn Saud, arrived at Ghubb's Camp in Iraq to-day and telegraphed following urgent message to me:—

"We are informed that Mutair and Ajman within boundaries of Koweit Ibn Saud with his army arrived at Kharja. Presence of rebels in Koweit Government evict them by force or grant permission for us to attack them where they are. We expected British Government to attack them before, but it did not do so. Request reply very urgently as we have no water in present camp."

I have replied:—

"I have referred your message to London. In the meantime, Royal Air Force in Koweit are engaged in attempting to expel rebels to Nejd and I am unable to give permission for Ibn Saud's forces to enter Koweit territory in order to attack or pursue rebels."

I presume orders of His Majesty's Government on policy to be pursued in Koweit will be sent direct to Bushire. I will reply to your telegram of 4th January. As far as I am aware no surrenders have been accepted with conditions, but I am verifying this by enquiry from officers on spot.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 7)

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda, January 6, 1930.

FOLLOWING is gist of note just received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs with reference to his note reported in my telegram No. 4 —

He has now been informed that Dawish and his followers are themselves encamped within Iraq frontier and are in constant touch with Captain Glubb and the officer commanding Iraq frontier districts. If true, this would be most regrettable and surprising.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs then refers again to general promises given, also to my note based on your telegram No. 147 regarding instructions issued to Captain Glubb.

If information is correct, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs protests strongly against the action of above officers, which he says violates undertakings of His Majesty's Government and is contrary to profession of friendship frequently made.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Bushire and Koweit.)

Resident in Bushire to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office January 7)

(Telegraphic)

Bushire, January 6, 1930.

REFERENCE Bagdad telegram of 5th January (see No. 9).

Koweit is quite defenceless and has no regular police or any force at their disposal capable of enforcing any order that His Majesty's Government may issue regarding ejectment or internment of rebels. Further, while Ibn Saud would probably hesitate to commit aggression against Iraq, he might possibly not have similar compunctions regarding Koweit, even to extent of threatening town, and serious situation might arise involving landing of naval forces, as was done in 1924. I therefore recommend, subject to concurrence of High Commissioner, that if any surrenders are made to Royal Air Force or arrests made by them in Koweit territory, they should be regarded as being made to Iraq forces, and individuals concerned should be handed over by Royal Air Force to Iraq authorities or otherwise disposed of under order of High Commissioner. Political Koweit, with concurrence of Sheikh has authorised Chief Staff Officer, with whom he held consultation to-day, to act in accordance with the above recommendations.

He reports Dawish with most of his following now close to Jahrah, and may himself any moment try to make a dash for Koweit if he sees all up. This Dickson is trying to avoid at all costs, and he is himself proceeding to Jahrah.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Resident in the Persian Gulf.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, January 6, 1930.

BAGDAD telegram of 5th January (see No. 9).

1. From your telegram of 2nd November it seems just possible that rebels might be persuaded to leave their women and children in safety in Iraq or Koweit territory. If you consider that there is any prospect of this, I would be glad to hear of it.

I am informed that presence of women and children with rebels makes it very difficult forcibly to eject them, and he asked whether he would have any objection to our allowing rebels to leave their women and children in Iraq or Koweit territory on condition that they themselves returned to Najd forthwith. It could be explained that once rebels are separated from their women and children they can, if necessary, be ejected by force.

2. Unless you see objection Ibn Saud should, in any case, be informed immediately that sole reason for delay in implementing our undertaking to expel rebels is presence of women and children, which renders it difficult to employ force, and that every effort is being made to find some way of overcoming this difficulty.

3. Situation is clearly becoming critical, and there seems real danger unless something is speedily done to counteract tendentious reports which are reaching Ibn Saud as to our treatment of rebels and to convince him that real attempt is being made in circumstances of great difficulty to carry out assurances given to him, he may take matters into his own hand and invade Koweit or Iraq territory with his forces. Until His Majesty's Government are in receipt of High Commissioner's reply to my telegram to Bagdad of 4th January (see No. 7), they are not in a position to issue definitive instructions, either as regards disposal of refugees or reply to Ibn Saud's representations. They are inclined to think that once decision has been reached it would clear the atmosphere if arrangements were made for Dickson, preferably accompanied by representative of Air Officer Commanding Iraq, to have a personal meeting with Ibn Saud with the object both of communicating decisions reached and of discussing whole position with him.

4. In the meantime, His Majesty's Government suggest that it might produce effect if, when communicating message suggested in paragraph 2 above to Ibn Saud, we were informed that His Majesty's Government, in order to avoid delay and with a view to placing Ibn Saud in full possession of the position as it presents itself to them, would be willing immediately to dispatch Colonel Dickson, with whom he is well acquainted accompanied by a representative of the Air Officer Commanding Iraq, to his headquarters in the field to discuss with him a solution of the present difficulties, and that His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn as soon as possible whether he agrees to this proposal, and is prepared to furnish Colonel Dickson and his party with the necessary safe conduct to his headquarters.

5. Communication on lines of paragraph 4 should not, of course, be made unless you feel satisfied that despatch of Dickson and party would involve them in no personal danger. Dickson in any case, should not actually leave until His Majesty's Government are in a position to furnish him with full instructions and until safe conduct from Ibn Saud has been received.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Koweit, Jerusalem, Jedda and Government of India.)

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 7, 1930.

PRIME MINISTER asked to see me this morning and brought letter from himself marked "very urgent," gist of which is as follows—

Since Ibn Saud is now encamped close to Iraq frontier, Iraq Government feel excellent opportunity presents itself for a joint meeting in order to discuss settlement of outstanding questions between the two Governments. Faisal is so impressed with the necessity for seizing this opportunity of making friendly overtures to a neighbouring King on his borders, that he is ready to meet Ibn Saud himself, either in neutral zone or at some convenient place near the frontier, for discussion of these questions. Iraq Government request me to convey this invitation to Ibn Saud.

I am sure that the atmosphere of distrust between Iraq and Najd Government has been doing much to hinder the settlement of outstanding questions between the two Governments, and would be glad if I could take part in conference, which would probably be attended by Prime Minister and Cornwallis. Matters for discussion would be (a) breaches of article 4 of the 1924 Agreement, (b) the question of the frontier, (c) the question of the safe conduct of pilgrims, (d) the question of the safe conduct of trade, (e) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (f) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (g) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (h) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (i) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (j) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (k) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (l) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (m) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (n) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (o) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (p) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (q) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (r) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (s) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (t) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (u) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (v) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (w) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (x) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (y) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims, (z) the question of the safe conduct of the pilgrims.

be prepared by personal contact for a better mutual understanding. Since it is unlikely that Ibn Saud will remain near Iraq border for long, I request instructions by telegram as to whether I am authorised to despatch invitation to Ibn Saud as suggested. If meeting approved and takes place before question of rebel refugees is decided, I will attend.

E 114/1 91

No 14

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 6)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 7, 1930

FOLLOWING telegram of 4th January [see No 7]

(a) Difficulty regarding expulsion is due to the fact that Dawish and other rebel leaders are accompanied by women and children, which makes effective action against them almost impossible. Surrender on terms suggested in my telegram of 31st December [see No 2] seemed only immediate feasible solution, but offer was withdrawn on the receipt of your telegram of 2nd January [see No 3], and Royal Air Force have been unable to make any headway in Kuwait though there are apparently no rebels left in Iraq territory.

(b) Handing over of Ibn Mashhur to Hejaz Government is not barred by terms of his surrender which was unconditional. Iraq Government have ordered that he should be kept under close surveillance pending result of negotiations for his disposal.

(c) Further reports from local officers show that no surrender of rebels has been accepted with conditions.

(d) A surprise attempt was made by Royal Air Force armoured cars on 5th January to round up rebels in Kuwait territory, with object of forcing disarmament if they refused to return to Nejd. Royal Air Force failed to come up with them owing to mud caused by recent heavy rains. Latest report shows that bodies of rebels have slipped past Royal Air Force armoured cars in north-western Kuwait towards Jahra.

Air Force to expel or disarm rebels when they can get in touch with them.

(e) I agree to proposed procedure as affecting Iraq, provided that decision to hand over rebels captured in Iraq should not be taken without concurrence of Iraq Government.

(f) This is matter for discussion with Iraq Government but Prime Minister informs me that it is their intention to recover loot taken from Iraq tribes and punish rebels who have raided into Iraq. Action will presumably be taken under Section 27 of Tribal Disputes Regulations.

and that Ibn Saud's detachment of 200 men, and Iraq Army Motor Machine Gun Detachment left Bagdad yesterday morning for his camp to assist in dealing with any rebels who might attempt to enter Iraq territory.

E 116 1 91

No. 15

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 6)*

(Telegraphic)

Bushire, January 7, 1930

FOLLOWING telegram has been addressed by the Political Agent, Kuwait, to the Chief Staff Officer, and repeated to me and Bagdad —

"Proceeded to Jahrah after you left to see if any rebels there. Found Dawish and Ibn Lami with their families camped in Palm Grove, also many other rebels. I was surprised to find that Dawish had dropped his arms. I told him eleventh hour had come and asked him to accompany me to your camp and make surrender to you. I emphasised that his surrender must be

without any conditions at all, and that you would send him to Basra as a prisoner and his tribe to Jarishan. I even offered to accompany him in aeroplane if he is nervous. After some hesitation, in spite of his sons persuading him, he stated in clearest terms that he simply dared not give himself up with prospect of being handed over to Ibn Saud. I urged him to face things as a brave man, but nothing would shake his determination. Warned him not to attempt to come to Kuwait or try to make Dakhala on sheikhs or myself, as this impossible by His Majesty's Government's orders. Dawish said that he had no intention of doing this but merely wanted supplies, of which he is in direct need, afterwards was marching south to try conclusions with Ibn Saud. He said he would be in the direction of Manaqish. This last may be bluff or may not."

To "make Dakhala" is Arab expression seeking asylum. Under Arab custom person with whom asylum is sought must protect refugee even to extent of fighting for him.

(Repeated to Jeddah and Government of India)

E 116 1 91

No 16

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 6)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 7, 1930

FOLLOWING telegram has been received from Glubb —

"Letter arrived from Ibn Saud asking despatch following telegram to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, copy to Kuwait —

"Encamped to-day Khirja, our secretary interviewed Glubb at Ubad. Glubb informed him rebels escaped and arrived west of Jahra. Situation very critical. We repeat our demand to evict rebels from boundary or permission from the British Government for us to attack them where they are."

E 129 1 91

No 17

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 7, 1930

FOLLOWING telegram has been received, dated 6th January, from Glubb —

"Sheikh Yasar (Ibn Saud's secretary) requests despatch of the following to you —

Your telegram received, and desire to emphasise His Majesty only moved out with the object of punishing Mutair and Ajman and their guilty followers for past crimes in Iraq and Kuwait, and he has now reached the frontier of Nejd joining with Iraq and Kuwait. He found none of the rebels in our frontier and ordered me to repeat the following demand to your Excellency. Firstly, British Government to evict the remaining rebels by force from Kuwait and inform us of their eviction through British Government post. Secondly, if the British Government does not evict the rebels, we will deal with the affair in the shortest possible time. Thirdly, if the British Government does neither of the above, requests reply that we must abstain from dealing with the rebels because they are in Kuwait. In that case, His Majesty, with deep regret will rest with those who gave the rebels asylum."

If reply of His Majesty's Government to this message is telegraphed to me, I will forward it to Glubb for communication to Ibn Saud. I have no further developments to report.

E 131 1 91]

No. 18

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic)

Bushire, January 7, 1930

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad —

'Secretary of State for the Colonies' telegram of 6th January (see No. 12)

"I am consulting Dickson regarding possibility of solution suggested in paragraph 1

I have instructed Dickson to transmit message contained in paragraph 2 and also, unless he sees any objection, to add message contained in paragraph 4

Dickson may have difficulty in forwarding message at once. Could you please transmit message contained in paragraph 2 to Ibn Saud through Glubb in reply to message contained in your telegram of 7th January" (see No. 15)

(Repeated to Jedda)

E 133 1 91

No. 19

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, January 7, 1930

YOUR telegram of 7th January (see No. 13).

His Majesty's Government agree that personal meeting between King Feisal and Ibn Saud at this juncture might have excellent effect. But they doubt whether this is the best moment for proposals for a conference to work out a general settlement such as Iraq Government propose, which would clearly be a lengthy business. Moreover (see paragraph 2 below), question of refugees presents serious difficulties. In these circumstances, they would much prefer that meeting should not be on basis of formal agenda or with reference to any list of subjects, but with object of establishing personal contact and co-operation against rebels. His Majesty's Government consider it essential that you should be present at meeting in person, and it should be made clear in your invitation to Ibn Saud that you will be there. Outcome of meeting. If you and Iraq Government agree to meet at Bagdad, you should discuss the following points:

2. Question of refugees. His Majesty's Government are apprehensive of the fate of those who may surrender themselves (see No. 14 paragraph (f)). They regard it as essential, if at all possible, that rebels should be handed over with minimum of delay to Ibn Saud, if necessary under guarantees from him that adequate punishment will be meted out by him in respect of crimes against Iraq. (His Majesty's Government would not, however, raise objection to retention by Iraq Government or Kuwait of Iraqi or Kuwaiti loot found with refugees.) We should be glad to learn what conditions, if any, you contemplate Iraq Government would be likely to wish to attach to their concurrence (see No. 14 paragraph (e)), and whether, if Iraq is asked to take over for custody rebels who may surrender in Kuwait (whether to Iraq elements operating there or not) (see No. 11), they would regard this as entitling them to any voice in ultimate disposal of such refugees. Are we right in thinking that, save for Ibn Mashhur and his party, no rebels have so far surrendered in Iraq? As regards acceptance of any conditions which Iraq Government endeavour to impose in connexion with surrender to Ibn Saud of refugees.

(Repeated Bushire, Kuwait, Jedda and Government of India.)

E 132 1 91]

No. 20

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 7, 1930

ROYAL Air Force armoured cars are now at Jahra, temporarily weather bound. Mutair rebels, with women and children, are moving south, as a result of aerial reconnaissances, accompanied by occasional warning bombs. Ibn Saud is moving east along Nejd-Koweit border with his whole force. Entirely new situation has thus been created and if bombing is continued effect will be either that rebels will break back or that they will be driven into jaws of Ibn Saud when His Majesty's Government will have to face stigma of responsibility for massacre of women and children which may result. Bombing has accordingly been temporarily suspended, and will not be resumed pending further instructions. I adhere to view expressed in my telegram of 31st December (see No. 2), that best hope of satisfactory outcome is to accept surrender of rebels on the lines suggested. In discussing case of Ibn Mashhur to-day, King Feisal told me that he could not agree to hand over any rebel refugee to Ibn Saud against his will, as this would be tantamount to handing over to him even if surrender had been unconditional. He added if Sheikh of Koweit agreed to such a proceeding his daughter would remain for ever unmarried.

(Repeated to Bushire and Koweit)

E 150 1 91]

No. 21

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 8, 1930

IRAQ Government are anxious to know that rebels who surrender or are captured by Royal Air Force or British troops should be regarded as prisoners of Iraq Government or that they should be imprisoned in Iraq territory.

(Repeated to Bushire and Koweit.)

E 155 1 91]

No. 22

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 9.)

(Telegraphic)

Bushire, January 8, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 6th January (see No. 12)

Local Agent of Koweit, who is at Jahra, reports that countryside is covered with distressed persons, out of control and in terror of attack both from our aeroplanes and from Ibn Saud. Situation is therefore not now possible. He hopes that Ibn Hithlain will surrender unconditionally this morning. Mutair, with exception of parties referred to in my preceding telegram of today, are moving south to frontier. Messages contained in paragraphs 2 and 4 of your telegram of 6th January (see No. 12) were sent by Dickson to Ibn Saud yesterday. He hopes to fly to Ruqai to see situation and if Ibn Saud is himself definitely in vicinity. I do not think there would be any danger, and consider that personal meeting very desirable.

I have just received Bagdad telegram of 7th January (see No. 14 and 19). I suggest that Dickson and representative of Air Officer Commanding should proceed as soon as safe conduct is received to visit Ibn Saud and inform him somewhat on the following lines. As Ibn Saud knows, in accordance with Arab customs refugees cannot be surrendered without negotiations (vide concluding

* Not printed

portion of Bagdad telegram of 7th January), and that in order to carry out these negotiations and also to effect general settlement of outstanding questions, it is proposed that conference should be held at which representatives of Iraq and Koweit attend. This would probably relieve immediate situation and allow time for deliberation regarding conference.

(Repeated to Jeddah, Bagdad, Government of India and Jerusalem.)

E 156/1 91)

No. 23

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies —
(Communicated to Foreign Office January 9.)*

(Telegraphic)

Bushire January 9, 1930

FOLLOWING reply received from Ibn Saud —

"In reply to your message of 7th His Majesty accepts the proposal of His Majesty's Government that he should be accompanied by a detachment of the Royal Air Force. He will camp to-day north west of Musannat, to-morrow Jau al-Hwar, day after that Bahiya Jofan. Please inform us time of arrival of deputation also if by car or air. His Majesty has ordered Hafidh Wahba to come with deputation. Please afford assistance, request reply urgently."

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jeddah and Government of India.)

E 157/1 91)

No. 24

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 9.)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 9, 1930

REPORT just received from Burnett, commanding Royal Air Force in Koweit, that Naif bin Hithlain, Ajman Sheikh, surrendered unconditionally with his tribe to-day. Hithlain, with three servants, has been conveyed in Victoria as Royal Air Force. Government objection to internment in Iraq territory, and Air Officer Commanding is now trying to arrange for Hithlain's detention in ship or steamship. Patricia Stewart, living in Shatt al-Arab, pending His Majesty's Government's instructions as to disposal. Burnett has ordered Ajman tribesmen, with women and children, to proceed in the direction of Jarishan, but has been unable to disarm them. In view of Iraq Government's unwillingness to allow them to cross into Iraq, I trust that every effort will be made by Koweit authorities to prevent this. Iraq Government are being asked to co-operate on their side of the frontier. Dawish, accompanied by his fighting men, is apparently continuing his march southward towards Nejd frontier. Burnett has carried out dangerous operation in the face of enormous difficulties, and I trust that his action, which was obviously dictated by the exigencies of the critical situation, will receive the approval of His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

E 157/1 91)

No. 25

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 9.)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad January 9, 1930

YOUR telegram of 7th January (see No. 19) Invitation is being despatched to Ibn Saud on lines directed. His Majesty's Government may perhaps consider that meeting between Dickson and Ibn Saud could more profitably be merged into larger meeting a week or so hence if Ibn Saud accepts invitation. A further consideration is that meeting at this moment might be inopportune if report is true that forces of Feisal and Ibn Saud are converging. If early meeting with Dickson still considered

desirable I trust that Iraq Government will not be committed by instructions referred to in paragraph 5 of your telegram of 6th January (see No. 12).

2. Question of refugees. Prime Minister informed me to-day that Iraq Government would be unwilling to agree to handing over to Ibn Saud of rebels who had surrendered unconditionally in Iraq except on terms which rebels had themselves accepted. Mashhur and his party are the only rebels concerned at present.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

E 158/1 91)

No. 26

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 10.)*

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, January 9, 1930

YOUR telegram of 7th January (see No. 20).

His Majesty's Government have no desire that action should be taken which would have effect of forcing refugees directly into the arms of Ibn Saud's forces, and possibly resulting in massacre of women and children. In the circumstances explained in your telegram you were clearly right in suspending bombing operations.

1. My Government are anxious to see that action on the lines of that already taken, which has now led to the unconditional

inducing remaining rebel refugees either to surrender also or to leave Koweit territory. With regard to bombing, this must be left to your discretion, but it should be only as last resource, and, if found necessary, it should be conducted, as has already been the practice, with the object of intimidating refugees rather than causing casualties, and every effort should be made not only to avoid casualties to women and children, but also to restrict casualties among male refugees to the smallest number consistent with achieving the effect desired.

2. In view of attitude adopted by King Feisal on question of ultimate disposal of refugees and desirability that His Majesty's Government should retain a free hand to negotiate conditions governing their handing over to Ibn Saud, His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn at the earliest opportunity whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to retain in Koweit territory should be retained there at exclusive disposal of His Majesty's Government in the custody of the Royal Air Force and should not be handed over to the Iraq Government, or, unless absolutely necessary, accommodated in Iraq.

3. His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn at the earliest opportunity (see No. 2), you consider that His Majesty's Government could properly require that the Government of Iraq should be glad of the views of the Resident on this point.

4. Provided you see no objection, I consider that steps should be taken immediately to inform Ibn Saud of the surrender of the Ajman, and that every effort is now being concentrated upon securing the surrender of remaining refugees, or, alternatively, their expulsion from Koweit territory.

5. Since foregoing paragraphs were drafted, I have learnt through Air Ministry of surrender of Dawish and his party, leaving only Ibn Lami's party still at large.

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit, Jeddah and Government of India.)

E 159/1 91)

No. 27

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 10.)*

(Telegraphic)

Bushire, January 9, 1930

FOLLOWING from Koweit

Just returned from Jahra

"At 11 A.M. to-day Naif-al Hithlain surrendered unconditionally and with him his tribe. He is now being escorted to Jarishan at once. About 200 more terrified Mutair women, excluding children, are said to have found their way back to Jarishan. They have taken

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refuge in the village, unable to face the prospect of battle and massacre if Dawish forced across border. Dawish is not yet out of Kuwait, but advance party camped close to border. Dawish sent me message by Ibn Hithlain that, if only ray of hope given that he would not be handed over by His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud and to his death, he would surrender to me at once. The Sheikh of Kuwait is terribly upset at whole of business, and has asked me to offer to Ibn Saud all Kuwait camels for life of Dawish. The Sheikh says that we are forcing him at the point of the bayonet to dishonour himself in the eyes of all Arabs.

"[Addressed to Bushire. Repeated to Bagdad.]"

(Repeated to Jedda and India.)

E 159 1 911

No. 28

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 10)

(Telegraphic)

Bushire, January 9, 1930

REFERENCE to Bagdad telegram of 9th January [see No. 21]

Sheikh proposes to intern leaders on Falaicha Island or in Kuwait town, and their following east of Janyah Safwan road, allowing them to retain arms for self-defence. I have approved locations, but am consulting Dickson regarding arms. In any case, it will probably be some time before proposal can be given effect to Hithlain is being put temporarily on board "Patrick Stewart," which is now at Basra, but will be transferred to R M S "Lapin" on arrival. I recommend that he should then be brought to Kuwait.

(Repeated to Bagdad)

E 164 1 911

No. 29

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 10)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 9, 1930

AIR-COMMODORE BURNETT has arrived at Bagdad, and reports that Dawish surrendered to him unconditionally to-day. Dawish and one of his sheikhs, Ibn Edaim, with three retainers have been conveyed by aeroplane to Sheikhab, and will be removed to steamship "Patrick Stewart."

Ajman and Mutair tribesmen, who are included in unconditional surrender, are moving into Northern Kuwait. One special section of Mutair have crossed into Nejd.

(Repeated to Bushire and Jedda)

E 192 29/01

No. 30

Sir H. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received January 11, 1930.)

(No. 618.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 27, 1929.

I HAVE the pleasure to inform you that, in a press statement of the 15th December the information that Mirza Habibullah Khan Hoveida (formerly Ain ul Mulk) had been appointed Persian "diplomatic representative" to the Sultan of the Hejaz.

2. Mirza Habibullah Khan Hoveida was the representative whom Persia sent to the Hejaz on a special mission in the spring of this year—a compliment which King Ibn Saud reciprocated during the summer.

3. It is not yet known definitely whether Mirza Habibullah Khan Hoveida will accept the appointment, were he appointed Minister he would do so, but he fears that he may be compelled to obey the order, he would, in those circumstances, go unwillingly.

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4. Should he eventually go as Persian representative to King Ibn Saud, the British agent will find him a friendly colleague, as did in the past British consuls in Damascus. He is well known to this Legation, and has said that, in the event of his going to the Hejaz, he would always be most willing to help his British colleague in any way he could. He speaks Arabic fluently.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Iraq and His Majesty's consul, Jeddah.

I have, &c

R. H. CLIVE.

E 169 1, 911

No. 31

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 11)

(Telegraphic)

Bushire, January 10, 1930

I HAVE instructed Dickson to inform Ibn Saud that he hopes to visit him very shortly, but is awaiting final instructions from His Majesty's Government, and to ask whether he is remaining at Baniya Aifen (just north of Abu al Hiran), or whether he is moving elsewhere. I submit following for consideration of His Majesty's Government. The Sheikh of Kuwait is an independent ruler, and we can hardly compel him to agree to measures which would irretrievably dishonour him in Arab eyes without making it perfectly clear that whole responsibility is ours. I recommend that we should follow Arab custom as one Arab ruler with another on behalf of tribesmen who have surrendered in his territory. Dickson's rôle would then be that of personal friend of both parties, who would endeavour to compose differences that might arise. Any agreement arrived at would, of course, be subject to approval of His Majesty's Government, but Sheikh would have had full opportunity of effecting settlement himself, and it would do much to raise his prestige, which has been severely damaged lately by the somewhat high handed measures which we have been forced to adopt towards him, and if no settlement was effected, His Majesty's Government would be in a better position to consider desirable. It would, of course, be necessary to obtain concurrence of Ibn Saud to visit of Sheikh of Kuwait. If this suggestion is not approved, then only the following course is open. I recommend that Dawish, Lami and Hithlain, who are being transferred to the steamship "Patrick Stewart," should be landed at Basra, and should not be landed at Kuwait. (Repeated to Jedda, India and Bagdad)

E 197, 1 911

No. 32

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 11)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 10, 1930

YOUR telegram of 9th January [see No. 26]

2. I agree that it is essential that all refugees who have surrendered to the Royal Air Force in Kuwait territory should be retained as prisoners at the exclusive disposal of His Majesty's Government.

3. As regards Dawish, Lami and Hithlain, who have been removed to steamship, "Patrick Stewart," I strongly recommend that they should be interned in Nejd, Kuwait or Iraq in the future. This essential condition could not be secured in Kuwait or Iraq territory.

4. As regards Ajman and Mutair tribesmen who have surrendered in Kuwait, I consider that Ibn Saud should be informed that he is debarred from negotiating their return to Nejd until His Majesty's Government have agreed to the necessary preliminary conditions since they are regarded as prisoners of His Majesty's Government.

5. Conditions should include satisfactory arrangement for making good losses inflicted on Kuwait and Iraq and on undertaking to be given by Ibn Saud to His Majesty's Government.

6. This undertaking should provide for safeguard regarding their treatment which would be acceptable to the refugees and for suitable guarantees regarding future protection of Kuwait and Iraq from their depredations.

7. I recommend that Burnett and Dickson should be instructed to meet Ibn Saud as soon as possible to announce these orders. I consider Burnett's presence is essential in order to emphasise the fact that surrenders were made to the Royal Air Force, and that His Majesty's Government are determined to retain the question of disposal of the prisoners in their own hands.

8. I request that His Majesty's Government's orders on these points may be telegraphed to me as person responsible for the operations of the Royal Air Force in Kuwait.

(Repeated to Bushire, Jeddah, Government of India and Kuwait.)

E 198 1 91,

No. 33

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies -
(Communicated to Foreign Office January 11)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 10, 1930

YOUR telegram of 9th January paragraph 4, see No. 26
I despatched following message to Ibn Saud through Ghubb yesterday

"Please inform Ibn Saud immediately from me that Dawish and Naif-bin-Hithlain have surrendered to the Royal Air Force in Kuwait and have been interned on board one of His Majesty's ships pending receipt of instructions from His Majesty's Government.

Main portion of Ajman and Mutair have also surrendered to the Royal Air Force and are being interned temporarily in Northern Kuwait. Small section of Mutair last seen moving south-west in the neighbourhood of Muzah.

(Repeated to Bushire, Kuwait and Jeddah.)

E 201/1 91)

No. 34

Mr Bond to Mr A Henderson.-(Received January 11)

(No. 7)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, January 11, 1930

FOLLOWING is gist of a note dated 10th January which I have received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in which he presses for a categorical answer to demands already made for delivery of rebels, and states that procrastination would have most serious results.

He learns that rebels have been permitted to cross the frontier of Kuwait. This is contrary to the undertaking given that they crossed the frontier they would be expelled by force.

Their movements within Kuwait and Iraq boundaries without action being taken against them in accordance with assurances given have produced serious doubts as to the trustworthiness of His Majesty's Government. He adds that the policy of *laissez-faire* would unfavourably affect the good relations between the two countries.

He requests to be informed with all frankness and at the earliest opportunity of the position which His Majesty's Government are taking up.

In a second note of the same date, despatched on receipt by him of the news of Dawish's surrender, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs states that rebels particularly Dawish-bin-Mashhur, Ibn Lam and Ibn Hithlain, should be handed over. Acceptance of their surrender is, he says, contrary to the undertakings of His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Kuwait, No. 8.)

E 202 1 91.

No. 35.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq -
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 9, 1930

YOUR telegram of 9th January and Bushire telegram of 8th January (see Nos. 22 and 25).

His Majesty's Government consider it important that main question of disposal of prisoners should be decided as soon as possible. Meeting between King Faisal takes place and therefore that meeting between Dickson and Ibn Saud should first be held. Except as regards Ibn Mashur, the Iraq Government are not directly concerned with question of refugees and presence of representatives of Iraq at meeting would have no obvious justification and might conceivably prejudice the success of the negotiations. His Majesty's Government anticipate that once this question is disposed of a more favourable atmosphere will prevail and thus that proposed conference between King Faisal and Ibn Saud will have great prospect of success.

When His Majesty's Government have received your views and those of Resident in regard to conditions to be required of Ibn Saud in return for handing over refugees (see paragraph 3 of No. 26), they will be in a position to furnish Dickson with instructions on this subject and proposed meeting between him and Ibn Saud can then take place without further delay.

(Repeated to Bushire, Kuwait, Jeddah and Government of India.)

E 231/1/91)

No. 36

Mr Bond to Mr A Henderson.-(Received January 13.)

(No. 8)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, January 12, 1930

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in his letter to me is very accusing His Majesty's Government of breach of faith. He has spoken strongly to this effect to a party of journalists, representing leading Egyptian papers, who have been attending anniversary celebrations here as guests of the Hejaz Government.

I am inclined to think that Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs' action has not met with Emir's entire approval, and although I can sympathise with the former's feelings, I think, in view of tenor of his notes, that a somewhat curt reply might have salutary effect.

I would therefore propose, subject to your approval, to limit myself to stating: "The matter in question is being dealt with direct between His Majesty's political agent at Kuwait and the King, and after consultation with the latter, arrangements are being made for a meeting with the King in order to discuss with him personally the various points at issue. In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government prefer to await outcome of this meeting before replying to his notes."

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Kuwait, No. 11)

E 236/1/91)

No. 37

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq and the Resident in the Persian Gulf -(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14)

(Private and Personal.)

Colonial Office, January 14, 1930

IT seems clear that in the event of rebel leaders being handed over to Ibn Saud, His Majesty's Government, and in a lesser degree the Sheikh of Kuwait, will incur considerable odium as having committed an act which is contrary to Arab tradition. If leaders are handed over to him, Ibn Saud may either cause them to be put to death or, as is more probable, he will apparently incur blame for having committed an act of inhumanity and breach of Arab custom, in the latter event, Dawish and other rebel leaders would doubtless

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If this view is correct, it would seem undesirable to send mission headed by military officer "to announce orders." If we can settle disposal of refugees in the near future, the matter might be left for discussion at subsequent meeting between Feisal, Ibn Saud and Sheikh of Kuwait. Another solution of the difficulty would be for me to head mission myself, taking Dickson as my assistant. In this case there would be no objection to Burnett being the Royal Air Force representative, if Bagdad still stated there would be no objection.

E 297 1/911 No. 43

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, January 12, 1890*
 FOLLOWING from political agent, Koweit —

"My man has just returned from Ibn Saud. Latter is camping at Rajam Aisan, south-east of Jebel Hirmis, a little north of Gara. Return journey took four hours. With Ibn Saud are twelve lorries, about thirty touring cars, and camel force of about 5,000 men, camping in approximately 400 tents, camels all starving. Ibn Saud will camp five days present position, afterwards must move. He is very angry at rebel leaders being sent to Basra, asked my man why I had not adopted simple course of bringing them to him personally, with their women, and ask for their pardon. He would readily have forgiven them, and was still prepared to do so if approached in right way. Asked why I had not visited him, said that he expected me at Safah, wanting me to come as soon as possible for friendly talk. In letter which he also sent he thanks me for having got rid of Awazim. My man reports rebel force under Ibn Ashwan was destroyed, also party which escaped via Manaquish yesterday. Ibn Saud saved ten lives. Repeated to Aviation and Chief Staff Officer."

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jedda and India)

E 238 1/911 No 44

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14)

(Private and Personal)

(Telegraph)

[illegible]

would be through Ibn Saud. This would probably be difficult, since he is certain to oppose deportation.

(Repeated to Bagdad)

21

E 258/1/917

No. 45

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic)

Jednak, January 14, 1930

MY telegram No. 8.

I have now received a long note from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 13th January enumerating undertakings of His Majesty's Government and once

Note is in the main a recapitulation of representations previously made, but is couched in conciliatory language

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Koweit, No 13)

E 260/1,911

No. 48

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 15)*

(Telegraphic.) P

Hooded, January 12, 1930

REFERENCE is to my immediately following telegram.

You will see that only difference between Ibn Saud's attitude and that of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in Jedda telegram No. 7 to Foreign Office No. 34], is that Minister for Foreign Affairs is even more uncompromising. We have no doubt that the same attitude will be maintained by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the future. The same attitude was also maintained through me to Ibn Saud, and repeated to Jedda for identical communication, *mutatis mutandis*, to Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"I have repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Government your Majesty's message, communicated to me through political agent at Kuwait, and I am instructed to reply as follows: 'His Britannic Majesty's Government have never promised to surrender the persons of rebel leaders to your Majesty. Such proceeding would, as your Majesty is aware, be entirely contrary to all local custom and international usage. As has been already explained to your Majesty, the only thing that prevented His Majesty's Government from expelling rebel tribes was that they were accompanied by their women and children, against whom it was impossible to take military action. Your Majesty was warned of this contingency as long ago as the middle of October.'"

(Fide Foreign Office telegram No. 107 of 14th October to Jodida.)

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit and Jedda.)

E 260 1/91)

343. 47

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies -
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 15)*

IN reply to message reported in my telegram of 10th January [see No. 33] I have received following from Ibn Saud,—

" In reply to your Excellency's telegram regarding confinement of Dawish, Hithlain, and most of the Mutair and Ajman. Despite our seeing the slowness of His Majesty's Government in fulfilling its promise, we, with our troops, are still expecting fulfilment of the same, given repeatedly in its letter, and request now handing over of Dawish, Hithlain and Mashur, and driving out of all Mutair and Ajman. We have no doubt that the British Government will appreciate the difficulties which we and the people of Nejd have endured, trusting in its promise, also, that it will appreciate the position of our troops on the boundary with their hands tied, while enemy is in security. They therefore request for early fulfilment of promise. Please accept our respects

E 265 1 91]

No. 48

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 16)

(Telegraphic)

Jerusalem, January 14, 1930

YOUR telegram to Palestine of 3rd January [No. 7]. Disposal of Ibn Mashur.
I do not desire any action taken in respect of raid against Zehn in February 1928 against Mashur. He was, I understand, punished by Ibn Saud, but not for restoration of property stolen from him.
(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire, Jedda and Koweit)

E 273 1 91

No. 49

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 16.)

(Telegraphic)

Bushire, January 15, 1930

FOLLOWING from Koweit of 15th January —

"One of Ibn Saud's cars arrived last evening. Hafidh Wahba this morning delivered very friendly verbal message to me from Ibn Saud asking me to visit him at his camp in the desert. He said, had flown over his camp and over his camels on successive days. He thought airmen probably acted without authority, but in any case he would like warning given them, as it excited his people, and was irregular. Hafidh Wahba further informed me that Ibn Saud had received communication regarding visit of King of Iraq, and obviously welcomed idea, as he had ordered marquees, tables and chairs to be got ready in Koweit and transported by dhows to Ras-al Zor as soon as arrangements visit definitely fixed. From this it looks as if he would soon move Wufra, as suggested him by me."

(Repeated to High Commissioner for Iraq and Jedda)

E 275 1 91]

No. 50

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Resident in the Persian Gulf —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 17)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, January 15, 1930

His Majesty's Government have carefully considered question of disposal of rebel refugees in the light of your views and those of the High Commissioner, and have reached the following conclusions:

1. In view of the importance of the issues involved and of the delicate situation which has arisen, they consider it in the highest degree desirable that you yourself should assume personal charge of mission to Ibn Saud, and should take with you both Dickson and, subject to the High Commissioner's consent, Burnett, to whose presence as a military adviser His Majesty's Government attach great importance. They trust that you will immediately put in train the necessary arrangements for your mission.

2. Jedda telegrams of 11th and 12th January and Bagdad telegrams of 13th January [see Nos. 34, 36, 46 and 47] have been carefully considered. Having regard to the fact that the assistance and co-operation of the military forces of His Majesty's Government have been the determining factor in the suppression of the revolt against Ibn Saud, they cannot but take exception to the tone of the recent communications from him and his Government. In the circumstances, they consider that a dignified and stiff remonstrance is called for. They consider, however, that it is preferable that this should be conveyed by word of mouth rather than by a written communication. On your arrival at Ibn Saud's camp you should therefore explain

to him that His Majesty's Government never agreed to hand over rebels who might surrender, and, as has already been explained to him, the only thing that prevented His Majesty's Government from doing so was that they were accompanied by their women and children, against whom effective military action could not be taken. You should remind Ibn Saud that he was warned of this contingency as long ago as the middle of October. You should leave him in no doubt as to the exception taken by His Majesty's Government to his recent communications. (You should know for your guidance that His Majesty's Government do not regard themselves as committed, and cannot agree to unconditional surrender or to surrender on conditions repugnant to Arab custom or British traditions.)

3. His Majesty's Government have considered the High Commissioner's proposal that the rebels should be deported to the Sudan, and will be the alternative least open to political objection. They assume that you will, in the event of surrender to Ibn Saud or deportation, would willingly choose the latter. You will be able to justify on this ground any action taken by His Majesty's Government.

4. The High Commissioner has also suggested that the rebels should be sent to the Sudan, and that the High Commissioner should be authorised to negotiate with Ibn Saud on this subject. His Majesty's Government have considered this proposal, and have decided that the High Commissioner should be authorised to negotiate with Ibn Saud on this subject, and that the High Commissioner should be authorised to negotiate with Ibn Saud on this subject.

5. If, on the other hand, you do not feel that deportation is really essential, you should endeavour to obtain from Ibn Saud written and binding guarantees that, if leaders are handed over—
(a) Their lives and those of their relatives will be spared.
(b) No action will be taken which would excite the Arab sentiment or run counter to British traditions.
(c) Effective measures will be taken to eliminate the possibility of Iraq or Koweit suffering further at their hands.

6. His Majesty's Government have also considered the possibility of the rebels being sent to the Sudan, and have decided that the High Commissioner should be authorised to negotiate with Ibn Saud on this subject.

7. His Majesty's Government have also considered the possibility of the rebels being sent to the Sudan, and have decided that the High Commissioner should be authorised to negotiate with Ibn Saud on this subject.

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7 As regards the question of recovery of loot, His Majesty's Government do not feel that they are in a very strong position. Iraq and Kuwait, it is understood, intend to present large counter-claims. Moreover, special machinery for adjustment of such claims is provided for in Bahra Agreement. His Majesty's Government doubt, therefore, whether they could take matters into their own hands and seize property of refugees to satisfy local claims, or, alternatively, could make restoration of loot a condition of surrender of refugees. On the other hand, they realise that, once refugees have been surrendered, Iraq and Kuwait will not be in a very strong position to demand restoration of loot. In all the circumstances, His Majesty's Government can only leave it to you to do what in your judgment is practicable. It is, however, essential that there should be satisfactory guarantees from Ibn Saud on this point. You will appreciate that the question will inevitably be raised in later discussion with Iraq and Kuwait, and it is, therefore, very desirable that the necessary arrangements should be made at this stage.

8. The position of Ibn Mashur (whose surrender has now been demanded by Ibn Saud) is not quite on all fours with that of other rebel leaders (see Nos. 2 and 7). Ibn Mashur is at present in the custody of the Iraq Government, and that question of his ultimate disposal can better be handled at subsequent meeting with King Feisal.

9. Finally, His Majesty's Government would be glad to be assured that three persons, to be named, are to be regarded as the maximum number of persons who must accompany them. They would be glad of confirmation. They are anxious to reduce party to absolute minimum consistent with objects in view, and trust that it may be possible to reduce total below thirty three. In particular, they feel under no obligation to deport and maintain full complement of female relatives or children of leaders unless surrender of these persons to Ibn Saud would lay His Majesty's Government open to charge of inhumanity. Subject to your views, His Majesty's Government are disposed to accept that governing consideration should be whether persons to be deported would be exposed to risk of death or barbarous treatment if handed back to Ibn Saud.
(Repeated to Bagdad, Kuwait, Jedda and Government of India.)

E 234/1/911

No. 51

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 17)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 16, 1930

MY telegram of 9th January [see No. 25]. I have received cordial reply from Ibn Saud accepting invitation to meeting with Feisal and myself and asking me to suggest convenient date.

(Repeated to Bushire, Kuwait, Jedda and India)

E 235/1/911

No. 52

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 17)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 16, 1930

MY immediately preceding telegram (No. 51). I have been discussing the dates with the King and Prime Minister and was on the point of despatching invitation to Ibn Saud to meet Feisal and myself on the 25th January at Rukhaimiya in Iraq Nejd neutral zone when I received your telegram of 15th January (No. 50). January 25th was selected as giving time to both parties to make the necessary preparations and also to arrange the meeting. It is now fixed for 25th January. As you will see from my telegram of 8th January (No. 8), I contemplated that the preliminary visit of Mr. Bond and Mr. Burnett to Ibn Saud would

have been intended to discuss the question of the status of the Hejaz Nejd Legation. As to this question, I have modified my reply to Ibn Saud as in my immediately following telegram addressed to Bushire.

E 235 1 91

No. 53

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 17)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 16, 1930

FOLLOWING addressed to Bushire

"Reference to the Secretary of State for the Colonies telegram of 15th January and my repeat to you [see Nos. 50 and 52]. I agree that Burnett should accompany you and have authorised Air Officer Commanding to make arrangements with you direct. I see from a telegram from Tehran that you propose to fly to Kuwait, and I feel sure that you will appreciate the desirability from our point of view of your negotiations with Ibn Saud being concluded as soon as possible.

"I shall be glad if you see no objection if Dickson can be authorised to thank Ibn Saud from King Feisal and myself for his courteous message and to say that it is hoped that Rukhaimiya in Iraq Nejd neutral zone will be acceptable as the meeting-place, and to request His Majesty to let me know the earliest possible date after the 25th January on which meeting at Rukhaimiya can take place."

E 334 334 911

No. 54

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 20, 1930)

(No. 329.)

Jedda, December 31, 1929

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 100 of to day's date reporting that I have this day notified the Hejaz Government of the raising of the status of the British agency in this town to that of a Legation.

2 I have not delayed in doing so, as the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs recently raised the subject again and was obviously anxious that the change should take place as soon as possible. I am, furthermore, due to preside at a luncheon on the 24th instant, at which all the chief officials of the Government and the leading notables of Jedda and Mecca, about eighty persons in all, are to be present. The moment seems to me, therefore, to be particularly opportune for notifying the Hejaz Government of the fact, and I do not anticipate in the near future any occasion for doing so again.

3 I have the honour to enclose a copy of my note to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4 I have also the honour to inform you that the Legation is now open for business at Bagdad, Cairo, Bushire, Kuwait, Bahrain, Delhi, Khartum, Port Sudan, Lagos, Aden, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Beirut, Basra, also to the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c
W. L. BOND

Enclosure in No. 54

Mr. Bond to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca

After compliments.)

Your Excellency,

Jedda, December 21, 1929

I HAVE the pleasure to inform you that the Legation is now open for business. I have expressed in your Excellency's note of the 18th June last, His Majesty the King's desire for the Legation to be raised to the status of a Legation at Jedda, and to the proposed movement of a Hejaz Nejd Legation in London.

2. Steps are being taken to select a suitable senior officer for appointment as British Minister to Jedda, and Sheikh Hafiz Wabba's name will in due course be submitted to His Majesty, as requested in your Excellency's note, as Hejaz-Nejd Minister at London.

3. I myself have been appointed Chargé d'Affaires pending the arrival of a British Minister and new credentials as such are to be sent to me as soon as possible (Respects.)

W L BOND

E 342 334 91]

No 5

Mr Bond to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received January 20, 1930.)

(No. 337)

Sir,

Jedda, December 30, 1929

WITH reference to my despatch No. 329 of the 21st instant, enclosing a copy of a note which I addressed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs notifying him of the raised status of the British agency in Jedda, I have the honour to enclose a copy of Sheikh Fuad Hamza's reply, dated the 25th instant, in which he expresses considerable pleasure at the action taken by His Majesty's Government, and makes the usual polite remarks about myself.

I have &c
W L BOND

Enclosure in No. 55.

Fuad Hamza to Mr Bond

Sir,

24.7.1948 (December 25, 1929)

I AM not exaggerating when I say that I am very greatly delighted to hear the news you communicated to me in your letter of the 21st December, 1929 (20.7.1948), to the effect that His Majesty King George V has approved the proposal to raise the status of the British agency to that of a Legation. My delight is due to two reasons: firstly, to the fact that the status of the British agency has been raised to that of a Legation, and secondly, to the confidence placed in you by your Government in selecting you to act as Chargé d'Affaires for the British Legation. My congratulations to you are, therefore, naturally doubled.

I would not like to allow this opportunity to pass without referring to the noble assistance which I have received from the British Legation in the past. I wish to assure you that you will meet from all officials of the Hejaz Government every co-operation and encouragement so that you will persevere in the protection of friendly relations, the maintenance of which, I consider is one of our most sacred duties.

I hope that the day on which you will be able to ask me to arrange a time for presenting your credentials in your new capacity is near.

With highest respects,
FUAD HAMZA

E 329 1.91

No. 55

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 20.)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 18, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 15th January [No. 50]. It is not clear to me whether His Majesty's Government prefer to regard rebel tribes as prisoners or as refugees. Air Officer Commanding points out that if His Majesty's Government are to be responsible for their ultimate disposal on lines negotiated between Resident and Ibn Saud, he must be allowed to reinforce Royal Air Force in Kuwait, who are not strong enough to ensure that rebels will neither dribble into Iraq (possibly

encouraged by Feisal) nor become inextricably mixed with Kuwait tribes, nor even return to Nejd in consequence of direct overtures from Ibn Saud. He has asked me to agree to half-company Assyrian levies being sent in motor cars to Kuwait to assist Royal Air Force. It appears to me that employment of Iraq levies outside boundaries of Iraq is difficult to justify except in Iraq interests, and it appears from your telegram that the Iraqi Government to hope for more than they are likely to obtain. I have therefore told Air Officer Commanding that I cannot concur without specific authority from His Majesty's Government.
(Repeated to Kuwait)

E 391 1 91

No 57

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 22.)*

(Telegraphic)

Kuwait January 21, 1930

YOUR telegram of 15th January [see No. 50]

I have discussed return of rebels with Ibn Saud. He agrees to following conditions—

- (i) Neither amongst the leaders nor the tribesmen shall any person be put to death.
- (ii) The punishment to be awarded shall not be contrary to Arab sentiment.

He has given me private assurance that he proposes to insist on Hawiah and the other leaders submitting publicly to him, and that he will keep them under surveillance either in Riyadh or in camp with him in the same manner as Ibn Raschid, Rajad Sheikh of Ataba and the others who have fought against him have been treated.

As regards the tribes, he proposes to take from them all camels, sheep, &c, which they have stolen, and will probably order them to reside in specified areas for some time to come.

(iii) He undertakes to take effective steps to prevent raids into Kuwait or Iraq in the future and should raids by Mutair or Ajman occur he accepts full responsibility for them and undertakes to pay compensation for all property stolen and blood money for anyone killed.

(iv) As regards Kuwait, he agrees, should sheikh desire it, to commission, on analogy of that provided in Bahra Agreement, to examine claims between Kuwait and Nejd, and to refer to a commission under Bahra Agreement for settlement of claims between Nejd and Iraq and accepts responsibility for all claims found by commission due from him.

Ibn Saud's attitude is very conciliatory now. He has expressed regret for the tone of the recent notes sent by his Minister for Foreign Affairs. He is, with suppression of this revolt and that of Ataba, stronger now than he has been for some time past and therefore will probably be able to enforce his orders for some time to come. He is ready to confirm the above arrangements by exchange of letters. Chief Staff Officer is of the opinion that [while] permanent peace on the Iraq-Nejd frontier cannot be guaranteed without the deportation of the leaders and the return of lost before the surrender of the tribesmen and I share this view. We realise, however the force of considerations mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 7 of your telegram under reply and the desirability of early settlement. May I therefore be authorised to arrange surrender of rebels on above conditions?

I request reply by to-morrow if possible, as Ibn Saud wishes to shift camp.
(Repeated to Bagdad, India and Jedda)

'E 412 412/91]

No 56.

Sir R Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 23)

(No 20)

Sir,

Tehran, January 12, 1930

IN continuation of my despatch No. 487 of the 20th September, 1929, regarding the signature of the Perso-Hejaz treaty, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy in translation of the articles of the treaty in question.

2. The treaty was ratified by the Majlis on the 8th January.

Copies of this treaty have been sent to the High Commissioner for India and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R H CLIVE.

Enclosure in No 58

Treaty of Amity between Persia and Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies

(Translation)

HIS Majesty the Shah of Persia, on one hand, and His Majesty the King of Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, on the other, in order to establish friendly relations between the two countries and to consolidate the foundation of the same, and realising that the establishment of the said relations will be the cause of peace and tranquillity in the region, have decided to conclude a treaty of amity, and for this purpose have named as their plenipotentiaries, viz. —

His Majesty the Shah of Persia. His Highness Mehdi Kuli Khan Hedayet Prime Minister.

His Majesty the King of Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies. Sheikh Abdul Basit Fazl and Sheikh Mohammed Abdul Rawaf.

Who, after the exchange of their credentials, which were found according to usage (good), have agreed as follows —

ARTICLE 1

Between the Imperial Persian Government and the Government of Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, and between the subjects of the two countries, everlasting peace and sincere friendship will be established and the two high contracting parties will use all their efforts to maintain and strengthen the said relations.

ARTICLE 2

In view of the fact that the two high contracting parties are desirous and have the right to despatch their Ministers plenipotentiary and consuls to each other's countries, they have agreed that, on condition of reciprocity, the representatives of each of the parties in the other party's country be given treatment in conformity with the rules and usages of the general international laws.

ARTICLE 3

Each of the high contracting parties will undertake to give the subjects of the other party in its territory all the rights and privileges which the subjects of the most-favoured-nations enjoy. The Government of Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies undertake to give Persian pilgrims in every respect the same treatment as they give to other pilgrims, and to allow no difficulty to be created in regard to the ritual ceremonies of the pilgrims to the Kaaba and the discharge of religious obligations by Persian pilgrims. Likewise, the Government of Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies undertake to provide means of safety, comfort and security for the said pilgrims.

ARTICLE 4

The two high contracting parties are desirous to take measures in due time for the conclusion of political, commercial, economic &c., agreements.

ARTICLE 5

This treaty has been signed in four copies, in Persian and Arabic. The Persian and Arabic texts are equally authoritative and valid.

Dated Tehran, Shahriwar 2, 1309, Rabiul Awal 18, 1348 (August 24, 1929)

(L.S.) MEHDI KULI
(L.S.) ABDULLA-AL-FAZL.
(L.S.) MOHAMMED ABDUL-RAWAF

E 407 1 91

No 59

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office January 23)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 22, 1930

REFERENCE Resident's telegram of 21st January (No. 57)

I have, in fact, capitulated to the demands put forward with such insistence by Ibn Saud. His conciliatory attitude is not surprising, as proposed settlement will give him all he wants at once, while His Majesty's Government and Iraq Government only get promise, which experience has hitherto shown to be illusory. View held here is that if rebel leaders are handed over to Ibn Saud without their consent Arab tradition will have been violated, while, if Ibn Saud makes terms with them without Iraq's participation, the interests of the Iraq Government will have been compromised. I have, however, repeated to the Resident that His Majesty's Government will make it clear that there can be no question of any individual being handed back against his will. Also that final disposal of the leaders (except by deportation in which case concurrence of neither party would be necessary) cannot be decided until Iraq Government have had opportunity to express their views, preferably at proposed meeting between King Faisal and Ibn Saud. Otherwise I shall find it extremely difficult to convince Iraq Government that His Majesty's Government have not taken an *ex parte* decision to their detriment.
(Repeated to Resident (at Kuwait) and India)

[E 417/1/91]

No 60

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 23)

(Telegraphic)

Kuwait, January 23, 1930

MY telegram of 21st January (see No. 57)

I interviewed Dawish, Hithlain and Latmi morning of 22nd January on board H.M.S. "Lupin." They are willing to return to Ibn Saud on terms proposed.
(Repeated to Bagdad, India and Jedda)

E 418/1/91]

No 61

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 23)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 23, 1930.

MY immediately preceding telegram to Resident in the Persian Gulf. His two telegrams, which appear not to have been repeated to London, convey message from Ibn Saud that he regrets he cannot move to Rukhamriyah owing to difficulties about supplies and inadequate transport. He suggests that King Faisal and I should meet him at Wafra or Kubrat Dawish in Kuwait Nejd neutral zone, and asks that we should bring our own tents from Bagdad.

E 454/1 913

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, Kuwait.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)

Colonial Office, January 23, 1930

His Majesty's Government assume that you are satisfied that settlement on lines recommended by you will not run counter to Arab sentiment. On this assumption and subject to qualifications which follow, they authorize you to arrange settlement as you propose.

In view of Ibn Saud's now declared intention to take from rebel tribes camels, sheep, &c., which they have stolen, you will no doubt consider possibility, despite paragraph 7 of my telegram of 15th January, of securing some undertaking as regards restitution of Kuwait and Iraqi loot independently, and in anticipation of arrangements referred to in your condition (4).

(Repeated to Baghdad, India and Jeddah)

E 454 1/91]

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)

[Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page]

Nor can I agree that Iraq Government have any *locus standi* as regards disposal of rebels and their leaders other than Ibn Mashhur, whose case is not now in question. Efforts of His Majesty's Government have been consistently directed to keeping control of this matter in their own hands. Leaders of tribes, with exception of Ibn Mashhur, have surrendered in Kuwait and to Royal Air Force, and in deference to Iraq Government's views we have acquiesced in Iraqi forces not being used to round up the rebels.

I cannot see how, in these circumstances, Iraqi interests are compromised especially in view of binding and extensive character of assurances now offered by Ibn Saud. In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government have felt no option but to send to Resident instructions contained in my immediately preceding telegram (Repeated to Political Resident Koweit, India and Jeddah).

E 455 1,911

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq -
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27)*

Colonial Office January 23, 1930

I am advised that, juridically, rebel tribes must be regarded as refugees and not as prisoners. I agree however, that it is important to prevent their dribbling into Iraq or Nejd or mixing with Koweiti tribes pending result of negotiations as to their disposal.

I agree that it is undesirable that levies should leave Iraq, if this can be avoided, and if Air Officer Commanding still considers there is danger of infiltration of refugees into Iraq, he will doubtless consider desirability of posting detachment of levies near frontier, as suggested by Biscoe

Repeated to Kuwait)

E 455 1 011

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27)*

13 122 11 117 22 143

Air Force with regard to rebels in Kuwait. Up to the present their duties have been as follows. Firstly, shepherding the rebels into a small area, secondly, moving them into north-west corner of Kuwait, thirdly, protecting them against attempts by Iraqi tribesmen to recover some of their stolen property. The rebels are now collected in the north-west corner of Kuwait, but problems of water and grazing are making it increasingly difficult to keep them there. The rebels are also

becoming less amenable to control. As regards the third duty, the Royal Air Force have already arrested some Iraqis, and restored to rebels flocks of sheep that Iraqis were driving off. Air Officer Commanding is uncertain whether rebels are still

Force has no further responsibilities and can return to Iraq
(Repeated to Bushire, Kuwait and Jedda)

E 457 1 91

No. 66

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies -
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 24, 1930

REFERENCE your telegram of 23rd January (see No. 62)

As regards *locus standi* of Iraq Government, I submit that they have materially contributed to suppression of revolt against Ibn Saud. This they have done at the instance of His Majesty's Government, doubting whether their own interests were best served thereby. In my telegram of 16th December, I suggested that, in the circumstances, His Majesty's Government should press Ibn Saud strongly for return of loot taken from Iraq tribes. Shortly before this Dawish had actually arrived at Iraq-Nejd frontier and had made direct overtures to Iraq Government, who could have bargained with him for future security from Mutair raids and for return of loot or alternatively, could have allowed Iraq tribes to recover it. Instead of doing this they refused to parlay and ordered him to go back (see Part XXV, No. 59), after which he entered Kuwait. It is true that Iraq Government did not see their way to send police cars to co-operate in Kuwait territory, but I should find it difficult to use this as an argument against their being consulted as to the disposal of the rebels in view of considerations which led them to refuse (vide my telegram of 7th January (see No. 21)).

I should be grateful for early instructions as to the moment when, and terms in which, decision of His Majesty's Government should be communicated to the Iraq Government.

(Repeated to Resident, India and Jedda)

E 480 1/91

No. 67

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies -
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27)*

Bushire, January 26, 1930

Of R telegram of 23rd January (see No. 62) Negotiations have come to a standstill.

Ibn Saud has agreed to setting up of a tribunal under Bahra Agreement any time at my request, month's notice. Then, as suggested in paragraph (a) of your telegram, I asked that some restitution should be made independently and in anticipation of Bahra Agreement, and proposed 1,000 camels should be delivered within a month of tribes' return. After prolonged discussion Ibn Saud has offered to collect tribes in specified area, when he can take from them stolen camels, and British authorities can send representative to be present whilst this is being done, and he will hand over to him one-third of total camels which are taken from rebel tribes and send them up to the frontier. He absolutely refuses, however, to specify any number on ground that he has no idea how many camels will be found. Without some minimum figure, however, I think arrangement will be of little value, except as posture, since there would probably be collusion between Nejd officials and tribesmen to conceal camels, &c. I am making further efforts to-day, Sunday, 26th January.

E 481/1/91

No. 68

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies -
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27)*

(Telegraphic)

Kuwait, January 26, 1930

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad -

"Your telegram of 23rd January (see No. 61)

"Ibn Saud accepts the invitation to meeting on board ship with pleasure, but states that he has to go to Hassa, and so cannot proceed to meeting for a period of twenty days, and will give seven days' notice. He adds that this is conditional on satisfactory settlement of present negotiations, otherwise he will go off into the interior. This refers to deadlock reported in my immediately preceding telegram."

(Repeated to India and Jedda)

E 480 1 91

No. 66

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies -
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27)*

(Telegraphic)

Kuwait, January 27, 1930

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad -

"Negotiations concluded. Ibn Saud agreed to pay £10,000 compensation to British subjects. 1st Mar. 1930. Ibn Saud has agreed to pay £10,000 compensation to British subjects as soon as possible. Meanwhile, I trust Iraq authorities will take steps to prevent their tribes raiding."

(Repeated to India and Jedda)

E 512/1/91

No. 70

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies -
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 28)*

(Telegraphic)

Kuwait, January 27, 1930

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad:-

"My telegram of 26th January (see No. 66)

"Ibn Saud now proposes 20th Ramadan should be definitely fixed for the meeting, and that preliminary conference of Ministers should take place, preferably at Kuwait, as soon as possible. Any matters not settled by then would be left over to King's meeting. He can only meet King Faisal for two days, as he has to get back for 1dd. He wishes 'Patrick Stewart' to embark him at Bahrein and return with him there after the meeting. He did not like the idea of Shatt-el Arab as the meeting place, but the commander of H.M.S. 'Lupin', whom I have consulted, can suggest no other place offering some shelter, and Ibn Saud is bad sailor. I think if it were made quite clear that the meeting-place would be outside territorial waters he would probably agree. He is remaining in present neighbourhood for six days and then leaving for Hassa, when it will be difficult to communicate with him, and so request early reply."

E 523 1 911

No. 71

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 29)

(Telegraphic)

Koweit, January 28, 1930

MY telegram of 26th January (see No. 69)
has been exchanged between Ibn Saud and myself yesterday, and I returned to Koweit. Rebel leaders are being flown to Ibn Saud's camp this morning, and will be handed over personally by Dickson. Chief Staff Officer is arranging return of a boat. Following is gist of Ibn Saud's letter to me: (1) Though rebel leaders and their followers deserve punishment for their offence, in deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government he undertakes to spare their lives. (2) While it is his intention to punish them, any punishment awarded will be "saturated with the spirit of kindness and mercy," but he reserves the right to recover from them any plunder that they may have taken. (3) He promises categorically to prevent any raids in the future by Mutair, Ajman, or any other Nejd tribes into Iraq or Koweit territories. Should any such raids occur, he agrees to effect a settlement without delay under machinery provided in the Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq, and to return immediately anything plundered from Koweit in accordance with the customs of the Bahra Agreement. (4) He agrees to settle all past claims by tribunal provided in Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq, and in accordance with current practice in the case of Koweit, provided that all Mutair and Ajman, and their followers and property, at present in the hands of the British military authorities are returned to Nejd territory. In view of the friendship existing between him and His Majesty's Government, he agrees to pay £10,000 through Jedda on 5th Shawal (3rd March) as compensation to the tribesmen in Koweit and Iraq in anticipation of final settlement of account. Finally, he agrees to appoint representative to the Bahra Agreement Tribunal at any time at one month's notice, but requests the month of Haj (pilgrimage) being excluded. Comments are contained in my immediately following telegram.
(Repeated to Bagdad, Jedda and India.)

E 526 1 911

No. 72

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 29)

(Telegraphic)

Koweit, January 28, 1930

MY immediately preceding telegram.
Reference your telegram of 28th January (see No. 62)
In view of his categorical promise to prevent raids, Ibn Saud strongly resents any dictation as to the means by which this was to be implemented. Also, I think any undertaking regarding place of confinement of the leaders, &c., would not have been of much practical value. So long as he intends to fulfil undertaking to prevent raids, he will certainly take the necessary measures to control the leaders and tribes. If he does not mean to keep that promise, then he is not likely to fulfil any promise he may make regarding the leaders. Secondly, these people have rebelled against Ibn Saud, and I think that, in his own interests, he will take drastic measures to obviate the possibility of their doing so again. Having regard to these considerations—necessity of early settlement, importance which Chief Staff Officer and I attached to the early payment of some compensation, and discretion accorded to him—I consider that his undertaking to prevent raids and settle claims applies to all Nejd tribes, and the Bahra Agreement is tightened up by spontaneous promise to appoint member(s) of tribunal within one month.
£10,000 is the approximate value of 1,000 camels, and cash payment obviates difficulty of taking charge of camels, driving them up, &c.
(Repeated to Bagdad, Jedda and India.)

E 523 1/911

No. 73

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 29)

(Telegraphic)

Koweit, January 28, 1930

YOUR telegram of 27th January [not printed]
Ibn Shiblao and representative of Ibn Saud, bearing letter of forgiveness, came to Koweit yesterday, and interviewed rebel leaders and received from them message to the tribes to return. Also, I think, overtures have been made to them for some days past by Ibn Saud (see No. 56). Chief Staff Officer left to see the tribes this morning, and I do not anticipate much difficulty once they know their leaders have returned.
(Repeated to Bagdad.)

E 534 1/911

No. 74

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 30)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, January 25, 1930

YOUR telegram of 24th January (see No. 65)
As Resident is negotiating with Ibn Saud terms upon which rebel tribes should be handed back, it is clearly necessary that they should be kept under control, and that every effort should be made to prevent their dispersal into Iraq or Nejd or mixing with Koweit tribes, in order that when Biscoe's negotiations are completed His Majesty's Government may be in a position to consider how they can carry out their share of bargain. Responsibility of Royal Air Force must therefore continue until that time.

As regards loot I will telegraph further as soon as possible.
(Repeated to Resident in the Persian Gulf and Jedda.)

E 534 1/911

No. 75

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 30)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, January 28, 1930

Now that Biscoe has concluded settlement in regard to refugees, question of loot can only be dealt with in accordance with that settlement.
(Repeated to Koweit and Jedda.)

E 535 111/911

No. 76

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, January 30)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, January 29, 1930

FOLLOWING addressed to Hushire —

Reference your telegram of 27th January (see No. 70). I shall be glad if you will communicate the following message to Ibn Saud —

"His Majesty King Faisal is very glad to hear that your Majesty accepts the invitation to meet him on board ship, and agrees with pleasure that the 20th Bahar is a convenient date for the meeting, and that it should last two days. As regards place of meeting, King Faisal suggests that the most convenient place would be outside territorial waters and within easy reach of Koweit harbour in case the sea is rough. I will telegraph later to your Majesty on the question of preliminary meeting between Ministers."

[E 572 1, 91]

No. 77

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 1)

(Telegraphic)

Bushire, January 31 1930

FOLLOWING from Kuwait, dated 30th January

"Very cordial open letter, dated 29th January, to your address received, begging His Majesty's Government be informed that rebel leaders were duly handed over to him on 28th January in accordance with term of agreement made between you and him. He is deeply grateful to His Majesty's Government for their fulfilling their pledge so faithfully, and is confident that future relations between His Majesty's Government and Nejd will be strengthened and established more firmly than ever, and in particular His Majesty's Government's act will assist him in carrying out his engagement and preserve peace on his boundary, lastly, he trusts that the handing over of the rebel tribes will very shortly be completed. Letter follows by post."

[E 612/612/91]

No. 78

Mr Bond to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received February 3)

No. 25)

Jedda, January 20, 1930.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the accession of King Ibn Saud was celebrated on the 8th at Jedda by a series of festivities which had been devised for the occasion. These were the first celebrations of the sort that have taken place, and it is stated that the King was at first opposed to them, although he eventually gave his consent.

2 In Jedda the streets were belaguered and a general holiday was proclaimed on the 8th January. The day began with receptions and a salute of 101 guns, the foreign representatives and consuls and their staffs in uniform being received by the Governor at 11 A.M. Simultaneously, the Emir Feisal was holding a reception of notables in Mecca.

3 In the afternoon the Emir Feisal arrived from Mecca for a review of the local troops outside the town at Kandara. These consisted of a company of infantry of the Jedda garrison in their semi-European uniform, who presented a rather sorry spectacle compared with a few wild horsemen and a picturesque contingent of about 200 men on gaily caparisoned camels who followed. The artillery was represented by the four saluting guns, which were drawn by mules commandeered from the market place for the purpose. The review was preceded by tea at the palace at Kandara, to which some 300 guests had been invited.

4 In the evening an official banquet was held at Kandara at which about 150 guests were present, including the foreign representatives and a number of representatives of the Hejaz Government to attend the celebrations. The banquet was the occasion for a number of complimentary speeches extolling the virtues of the King and the progress made under his reign. There had, I am told, been a sharp dispute between the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Hejaz as to who should deliver the Government's address. The matter had been referred to the Emir, who had decided as a compromise that Sheikh Fuad's speech should be read by a citizen of Jedda.

5 Sheikh Fuad's speech was in the main also a eulogy of the King and his works. He enumerated the objects which the King had set out to achieve since his accession and commented on the results obtained. I enclose a résumé of his speech.*

6 For the following day a lunch had been organised by the Municipality of Mecca at Wadi Fatma, about 15 miles from Mecca, where tents had been erected and a large number of guests were present. The arrangements for lunch were excellent, although the super-abundance of food was calculated to daunt all but the hardest trencherman, and the guests, in spite of

* Not printed.

appetites sharpened by a two hours' drive across country, managed to make very good use of the food. The guests were all well, and the day was spent in a very pleasant manner with one another in showering fulsome praise on the King and his representative, the Emir.

7 The celebrations were organised, I am told, on an unprecedented scale for Arabia, and were very successful. No expense was spared and the organisation was, on the whole, good.

8 The invitation extended to the Egyptian journalists was a clever move on Sheikh Fuad's part. They were treated with assiduous courtesy and were loud in their praises.

9 The celebrations marked the end of the rebellion in the Hejaz, and the return of the King to his capital. The King's return to Mecca was a great triumph, and the celebrations were a great success. The King's return to Mecca was a great triumph, and the celebrations were a great success. The King's return to Mecca was a great triumph, and the celebrations were a great success.

I have, &c
W. L. BOND

[E 632/1/91]

No. 79

Mr Bond to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received February 4)

(No. 24.)

Jedda, January 20, 1930

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that I yesterday received a message from the Governor, obviously inspired, in which he stated that the acceptance of the surrender of the rebel leaders has produced a very bad effect on Arab opinion generally, and requested the Government to take steps to counteract this effect. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Hejaz has been overruled, and the Government has decided to take steps to counteract this effect. I have been asked to understand privately and confidentially that there was a demonstration before the British Legation.

2 I told the Governor that the demonstration was now being dealt with direct between the King and the local British authorities, and that I had been told that the whole proceeding would be handled quite discreetly and of all concerned. The Governor was obviously worried, and was anxious for some information which would serve to allay fears and counteract anti-British propaganda. I thought it as well, therefore, to state to him that the position, as I myself saw it, was that His Majesty's Government had been asked to co-operate in suppressing the rebellion, that British forces had been sent to the frontiers of Iraq and Kuwait for this purpose, that the rebels had been caught between two fires, and that they had thus been forced to surrender. There was, I said, no other course but to accept a surrender, particularly as the rebels were accompanied by women and children, and it was a pity that the rebels had been caught between two fires, and that they had thus been forced to surrender. There was, I said, no other course but to accept a surrender, particularly as the rebels were accompanied by women and children, and it was a pity that the rebels had been caught between two fires, and that they had thus been forced to surrender.

3 I then went on to discuss the harm that would be done by any ill-considered action which might be taken here while the negotiations were in progress with the King, and the bad effect that such an event must inevitably have on our relations and on British public opinion.

4 I think that my words had some effect, as the Governor left in a more cheerful frame of mind, and he will, I am sure, take all possible steps to forestall

[22271]

anything in the nature of a demonstration. I am, however, myself also taking steps privately to counteract hostile propaganda.

5. I should add that the Governor is personally opposed to Sheikh Fuad Hamza and his party, and there is no one more so. His influence is greatly inferior to that of the Syrian party, which has been gaining strength while the King has been away.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Transjordan, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agent at Kuwait.

I have, &c
W L BOND

E 630/95/81]

No 80

Mr Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 4)

(No 22)

Sir

Jedda, January 17, 1930

I HAVE the honour to refer to your letter No. 13 of 11th January regarding the activities of Mahmoud Nedim Bey, ex Governor-General of the Yemen.

2. On 11th January Mr. Maswaleh Nedim Bey asked to see me. I received him, as reported, on the 14th instant.

3. At the interview he began by reciting the history of the Yemen since the Great War and the part he played in it, drawing particular attention to his action in securing the release of Colonel Jacob's mission in 1919. He also stated that he had strongly urged the Imam to come to terms with His Majesty's Government as Great Britain was the only country that could be of real use to him. He added, however, that the Imam was an opportunist who would readily run into any alliance that seemed advantageous at the moment and that the situation in the Yemen had steadily deteriorated under his rule.

4. The tribes he said were now thoroughly discontented and if matters did not improve they would welcome the intervention of any Power if it held out a promise of settled conditions.

5. This statement may have been intended to mean either that Great Britain or for that matter any other interested Power might play an important rôle in the Yemen, or else that Ibn Saud himself might take advantage of the present situation. In any case Nedim Bey was obviously anxious to emphasise his own influence with the Yemen tribes.

6. I enquired whether he was still intending to proceed to Sanaa. He replied that while in Massowah he had met a number of refugees from the Yemen, and that in view of the reports which they had given him of the conditions there he did not feel particularly anxious to go. He said that he had learned that Colonel Jacob had gone to Sanaa, he imagined in connexion with the suggested reopening of negotiations with His Majesty's Government, and he preferred now to await information regarding the result of this visit before deciding on his next step.

7. The interview was inconclusive. Nedim Bey's explanation of his delay in proceeding to Sanaa and of his proposed continued presence here was not convincing, and I am left with the impression that there is some other reason for his seeking to establish relations with this Legation which he will probably disclose later.

8. Nedim Bey's presence here lends some colour to an unconfirmed report which I have received to the effect that Ibn Saud intends to take some action against the Yemen after the pilgrimage, and that Nedim Bey has been induced to come here for propaganda purposes with the Yemen tribes. It is further stated that Fuad Hamza has strongly opposed his employment and that, having failed, he has communicated information on the subject to the Italian representative with the result that Nedim Bey has now been refused permission by the Imam to enter the Yemen.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Political Resident at Aden.

I have, &c
W L BOND

E 653 1/91]

No 81

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 5)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, February 3, 1930

YOUR telegram of 15th January, paragraph 8: Ibn Mashhur [see No 30]

I have received letter from Ibn Saud demanding surrender of Ibn Mashhur, together with his companions and Ajman who accompanied him, "all of whom were arrested by the authorities who work under your Excellency's control (or supervision)". He reiterates claim that an agreement exists between himself and His Majesty's Government for these persons to be handed over to him. I propose, with King Feisal's concurrence, to reply that persons named are in the custody of Iraq Government and that their fate is a matter for discussion at meeting between the two Kings. Fuad Hamza left for Kuwait last week.

(Repeated to Bushire)

E 681/1/91]

No 82

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 7)

(Colonial Office, February 5, 1930)

YOUR telegram of 15th January, paragraph 8: Ibn Mashhur [see No 30]

I concur generally in proposed reply to Ibn Saud but suggest for your consideration that, in view of the importance of the question of the harmony of meeting between Ibn Saud and King Feisal, it might be preferable that question of disposal of Ibn Mashhur should in first instance be discussed (and, if possible, settled) at preliminary meeting between Ministers.

2. Please inform me at earliest possible date what are the proposals of the Iraq Government regarding disposal of Mashhur and his following.

3. Both in framing your reply to Ibn Saud and in your discussions with Iraq Government, please refer to my telegram of 4th January and correspondence with Hejaz Government regarding presence of Mashhur in Kuwait territory last May (see Jedda despatches of 18th May and 27th August, and Jedda telegram to Foreign Office, No. 68 of 25th May, 1929, repeated to you), which would make it difficult to argue that Mashhur is in different category from other rebels.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

E 785/1/91]

No 83

Headquarters, R.A.F., Iraq, to Air Ministry.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 13)

(Telegraphic) P

February 11, 1930.

REPORT of 11th February on situation in Southern Desert. On the morning of 11th February the last of the Ma'arib Air Force was seen in the Nejd. According to reports from Ibn Saud, there are still a very few rebels who have mingled themselves with Kuwait tribes and remain hidden. The political agent, Kuwait, reports that the rebels of Kuwait are still in the desert. All the rebel sections have been withdrawn to Sharbah, and one section has been ordered to return to Hinaidi. On 3rd February the detached flight of the 55th Squadron returned to Hinaidi, and on 12th February the "Victorias" attached to Sharbah are returning.

[22271]

E 800 1 91

No. 84

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 13.)*

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, February 12, 1930

YOUR telegram of 5th February [No. 82]

Iraq Government, to whom I conveyed the purport of your telegram, have agreed to the question of Mashhur being discussed at the preliminary meeting and have instructed their representatives to adopt the following lines of argument:—

1. Iraq Government undertaking to expel Dawish and his followers referred to the persons who had raided into Iraq and whom Ibn Saud wished to punish. Mashhur is not of this category.
2. Undertaking referred only to Nejd tribes, whereas Mashhur is a Syrian.
3. If Ibn Saud will agree to handing over Dhaif and Dahamshah chiefs who have taken refuge in Nejd, and also Ibn Miryad and his Mutair followers who murdered Iraq police at Busaiyah, Iraq Government will consider handing over Mashhur.

Iraq Government do not anticipate any agreement being reached at the preliminary meeting and consider that it will be necessary for the two Kings to discuss the question, and it seems likely that they are right. Whilst I have communicated to them the argument used in the latter half of your telegram, I submit that the argument that, by the adoption of Wahabism and two years' residence in Nejd, Mashhur has lost his Syrian status and becomes a Nejd is a dangerous one, since on the same grounds Ibn Saud could repudiate Iraq's claim to allegiance of Dhaif and Dahamshah sheikhs who have gone to Nejd.

E 871 92/91

No. 85

Mr Bond to Mr A Henderson -- (Received February 17)

(No. 28)

Sir,

Jedda, January 22, 1930

1. I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to the 31st December, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2) Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Straits Settlements and F.M.S., the Senior Naval Officer Red Sea Sloop, and His Majesty's Consul at Basra.

I have, &c
W. L. BOND

Enclosure in No. 85

Jedda Report for Period December 1 to 31, 1929

ON the 20th November an official communiqué was issued by the Hejaz Government in the following terms.

"After the brilliant success achieved in the punitive expeditions against the rebels, whose intention was to create disturbances in Nejd, His Majesty the King has given orders to all the forces to proceed to the frontier regions where the remnant of the rebels have sought shelter, so that decisive measures may be taken against them.

"All arrangements have been made, and the soldiers have actually begun their march in every appointed direction. The town soldiers have been ordered to gather at Shuka, while the Bedouin forces and their auxiliaries have been instructed to concentrate in their appointed bases. The force of the Harb left Bareida on the 16th instant, and those of the Atadiah moved on the same day from Shafra to Hafar-el-Atz, while the Bahtan also marched from Jafir.

They will all be concentrated at Shuka, whence the whole army will advance to any regions where any remnant of the rebels remain.

"Furthermore, the Emir Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid received orders to proceed to Shaabia (presumably Shaibah), where he has been joined by the men of Shaari and Aneiza. The present plan is to encircle the rebels (from every point), and thus render their escape impossible.

"Two days after the mobilisation of the above-mentioned forces, His Majesty the King proceeded to General Headquarters, where he gave the order to advance on the 22nd November. Prior to his departure His Majesty issued a decree appointing His Highness Prince Saoud as Regent during his absence.

"When the rebels realised that their situation was critical and that their obedience to those who desire to fish in troubled waters would bring inevitable disaster upon them, they petitioned His Majesty the King, offering to surrender. The King, however, informed them that it was impossible to pardon them until they had submitted to the arbitration of the law of God (Sharia). Thus, within a few days the punitive operations will have been brought to a successful issue."

2. The march of events during the month under review has largely justified the optimism of the concluding sentence. After his unsuccessful attempt to obtain terms from Ibn Saud, Feisal-ed-Dawish appears to have given up his idea of following moved towards Riqat, south of the eastern extremities of the Iraq-Nejd neutral zone, giving the Ajman instructions to follow.

3. On the 13th December the Administrative Inspector of the Iraq Southern Desert, when reconnoitring near Shaib-al-Auja with police cars, was approached by two horsemen, who stated that Dawish was close by and wished to speak to him, also that the rebel leader with Ibn Mashhur and Ruffidi with Mutair and Ajman tribesmen were all camped together in the neighbourhood. Captain Glubb refused to see Dawish. The latter subsequently addressed a letter to him professing friendship and readiness to obey Government orders and requesting an interview. The Iraq Government instructed Captain Glubb not to meet or communicate with Dawish or any other rebels, but to give out that any attempt by rebels to cross the Iraq frontier would be prevented.

4. Feisal-ed-Dawish's situation seems to have become rapidly worse in the latter half of the month, as evidenced by the secession of several leading sheikhs. On the 24th December Ibn Mashhur, with a following of 200, having entered Iraq and refused to leave under a threat of force, surrendered unconditionally to the Iraq police, who were supported by Royal Air Force armoured cars. They were disarmed and escorted to the Busaiyah post.

5. On the 30th December His Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq reported that a Harb force, who were assisted by some Iraqi tribesmen, near Riqat close to the Iraq frontier, and that Mutair fugitives on foot, mainly women, were collecting on the Iraq frontier. At the same time, Royal Air Force armoured cars were also reported to have been seen near the Koweit-Iraq boundary. His Majesty's High Commissioner is discussing with the Iraq Government the question of the disposal of the refugees, who had crossed into Iraq territory.

6. At the beginning of the month a letter was addressed to the King in reply to his letter of the 17th November, in which Ibn Saud alleged that obstacles were being placed in the way of the accomplishment of his task by the attitude of the British Government in regard to the neutrality of Iraq and Koweit and the failure of the authorities in Koweit to prevent the rebels from crossing the border (November report paragraph 1). It was also shown that the efforts which the latter have made to take refuge in Koweit territory had indeed, been frustrated on more than one occasion, and the King was given to understand that the overtures for peace which Feisal-ed-Dawish was reported recently to have addressed to him were in all probability due principally to the uncompromising attitude which His Majesty's Government had taken up in reply to those requests. Ibn Saud was further reminded of the material assistance rendered him, which in itself afforded a proof of the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government to co-operate with him, and he was warned against accepting reports from interested and unreliable sources.

that he did not intend to cast doubts on the intentions of His Majesty's Government and gratefully acknowledged the material assistance given. The only thing of which he complained was that the rebels were freely obtaining supplies from, and were watering their animals in, Koweit. If His Majesty's Government made investigations they would, he said, be convinced of the truth of his allegations regarding the encouragement received by the rebels from high quarters in Bagdad, it was, however unnecessary to discuss these matters further. He thanked His Majesty's Government for the orders issued to eject the rebels from Koweit, Iraq and Transjordan which, if enforced, would render it unnecessary for his forces to enter neighbouring territory. He proposed to launch an attack against Dawish, and would inform the nearest military stations on the frontier of any fresh changes and developments. Meanwhile, he renewed his protest regarding the action taken ~~visa-vis~~ ^{vis-à-vis} of the Awazim. He added in his letter to His Majesty's political agent at Koweit that Dawish had asked him for pardon and security, and that he had promised him his life on condition that he returned all plunder. This Dawish had refused.

14. Five raids by Hejaz-Nejd subjects are reported on the Transjordan frontier. As against them, ten raids, mostly of minor importance, are reported by the Hejaz Government to have been committed by Transjordan tribes against Hejaz-Nejd.

15. On the 5th December a letter, dated the 23rd November, was received from the King protesting against the persistent raids committed by the Transjordan tribes (November report paragraph 23). If matters continue thus, he says, the people of Nejd will be compelled to take action themselves. He offers the following alternative solutions of the trouble: (i) That His Majesty's Government should act as sole arbiter and be responsible for the execution of the arbitral decisions in so far as Transjordan is concerned. Ibn Saud undertakes to carry them out as regards his own territory. His Majesty's Government are then to take effective measures to prevent further raids. This would involve exemplary punishment of offenders. (ii) That the King should be left free to settle matters among themselves, towns remaining neutral as regards their agreements or disputes. Such a course, the King points out, would be fraught with dangers, and he only suggests it as the Transjordan Government has so far been unable to prevent its subjects from attacking his people. (iii) That he himself should be left free to arrange matters amicably with the Transjordan tribes—an

They were present at the meeting and acted as a mediator and conciliator between the different groups and factions. They did not take any part in the discussion or the decision-making process.

[illegible]

1. In view of the fact that the Jordanian Government has not yet decided whether it will accept the offer of the High Commissioner for Transjordan to send a mission to the United Kingdom to study the situation in the Jordanian Arab areas, the High Commissioner for Transjordan has decided to send a mission to the United Kingdom to study the situation in the Jordanian Arab areas.

19 With reference to the foregoing, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan has been requested to report as soon as possible whether existing and contemplated arrangements are, in his opinion, still sufficiently comprehensive to remedy a situation of increasing gravity, or whether he considers that new measures are necessary.

20 The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has put forward a request for formal negotiations in respect of various matters which, he states, the King wishes to raise in connexion with Persian Gulf affairs. These fall under the general

head, (i) customs and transit dues collected in Bahrein on goods imported into the Persian Gulf, and (ii) the position of Ibn Saud's agents in Bahrein and Kuwait.

21. Mahmoud Nedim Bey, erstwhile Turkish Governor-General of the Yemen, has reappeared in Jeddah. He was apparently invited by the Imam of the Yemen to join him as adviser, but some hitch seems to have occurred in the course of his journey to Sana, and he got no further than Masowah, returning thence to Jeddah.

22. Information was received by the Air Ministry towards the end of the month that the hangars and stores ordered by the Hejaz Government for the use of the new air force had arrived at Bahrein. Instructions were therefore sent for the aeroplanes themselves to be flown from Iraq to Duria Island, on which they are to be based.

23. The published figures of the number of pilgrims who had arrived by sea by the 27th December are 14,222. These compare favourably with the corresponding figures of last year, which totalled 12,858. The very large majority of these are Javanese pilgrims.

24. Under pressure from the Government, which stands to gain larger fees, the mutawwifs are inducing as many pilgrims as possible to travel to Mecca and Medina by car instead of by camel. The camelmen are suffering in consequence, but their protests are unavailing.

25. On the 3th December His Highness the Emir Feisal officially opened a new reservoir which has been built in Mecca to store the waters of the spring known as "Ain Zubeida" and keep them free from pollution. This reservoir will contain approximately 10,000 tons of water, which will be available for the pilgrims during the Hajj. It is a great boon to the pilgrims, but will certainly be of great benefit during the rush period. Three further reservoirs are being built along the road to Muna. At Muna itself two new roads have been opened in order to facilitate the pilgrim traffic.

26. The acting Egyptian consul, has, he states, succeeded in reaching an agreement with the local authorities, who have now waived their objections to the importation of medical stores (June report, paragraph 27). He is also satisfied with an assurance which he has received regarding the free importation of medical stores (June report, paragraph 27).

27. There is an idea on foot in Mecca of suggesting to the King that the Mahometan world should be formed out to the mutawwifs by auction, every Mahometan district being assigned for pilgrimage purposes to the exclusive exploitation of the mutawwif who bids highest. The system is a pernicious one, although it is calculated to bring in a greatly increased revenue to the Government, as it would place the pilgrims at the mercy of the mutawwif and would expose them to various forms of extortion.

28. Money is now flowing into the country in a steady stream, but the Government has much leeway to make up and it is ever on the look out for means of imposing fresh taxation. A municipal tax is being collected at Mecca and Jeddah of 2 per cent. on rent, and a small further charge of anything up to one pound a year is payable by shopkeepers.

29. With the approval of the King, a "Committee for the Study of Projects of Reform" has been constituted, and has published a notice inviting the services of foreign experts (i) to survey for minerals in areas to be selected, and (ii) to submit plans, giving estimates of expenditure, for the construction of an up-to-date quay and a customs house at Jeddah. Applications are to be addressed to the committee at the Department of Finance, Mecca.

30. On the 27th December the Rotterdam-Lloyd steamship "Madeon," carrying pilgrims, ran ashore on the Miamari reef, thus illustrating once again the necessity for beacons to indicate the approaches to Jeddah. She was subsequently floated off with her bows badly damaged.

31. During the period under review, one male slave, of Sudanese origin, took refuge in this Legation and applied for manumission and repatriation. He was sent to his home at Suakin.

32. The status of the British agency at Jeddah was raised on the 21st December to that of a Legation, and Mr. W. L. Bond was appointed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, pending the selection and appointment of a Minister. His Majesty's approval has also been obtained for the proposed establishment of a Hejaz-Nejd Legation in London.

E 872 334 911

No. 88.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 17)

(No. 29)

Sir,

Jedda, January 24, 1930

I HAVE the honour to report that I presented to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 22nd instant at the local office of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. I was in uniform and was received with a guard of honour.

3. The Emir Feisal, who was present at the interview, took place on the 11th of the 10th instant, presented to the Emir Feisal similar credentials as Chargé d'Affaires, which were, however, addressed by the President of the French Republic to the King.

4. I took the opportunity of assuring the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that I should continue to devote myself to the cultivation of friendly relations between His Majesty's Government and the Government of the Hejaz-Nejd. The Emir Feisal replied in suitable terms, and after a little further conversation I left. No one else was present at the interview.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND

E 868 1/911

No. 87

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq —
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 17)

(Telegraphic) P.

(Colonial Office, February 14, 1930)

YOUR telegram of the 12th inst. is received. It is of such importance that meeting between Ibn Saud and Feisal should take place in a friendly atmosphere, alike from point of view of future relations between Nejd and Iraq and from that of His Majesty's Government themselves and the refusal of Ibn Saud to persevere with his attitude towards His Majesty's Government regard it as desirable to make all possible efforts to arrive at an understanding with him. From a different standpoint, in view of assurances given to Ibn Saud they would be placed in a most embarrassing position if the Nejd of Iraq Government should persist in their present attitude towards His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government feel that it would be most difficult to contend that they have not done their utmost to bring about a settlement of the dispute between the two Governments by terms of the pledges given by Iraq Government. His Majesty's Government feel that it would be most difficult to contend that they have not done their utmost to bring about a settlement of the dispute between the two Governments.

His Majesty's Government's own inclination would be to hand over Ibn Mubarak to the Nejd Government, but it is not possible to do so without the consent of the Nejd Government. It is therefore necessary to continue to work for a satisfactory settlement of the dispute between the two Governments under article 4 of the Bahra Agreement to expulsion of sheikhs of these tribes.

On the other hand, the Nejd Government's opinion, quite unjustified as being directly contrary to the terms of the Bahra Agreement, is that the Nejd Government should be punished for raiding by Government to which the raiders are subject. It makes no sense to punish the Nejd Government for the actions of the raiders.

In the circumstances, Iraq Government should be informed that, while His Majesty's Government are prepared to continue to work for a satisfactory settlement of the dispute between the two Governments, they nevertheless are definitely unable to support the demand for the surrender of Ibn

Mirvad and you should use your utmost endeavours to induce them to substitute a demand that Ibn Saud should inflict upon him and his followers "severe punishment" which would be in accordance with article 1 of the Bahra Agreement. However, Iraq Government persist in maintenance of a wholly unworkable settlement with Ibn Saud, it may be found necessary for His Majesty's Government to warn Iraq Government accordingly.
(Repeated to Bushire and Jedda.)

E 884/1/91]

No 88

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 18)

(Telegraphic) Baghdad, February 18, 1930
I HAVE already pointed out to Iraq Government that Ibn Saud may refuse to accept an Arbitral group omitted. I suggest that my part at meeting will be that of an adviser, and that I should do what I can to encourage Kings to come to any agreement that would not be prejudicial to British interests. I must expect from meeting is frank statement of conflicting views with an agreement of mutual recognition and a promise to exchange representatives.
(Repeated to Bushire)

E 878 1 91]

No 89

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 17)

(Telegraphic) Baghdad, February 10, 1930
Your telegram of 15th February (see No. 87) is wholly unreasonable, and I should have mentioned this in my telegram. Mesopotamian Government were incensed at reports that he was in high favour with Ibn Saud, in whose train he was said to be riding stolen Mesopotamian she-camels. I propose with them to confine their demand in his case to request for adequate punishment.
With regard to Ibn Mashur, I agree that, if meeting of Kings were to be abandoned on his account, it would be most unfortunate, but I should find it very difficult to persuade Feisal to abandon his chief bargaining counter in advance of the meeting, and blame should surely rest on Ibn Saud if he wrecks the conference on this point.
Feisal himself suggested to me the other day that no useful purpose would be served by his meeting Ibn Saud unless latter agreed beforehand to his attendance at the conference. I am disconcerted if he attempts to make his own attendance at the conference a condition precedent to surrender Ibn Mashur.
The conference, which was friendly but inconclusive, indicates that the Iraq Government are not prepared to accept a settlement with Ibn Saud, and I am sure that the delegation indicate that they are not prepared to accept a settlement with Ibn Saud.
I am sure that the delegation indicate that they are not prepared to accept a settlement with Ibn Saud.
I am sure that the delegation indicate that they are not prepared to accept a settlement with Ibn Saud.
(Repeated to Bushire and Jedda.)

E 952 111 91]

No 90

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 21.)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, February 18 1930

YOUR telegrams of 16th February (Nos. 88 and 89)
I agree that as far as possible you should occupy the position of impartial adviser to both sides, your primary function as representative of His Majesty's Government being (1) to bring about settlement which is satisfactory to all parties on as many outstanding points as possible, and (2) to secure that the meeting, even if it is inconclusive, shall at least break up in an atmosphere such as to make resumption of negotiations possible. His Majesty's Government earnestly share your hope that this meeting may at least result in mutual recognition and a promise to exchange representatives.
As regards Ibn Mashur, the Dahamshah sheikhs and desert posts arbitration, you should be guided by my telegram of 15th February (see No. 87), and in case of need act on last paragraph of that telegram.

E 968 111 91]

No 91

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 21)

(Telegraphic)

Baghdad, February 20, 1930

AS a result of discussion with myself, King Feisal and the Prime Minister have orally agreed to the following subjects being discussed at meeting between the Kings on the lines indicated:

1. *Question of Posts* - If Ibn Saud adheres to uncompromising attitude adopted by his delegate at the preliminary meeting, King Feisal will declare that Iraq Government are ready to refer the question to arbitration forthwith that they accept draft Arbitral Convention enclosed in your confidential despatch of 2nd August, 1929 that they are ready to appoint their member and to propose third arbitrator under article 2. In default of agreement as to third arbitrator, King Feisal will offer to accept nominee of His Majesty's Government.
2. *Bahra Agreement Tribunal* - Iraq Government views have already been stated in my telegram of 18th February (not printed), and King Feisal will try to persuade Ibn Saud to agree to earliest possible date for meeting of tribunal.
3. *Ibn Mashur* - King Feisal will endeavour to reach agreement with Ibn Saud in the first place (he is confident that he will succeed). Question of Ibn Mirvad will be definitely dropped.
4. *Recognition* - King Feisal will agree to recognise Ibn Saud as King of Hejaz provided Ibn Saud's attitude towards question No. 1 is satisfactory.
5. *Representation* - If Ibn Saud insists that his capital is now in Hejaz, King Feisal will agree to be represented at Jedda or Mecca with a consul at Riyadh.

Please telegraph if you approve

E 1014/82 91]

No 92

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received February 24)

(No. 42.)

Jedda, February 7, 1930.

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period 1st to 1st January 1930.
2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Egypt, Baghdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem (1) and to the Royal Air Force officer commanding in Palestine.

and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, Khartoum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), His Majesty's consul at Basra, the Government of the Federated Malay States and the senior naval officer, Red Sea sloops

I have, &c
W. L. BOND

Enclosure in No. 92

Jedda Report for the Period January 1 to 31, 1930

THE final spark of the Akhwan revolt fizzled out when Feisal-ed-Dawish, following the detection of several of his leaders, himself surrendered unconditionally to the British Air Force on the Kuwait frontier on the 9th January. Naif bin-Hithlain, paramount chief of the Ajman, and Ibn Lami, who had also surrendered, were, with Feisal-ed-Dawish, interned on board H.M.S. "Lupin" pending a decision as to their ultimate disposal. The main portion of the Ajman and Mutair also surrendered to the Royal Air Force, and were interned temporarily in Northern Kuwait. In a final engagement on the 11th January a force of rebels under Ibn Ashwan, and also a small section of the Mutair, which left Kuwait in an attempt to escape, were destroyed by the forces of Ibn Saud, who led the attack in person.

On the 6th January His Majesty's political resident at Bushire was instructed to inform Ibn Saud immediately, unless he saw objection, that the sole reason of the delay in implementing the undertakings of His Majesty's Government to expel the rebels was the presence of women and children, which rendered it difficult to employ force, and that every effort was being made to find some way to overcome that difficulty. His Majesty's Government also suggested that it might produce a good effect if, when this message were communicated to Ibn Saud, he were informed that His Majesty's Government, in order to avoid delay and with a view to placing him in full possession of the position as it presented itself to them, with whom he was well acquainted, accompanied by a representative of the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq, to his headquarters in the field to discuss with him the solution of the present difficulties. A reply was received from Ibn Saud on the 9th January accepting this proposal and stating that he had ordered Sheikh Hafiz Wahba to accompany the deputy.

On the 10th January the King informed the Government of the surrender and internment of Feisal-ed-Dawish and Ibn Hithlain. In acknowledging the receipt of this communication, Ibn Saud stated that notwithstanding the delay on the part of His Majesty's Government in fulfilling its promises repeatedly given, he with his troops was still expecting their fulfilment, and requested that Feisal-ed-Dawish, Ibn Hithlain and Ibn Mashhur should be handed over to him, and the rebel tribes themselves expelled from Kuwait territory at an early date. The British Government, he added, would doubtless appreciate the difficulties which he and the people of Nejd, trusting in the promises of the British Government, had experienced, no less than the fact that his troops were then in position on the frontier with their hands tied while the enemy enjoyed security within Kuwait territory.

On the 16th January the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs who went so far in his public utterances as to accuse His Majesty's Government of breach of faith. Sheikh Fuad Hayza was informed on the 16th January that the question of the disposal of the rebels was being dealt with direct between the local authorities and the King, and that, after consultation with the latter, arrangements were being made for a meeting with him in order to discuss with him personally the various points at issue. In the circumstances His Majesty's Government preferred to await the outcome of that meeting before replying to his notes.

In the meanwhile His Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq was informed by the Prime Minister of the Iraq Government that as Ibn Saud was now encamped close to the Iraq frontier, the Iraq Government felt that an excellent opportunity presented itself for a joint meeting in order to discuss the settlement of outstanding questions between the two Governments. King Feisal he added, was so impressed with the necessity for seizing this opportunity of making friendly overtures to a

neighbouring King on his borders that he was ready to meet Ibn Saud himself either in the neutral zone or at some convenient place near the frontier for a discussion of the questions.

On the 17th January the Iraq Government was informed by the British Government that the King had been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom. The King had also been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom. The King had also been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom.

On the 18th January the Iraq Government was informed by the British Government that the King had been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom. The King had also been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom.

On the 19th January the Iraq Government was informed by the British Government that the King had been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom. The King had also been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom.

On the 20th January the Iraq Government was informed by the British Government that the King had been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom. The King had also been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom.

On the 21st January the Iraq Government was informed by the British Government that the King had been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom. The King had also been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom.

On the 22nd January the Iraq Government was informed by the British Government that the King had been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom. The King had also been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom.

On the 23rd January the Iraq Government was informed by the British Government that the King had been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom. The King had also been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom.

On the 24th January the Iraq Government was informed by the British Government that the King had been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom. The King had also been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom.

On the 25th January the Iraq Government was informed by the British Government that the King had been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom. The King had also been informed of the proposals of the British Government and that he was very anxious to see the rebels expelled from the Kingdom.

12 As regards Ibn Makhbar, who had surrendered to His Majesty's Air Force

19 On the 21st January, as a result of a meeting which he had had with the King, Lieutenant Sand was able to report that the King was subsequently able to report that complete agreement had been reached and letters embodying it exchanged between Ibn Saud and himself on the 27th January, also that the rebel leaders were being flown to Ibn Saud's camp where they would be handed over personally by Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, and that arrangements were being made for the return of the tribes.

19 On the 21st January, as a result of a meeting which he had had with the King, Lieutenant Sand was able to report that the King was subsequently able to report that complete agreement had been reached and letters embodying it exchanged between Ibn Saud and himself on the 27th January, also that the rebel leaders were being flown to Ibn Saud's camp where they would be handed over personally by Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, and that arrangements were being made for the return of the tribes.

(1) Although the rebel leaders and their followers deserve punishment for their offences, in deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government he undertakes to spare their lives.

(3) He promises categorically

14) He agrees to settle all past claims by a tribunal provided for in the Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq, and in accordance with current practice in the case of Kuwait, provided that all the Mutair and Ajman and their followers and property at present in the hands of British military authorities are returned to Nejd territory. In view of the friendship existing between him and His Majesty's Government, he agrees to pay £10,000 through Jeddah on the 5th Shawal (March 3) as compensation to tribesmen in Kuwait and Iraq in anticipation of the final settlement of the account. Finally, he agrees to appoint a representative to the Jeddah Agreement Committee at a time to be fixed by the Committee on a request to do so, the month of Haj (pilgrimage) being excluded.

16 The proposal for a meeting with King Feisal and Sir F. Humphrys was cordially accepted by Ibn Saud. On the subject of the place, which have arisen near the selection of the place of the meeting, the original intention of holding it near the Dajal-Ibn-Roman has been abandoned and it has been decided by common agreement that it should take place on board one of His Majesty's ships outside territorial waters. The date has been fixed for the 20th Ramadan (February 19) and the conference, it has been decided, is to last two days. The question of a preliminary meeting between Ministers is under discussion.

18 As a result of the renewed protests received from the King in the latter half of December regarding the action taken *vis-à-vis* of the Awazim tribe (December

19. The news of the return of the rebels by His Majesty's Government has been a great relief to the people of Mexico, and it is to be hoped that the Government will be able to restore the political atmosphere. The chief notables, who had been led by sedulous propaganda, have now returned to Mexico, and it is to be hoped that they will be able to assist the Government in the suppression of the revolt.

21. The Hejaz Government were informed on the 4th January that the four

25. The celebrations which, it is generally agreed, were organised on an unprecedented scale for Akhwan, and which, to the eyes of Europeans and Arabs alike, may be said to mark a definite departure from the rigid precepts which the Akhwan had succeeded temporarily in imposing. Photographs were taken freely, an official photographer had, in fact, come from Egypt, and photographed the Emir on every possible occasion. Smoking was indulged in openly or with only a pretence at concealment. In fact, there seemed to be a general relaxation of the strictness which had been the mark of the Akhwan movement since its inception. A clever move was made when issued to a number of representatives of the leading European newspapers was intended to create a favourable impression on the part of the

2. The Soviet steamship "Vostok" (formerly steamship "Loos") which arrived in Seattle on 14 January 1941, was a part of a Soviet cargo fleet. The Soviet cargo fleet was composed of a number of steamships, which were used to transport goods from the Soviet Union to the United States. The Soviet cargo fleet was a part of the Soviet Union's foreign trade, which was a major source of revenue for the Soviet Union. The Soviet cargo fleet was a part of the Soviet Union's foreign trade, which was a major source of revenue for the Soviet Union. The Soviet cargo fleet was a part of the Soviet Union's foreign trade, which was a major source of revenue for the Soviet Union.

27. The ruling of pilgrims is published at the Hajj season by sea by the 31st January was 1402 as compared with 1904 for the entire Hajj season, and car. It is estimated that practically all the Japanese and the majority of the Malay pilgrims have a worded.

(b) No slaves took refuge at this Legation during the period under review.

E 1076/111,91]

No. 93

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 26)

(Telegraphic) P

Bagdad, February 23, 1930

REFERENCE my telegram of 23rd February [see No. 91], conference between
Kings concluded to-night with the following results:—

- 1 Kings have exchanged letters in which they state that they will attempt to arrive at agreement regarding desert posts during next six months, in default of which each will nominate two arbitrators, and should they fail to agree at the fifth arbitrator, which seems inevitable, they will accept as president any person appointed by His Majesty's Government.
- 2 They both agree that the tribunal should meet in June at Koweit under the presidency of Fowle or Dickson as may be decided by His Majesty's Government.
- 3 Ibn Saud pardons Ibn Mashkur, and Faisal promises to do all he can to persuade him to return to Nejd, and if he refuses to insist on his leaving Iraq territory. There is no *quid pro quo*.
- 4 and 5 Draft of a *Bon Voisinage* Agreement has been accepted in principle. The preamble cites Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and Nejd and Faisal as King of Iraq, and by one of the articles provision is made for exchange of diplomatic missions. After three months there will be a further meeting of representatives to conclude a formal agreement on this basis.

Outwardly the meeting was characterised by much cordiality, though in private Ibn Saud did not conceal from me his distrust of Faisal, while the latter deprecated the duplicity of Ibn Saud's Ministers. I was asked by both Kings to convey their deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government for their hospitality and for making the meeting possible. Arrangements for the capture of the rebel leaders at meeting were beyond praise.

E 1091 1/91]

No. 94

Consul-General Buxton to Lord Passfield.—(Communicated by the Colonial Office,
February 26)

(Confidential)

My Lord,

Bushire, January 31, 1930

I HAVE the honour to submit a report on the negotiations which I have recently carried out with King Ibn Saud regarding the surrender of the rebel Ajman and Mutair tribes.

I received your Lordship's telegram to His Majesty's Minister asking him to obtain the permission of the Persian Government for a flying boat to come to Bushire to take me to Koweit on the 18th January, and that evening Sir R. Clive informed me that the Prime Minister had telegraphed the requisite permission to the Governor of Bushire. As, however, the mail steamer was leaving the following afternoon for Koweit and I was told that it was unlikely that I could catch it, I decided to proceed by steamer instead. I arrived at Koweit on the 18th January, and found that Colonel Dickson had arranged for me to arrive at Ibn Saud's camp on the 20th. I therefore had a preliminary discussion with Colonel Dickson and Air Commodore Burnett, and on the 20th instant I proceeded to Ibn Saud's camp by air. Most admirable arrangements for the transport of myself and the other members of the mission, servants, luggage, &c., were made by the Royal Air Force, and we travelled in three Victorias, accompanied by an escort of three Wapitis.

2 Ibn Saud had asked the Sheikh of Koweit to supply tents, servants, cooks, provisions, &c., for me and my party, and we found a camp ready pitched at some distance from Ibn Saud's camp, and were accommodated in comfort while the Royal Air Force made efficient arrangements to maintain wireless communication with Koweit, despite serious atmospheric difficulties at times.

3. I had not met Ibn Saud before, but Colonel Dickson, of course, knew him well, and told me that he had aged a good deal since he last saw him, and his manners had changed, whereas formerly his manners had been those of an important Arab sheikh, he has now assumed to a much greater extent the manners of a Royal

personage, largely due probably to the influence of the Syrians and Egyptians at his camp. The King coming to our camp for all discussions. The ostensible reason was that the King was living in the simplest style, and was not in a position suitably to entertain distinguished visitors, and that he had with him a number of fanatical and ignorant tribesmen, the real reason, I think, was that certain sheikhs from Iraqi tribes and others were visiting his camp, and Ibn Saud was anxious that we should not become aware of this.

4. In their instructions to me His Majesty's Government had said that they would much prefer to avoid deportation of the rebel leaders, if possible, and I felt that there was much force in the reasons advanced by them, though at first sight deportation certainly seemed the simplest course. After a full consideration, however, of all the issues involved, and as a result of my discussions with Ibn Saud and the impression I formed of his feelings and character, I believe it would have been a mistake, for the following reasons: His Majesty's Government have in the past given many signs of their friendship for Ibn Saud, they have supplied him with arms and ammunition, and even with aeroplanes with British personnel, they have taken the most drastic measures to ensure that no facilities should be afforded to the rebel tribes, and their general attitude has been one of readiness to assist him, of course, never offered to surrender the rebels to him unconditionally, and had warned him that a contingency might arise under which they would be unable to eject the rebels from Koweit or Iraq territory. If, however, when this contingency arose, His Majesty's Government had declined to surrender the rebel leaders to him, despite the very categorical undertaking he was prepared to give to prevent raids by Nejd tribes into Koweit and Iraq territory in the future, and his undertaking to spare the lives of all the rebels and make a prompt settlement of claims, then, I venture to think, Ibn Saud would have had some justification for feeling that, while the action of His Majesty's Government did not constitute a breach of faith, it was inconsistent with their former professions of friendship and implied a change of attitude. I am certain that he would have gone back to Nejd completely antagonised. To speak of the terms arranged as capitulation seemed to me to ignore the past relations existing between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud. Had he gone off to Nejd without the rebel leaders being handed over to him, what would have been the position? It would not have been possible permanently to stop the rebel Mutair and Ajman from returning to Nejd territory, which is their home, Ibn Saud would thus have been provided with a weapon ready to his hand, and, though it is

would have been forthcoming, and, with Ibn Saud in hostile mood and these tribes again at his disposal, I think there would have been a strong probability of a recurrence of organised raiding all along the border in the near future. It is, of course, possible that Ibn Saud may not fulfil his undertakings, though personally I believe that he intends to do so, and that organised raiding under his orders and with his encouragement will cease for at any rate some time to come, but I do think that the risk of organised raiding is very much less now than it would have been had Ibn Saud returned to Nejd with what he would have considered a definite grievance against His Majesty's Government. I have stressed the expression "organised raiding"; that petty cattle-lifting raids may occur from time to time is, of course, possible; they are more or less in the nature of a local pastime and of little importance, and are totally different matters to organised raiding carried out with the encouragement or under the orders of the King.

5. There is one other consideration to be borne in mind, and that is the projected air route down the Gulf. A portion of this route runs through Nejd territory, and we have tried in the past to obtain certain facilities from Ibn Saud for emergency landing grounds, &c., but these facilities have hitherto been refused. Possibly one of the considerations that induced His Majesty's Government to supply aeroplanes to Ibn Saud was that these might induce him to change his attitude. They will, I think, be on stronger ground to renew their requests, and he will be unwilling to accede to them now than would have been the case had the rebel leaders been deported.

6. His Majesty's Government insisted that the surrender of the rebel leaders should be in accordance with Arab sentiment. I therefore asked the commander of H.M.S. "Lupin" to bring them down to Koweit, and flew up to Koweit myself.

13. As regards the proposal for the conclusion of a new agreement similar to the Bahra Agreement I consider it not desirable that such

17 In conclusion, I desire to express my thanks to the Royal Air Force for the arrangements which were made for the conveyance of myself and my party, and

for the readiness with which they placed machines at my disposal whenever required. The weather in camp was exceedingly cold, and I fear that many of the officers and men underwent a good deal of discomfort. I am particularly grateful to the wireless operators, who often worked in great difficulty till very late hours of the night.

I enclose herewith a translation of the letter addressed by Ibn Saud to me. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
F V BISCOE, Lieutenant-Colonel
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

Enclosure 10 No. 94

Ibn Saud to Consul General Biscoe

(Translation)

(After Compliments.)

January 27, 1930

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter dated the 27th January, 1930. In view of the British Government's undertaking to hand over Faisal-ad-Dawish, Nasir-bin-Hithlain, Jasir-bin-Lami and all the Mutair and Ajman who are held by the British authorities, we hereby confirm our verbal conversation with you as follows —

- (1) That in spite of the punishment which the three leaders, Faisal-ad-Dawish, Nasir-bin-Hithlain and Jasir-bin-Lami, and their followers deserve for their offences against neighbouring Governments and their rebellion against us, we will spare their lives and those of their tribes in compliance with the wish of the British Government.
- (2) We regard it as our prerogative to inflict upon these people such punishment as will restrain them in future, and restrain others whose souls may lead them to do evil. These punishments, however, will be saturated with the spirit of justice and mercy for which we are known, but we reserve the right to take from them any property that they may have taken from others.
- (3) As regards the raids, we promise to prevent any raids against the neighbouring Governments, Iraq and Kuwait, whether by the Mutair, Ajman or any other Nejd tribe, should anything of the kind take place in future, we shall be prepared to apply without delay the Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq, and to restore immediately whatever may be plundered from Kuwait in accordance with the custom current between Kuwait and Nejd. If the ruler of Kuwait desires to enter into an agreement in regard to raids, similar to the Bahra Agreement, we are prepared to enter into such an agreement with him.
- (4) As regards property that has been carried off from Iraq nationals in the past, we are prepared to apply the procedure prescribed in the Bahra Agreement and, in the case of Kuwait, to effect a settlement of claims in accordance with the procedure at present in force, provided that none of the rebellious Mutair and Ajman and their followers who are in the hands of the British authorities or their property remain in Iraq or Kuwait territory.

In view of the friendship which exists between us and His Majesty's Government, we have agreed to their wishes as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter. We therefore see fit, in mercy to the unfortunate tribes of Iraq and Kuwait who have suffered losses, to pay them £10,000 sterling on the 5th Shawal, 1349, through His Majesty's representative at Jeddah, this to be in anticipation of a final settlement of claims.

And we shall be ready to send representatives at any time to effect a settlement in accordance with the Bahra Agreement one month after receipt of the request for such tribunal, the month of Zi Haj being excluded.

E 1110 111/91]

No. 95

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 25.)

(Telegraphic)

Bushire, February 26, 1930

FOLLOWING addressed to Government of India

"At the end of conference Ibn Saud informed commander of 'Patrick Stewart' that he had decided to visit Bahrain, then proceeded to Ojair by launch. I instructed commander to explain to Ibn Saud that visit at short notice would be inconvenient to shiekh, but that I would arrange for launch to meet him at outer buoy 7 miles out to take him direct to Ojair, and was informed that Ibn Saud had entirely given up idea of visiting Bahrain. Weather, however, was bad, and launch could not go out, so Ibn Saud landed and left the same day by launch for Ojair."

E 1145 111 91]

No. 96

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, March 4.)

(Telegraphic)

Baghdad, February 28, 1930

I HAVE received following telegram from Ibn Saud in reply to valedictory message from myself —

"I thank your Excellency most sincerely for all the good wishes expressed to your return. I was greatly pleased at seeing the opportunity of making the British Government and to you my thanks for the effort which you have made to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and its dependencies and Kingdom of Iraq. I hope that Almighty God will always help us to safeguard peace and tranquillity between the two neighbouring States."

Also letter from King Faisal and Prime Minister thanking me in similar terms and expressing great appreciation for facilities as kindly provided by His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Bushire, Jeddah and India)

E 1157 111 91]

No. 97

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, March 4.)

(Telegraphic)

Baghdad, March 2, 1930

I AM very glad to hear that the King of Iraq and the King of Hejaz and Nejd are in agreement to have undertaken, result may be that little real progress has been made. So far as Ibn Saud is concerned, he professes to place his reliance upon His Majesty's Government, and I am sure that the King of Iraq will be able to do so.

If they fulfil promises which they made to me that each would go a considerable distance to meet expectations of the other, I feel that conference, which has been held with enthusiasm locally, will be fruitful of enduring benefits to both countries.

If the King of Iraq and the King of Hejaz and Nejd are in agreement to have undertaken, result may be that little real progress has been made.

So far as Ibn Saud is concerned, he professes to place his reliance upon His Majesty's Government, and I am sure that the King of Iraq will be able to do so.

As a first step I am pressing King Faisal to ensure that Ibn Saud is able to do so.

(Repeated to Bushire and Jeddah)

Mr A Henderson to Mr Bond (Jedda)

No. 61)
Sir,

Foreign Office, March 10, 1930

WITH reference to your despatch No. 210 of the 25th August last, I transmit to you herewith the text of the draft commercial treaty between the United Kingdom and India and the Hejaz and Nejd, as revised in the light of the comments contained in your despatch, and I request that you will take an early opportunity of communicating this draft to the Hejazi Government for their consideration.

2 I desire to draw your attention to the following points which arise in connexion with various articles of the draft treaty—

Article 2.—If the Hejazi Government should raise the question whether Iraqi nationals are covered by the expression "persons under His Britannic Majesty's protection," you should inform them that His Majesty's Government do not regard Iraqis as protected persons for the purposes of this article. Their attention may be drawn in this connexion to the note addressed to King Ibn Saud by Mr Stonehewer-Bird on the 15th September, 1927, a copy of which was enclosed in Mr Bird's despatch No. 110 of the 26th September 1927.

Article 3.—The article has been amended to include Nejd and Nejd vessels.

Article 4.—Since, as pointed out in your despatch under reference, no foreign national may own property in the Hejaz, British subjects do not obtain reciprocal treatment under this article as regards the acquisition and disposal of their property.

the conclusion of a treaty on the lines of this draft, this point might be instanced as one in regard to which the balance of advantage lies with the Hejaz.

Article 6.—Articles 6 and 7 of the original draft transmitted to you in my despatch No. 147 of the 25th July have been merged into a single article, the remaining articles being renumbered accordingly. To meet the point made in paragraph 6 of your despatch, the word "articles" has been substituted for the word "goods" throughout. It has not been found possible to adopt your suggestion that the words "by the exporting country" should be inserted after the words "shall not be subjected," since their inclusion might give rise to difficulties in the case of articles which, though of British origin, remain for some time in a third country (e.g., Egypt) before being exported thence into the Hejaz.

You will observe that paragraph 3 of this article lays down, in more detail than did the corresponding clauses of articles 6 and 7 of the previous draft, the special circumstances in which prohibitions or restrictions may be imposed on imported and exported articles. In presenting the draft treaty to the Hejazi Government you should explain that such provisions are habitually included in commercial treaties.

that paragraph 3 (2) is so worded as not to conflict with the undertakings regarding the free exportation of arms to the Hejaz and Nejd given to King Ibn Saud by Sir G. Clayton in his letter of the 19th May, 1927, at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Jedda.

Article 7 (article 8 of the previous draft).—The assumption made in your despatch No. 210, that the treatment to be accorded to warships is governed by the rules of international law and custom, and is not normally dealt with in commercial treaties.

Nor does anything in this article or article 8 affect the right of the Hejazi Government to make such regulations as they may desire in connexion with the pilgrim traffic, since these articles provide for most favoured nation treatment and not for treatment on a basis of reciprocity.

Article 9 (article 10 of the previous draft).—In your despatch No. 210 you drew attention to the fact that the draft treaty would be in force as between the Hejaz and Nejd on the one hand and any British Colony, Protectorate, or mandated area administered by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the other, in respect of which notice to that effect is given by His Majesty's Government, whether its application to such Colony, &c., is agreeable to the Hejazi Government or not. Consideration has been given to the point. It is, however, now customary to embody a clause in this form in all similar treaties negotiated by His Majesty's Government, and other Powers have found no

difficulty in agreeing to its inclusion. There is no question, moreover, of the inclusion of Iraq in the treaty under this act, in that the Hejazi Government is not a mandated territory. In these circumstances it is not considered necessary or desirable to include Iraq in the treaty.

It has now been decided that no attempt shall be made to include Iraq in the present negotiations. The protocol relating to Iraq attached to the previous draft is therefore being abandoned.

3 When you submit the draft treaty to the Hejazi Government I shall be above you will inform them, on behalf of the Government of India, that the Indian States have the right to impose duties which may not be the same as British duties, but that under the tariffs of those States whatever these tariffs may be, the produce of the Hejaz and Nejd will receive treatment not less favourable than that

4 in paragraphs 2-5 of your despatch under reply, you drew my attention to, and I take a somewhat disappointing impression upon the Hejazi Government.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON

Enclosure in No. 98

Draft Anglo-Hejazi Treaty of Commerce and Navigation

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies,

Desiring to facilitate and extend still further the trade and commerce of their respective countries and to regulate by means of a treaty the commercial relations between Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, and to secure the sovereignty, protection or authority of His Britannic Majesty as he may desire should be bound by the treaty on the one side and the Hejaz and Nejd on the other.

Have resolved to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

A. B.

For India

C. D.

His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies,

E. F.

who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows—

ARTICLE I

The territories of the High Contracting Parties to which the present Treaty applies are the territories of His Britannic Majesty, Great Britain and Northern Ireland and India, and the territories in respect of which notification of accession is given under article 10 or notice of application is given under article 9.

Party" in subsequent articles of this treaty means the territories of such High Contracting Party to which the treaty applies

ARTICLE 2

The rights conferred by the present treaty upon subjects of His Britannic Majesty shall be enjoyed equally by all persons under His Britannic Majesty's protection.

ARTICLE 3

All vessels which, according to British law, are deemed to be British vessels, and all vessels of the Hejaz and Nejd, shall, for the purposes of this treaty, be deemed British or Hejazi and Nejd vessels respectively.

ARTICLE 4

The subjects of either of the two High Contracting Parties, including companies and associations, shall enjoy in the territories of the other High Contracting Party treatment not less favourable than that accorded to the subjects or citizens and the companies and other associations of any other foreign country. This provision shall extend to all matters of commerce and navigation, the establishment and carrying on of any description of business, the treatment of commercial travellers and their samples, the exercise of professions or occupations, residence and the acquisition and disposal of property.

ARTICLE 5

The following table shows the results of the first three years of the experiment. The first column shows the number of plants in each treatment, the second column shows the number of plants that died, the third column shows the number of plants that survived, and the fourth column shows the percentage of plants that survived.

ARTICLE 6

Articles produced or manufactured in the territories of either of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy, in the territory of the other, the same treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to articles produced or manufactured in any other foreign country. In particular, they shall not be subject on importation or subsequently to other or higher customs duties or charges or to other prohibitions or restrictions than those which similar articles produced or manufactured in any other foreign country are subject to.

Contracting Parties exported to the territories of the other shall not be subjected to other or higher duties or charges, or to other prohibitions or restrictions than those to which similar articles exported to any other foreign country are subject

3. Exceptions to the general rule laid down in the preceding paragraphs of this article may only be made in the case of—

- (1) Prohibitions or restrictions imposed in the interests of public security
- (2) Prohibitions or restrictions regarding traffic in arms, munitions and implements of war and other military supplies, in accordance with the conditions set forth in the Arms Traffic Convention signed at Geneva on the 17th June, 1925
- (3) Prohibitions or restrictions regarding traffic in drugs or drugs studies included now or hereafter within the scope of the International Opium Convention signed at Geneva on the 19th February, 1925.
- (4) Prohibitions or restrictions imposed for the protection of public health
- (5) Prohibitions or restrictions imposed for the protection of animals or plants, including protection against disease, degeneration or extinction, as well as measures taken against harmful seeds, plants and animals.

4. It is understood, however, that no claim will be made under this article to the enjoyment of any special duties or charges which may be accorded by the Hejaz and Nejd to the articles of any State in Arabia, or of any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey and is contiguous to the Hejaz and Nejd.

ARTICLE 7

Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes to treat in every respect the vessels of the other not less favourably than national vessels or the vessels of the most favoured foreign country. This equality of treatment shall extend to the right to import or export any goods which may be legally imported or exported and to carry passengers or cargo, and to the right to call at ports of call, and to be treated as to tonnage, port dues, charges and payments of all kinds levied on ships such as sanitary, port, quay, harbour, pilotage, quarantine, lighthouse and other dues, as well as to the right to be treated as to the same by the public authorities, public functionaries, private individuals, corporations or establishments of any kind.

The two High Contracting Parties undertake that imported or exported goods shall not be subjected anywhere in their territories to any differential duty, surtax charge or disability of any kind based on the flag of the ship by which the goods are imported or exported, and to the detriment of the flags of either of the two High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 8

The provisions of this treaty relating to the mutual concession of national treatment shall be applied to the subjects and vessels of each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other, treatment as favourable as that accorded to any other foreign country.

In the event of the coasting trade of either party being exclusively reserved to national vessels, the vessels of the other party shall nevertheless proceed from port to another, either for the purpose of landing the whole or part of their cargoes or passengers brought from abroad, or of taking on board the whole or part of their cargoes or passengers for a foreign destination. Such vessels shall, moreover, if engaged in trade to or from places not within the limits of the coasting trade so reserved, not be prohibited from the carriage between two ports of the territories of the first party of passengers holding through tickets or merchandise consigned on through bills of lading to or from places not within the above-mentioned limits, and while engaged in such carriage these vessels and their passengers and cargoes shall enjoy the full privileges of this treaty.

ARTICLE 9

1. His Britannic Majesty may, through his Representative at Jeddah, give notice to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the termination of the said Treaty of Commerce and Consular Privileges between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Hejaz and Nejd and the territory specified in such notice.

2. Either of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to terminate the application of the treaty to any territory to which it shall have been made applicable under this article at any time on giving twelve months' notice to that effect.

ARTICLE 10

1. His Majesty's Ministers hereby declare that His Representative at Jeddah, accede to the present Treaty in respect of any of His Majesty's self governing

2. After the expiry of a period of nine years from the coming into force of the present treaty, either of the High Contracting Parties may, by giving twelve months' notice, terminate the application of the treaty to any of His Majesty's self governing dominions in respect of which notification of accession has been given under paragraph 1 of this article.

3. Any notification made under paragraph 1 of this article may include any dependency or mandated area administered by the Government of the territory in respect of which the notification of accession is given, and any notice given under paragraph 2 shall be applicable to any such dependency or mandated area which was included in such notification of accession.

ARTICLE 11

So long as in any territory referred to in article 9 or 10 which is not bound by the present treaty goods produced or manufactured in the Hejaz and Nejd are accorded treatment as favourable as that accorded to goods produced or manufactured in any other foreign country, goods produced or manufactured in such territory shall enjoy in the Hejaz and Nejd completely and unconditionally treatment as favourable as that accorded to the goods of the most favoured foreign country.

ARTICLE 12

1. The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged at ^{as soon as possible} It shall come into force immediately on the exchange of ratifications, and shall be binding during a period of ten years from the date of its coming into force.

2. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other twelve months before the expiration of the said period of ten years of its intention to terminate the treaty, the treaty shall be renewed for a period of one year from the date of such notice.

His Britannic Majesty may give a notice of termination in respect of either Great Britain and Northern Ireland or India separately.

4. In the absence of an express statement to that effect in such notice, a notice given under the second paragraph of this article shall not affect the operation of the treaty as between the Hejaz and Nejd on the one hand and any territory in respect of which notification of accession has been given under article 10 on the other hand.

(E 1372 663 91)

No. 20

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received March 17.)

No. 20.)

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda, March 10, 1930.

IBN SAUD requests me through Emir Faisal to convey to His Majesty's Government a message with reference to memorandum dated 21st December (vide my despatch No. 330). Following are salient points:

King's last proposals were made because neglect to effect settlement was causing disturbances. Tribesmen from Transjordan having actually besieged Tebuk and Teima and operated near Jauk and Hail, cutting roads between these towns, motor cars being used for swift organised attacks. He feels sure that past attacks have been made in order to embarrass him in his recent campaign to cause friction between himself and His Majesty's Government, and to make him appear to his subjects powerless to defend them.

He urgently requests His Majesty's Government to adopt following measures: (1) to resolve the disturbances; (2) to take measures to discover the criminals and their instigators and to state punishments inflicted; (3) to take decisive measures to prevent further hostile action and to punish evil-doers whatever their instigation may be.

The King excuses his importunity and asks for reply very urgently.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 44.)

E 1385 93 91

No. 100.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received March 17.)

Jedda, March 2, 1930.

WITH reference to paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 323 of the 19th December last, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum indicating the steps which have been taken up to date in connexion with a scheme for supplying Mecca and Jedda with electricity. The subject, which was first broached two or three years ago and has occasionally been mooted since, is now being seriously canvassed.

The scheme is at present in its embryonic stages, and, although in its broad outlines it has received the approval of the King, its details still require royal sanction. It is, perhaps, early yet, therefore, to consider it as a serious project.

3. I will, however, follow its development and will report again later if it shows signs of materialising.

4. It is stated that the Government intend to call for tenders in the usual way, but this may be nothing more than a stratagem to conceal the fact that the contract has already been promised or parcelled out in anticipation to interested persons.

I have, &c.

W. A. BOND

Enclosure in No. 100.

Memorandum.

Proposed Scheme for supplying Jedda and Mecca with Electricity.

THERE is a movement on foot in the Hejaz, supported by the King, to establish a power-station for the purpose of supplying Mecca and Jedda with electricity.

The supply of electricity for Jedda is at present dependent on a small plant of inadequate performance which works in conjunction with the condenser.

A committee of notables, dubbed for this purpose "experts," for considering the scheme and estimating the benefits which would accrue from it.

The committee met several times and decided, as a first step, that a public meeting should be held at which the decisions arrived at during its session should be announced. A general meeting was accordingly held on the 27th January at the Ministry of Finance in Mecca to which all the notables and others were invited.

The audience, to a long, disjointed speech on the subject delivered by Sheikh Ahmed Ghazzawi, a member of the Committee for the Study of Projects of Reform.

This sheikh, acting as spokesman for the committee, stated that the purpose of the meeting was to make public the decisions of the Government and of the special committee.

After dwelling for some time on the interest shown by the King in this scheme in particular, and in all schemes in general tending to raise "the prestige of this dear land to a level consistent with its holiness and purity," the sheikh proceeded to enunciate these decisions as follows:—

1. A company is to be formed for the purpose of administering the scheme. Two-thirds of the shares are to be taken up by the Municipality of Mecca and the Ministry of Finance.
2. The remaining third of the shares is to be open to public subscription.
3. The price of these special shares (i.e., the remaining third) is to be £3 each.
4. Those who wish to subscribe must make an immediate deposit of one-third of the value of each share—£1; this will entitle them to effective participation in the scheme.
5. The rest of the money due on the shares is not payable until the managing committee has formed all details of construction, &c., settled, and effective measures taken to ensure a prosperous future for the company.
6. The managing committee is to be formed as soon as possible.
7. The managing committee is to be invested with the general control of the company and will watch over its interests and those of the shareholders.

[2287]

"I have no doubt that this new era which we usher in to-day in the relations between our countries will be a new and firm support to the friendly and true friendship which exists between them.

I am fully confident that you will receive from His Majesty the King every form of kindness and co-operation, which will facilitate for you the carrying out of the various objects of your mission. I am sure that the King will be most anxious to see for co-operation with you in every subject that may further strengthen the relations between the two countries.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. L. BOND

E 1541/1054/91]

No. 103

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson — (Received March 25)

(No. 60)

Sir,

Jedda, March 6, 1930

AS instructed in your telegram No. 31 of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum on slavery and the slave trade as practised in this country, including the measures adopted to suppress it.

2. I am indebted for much useful information on the subject to Commander F. Ratnay, R.N., senior naval officer of the Red Sea sloop, and to Munah Ihsanullah, the Indian vice-consul attached to this Legation.

3. This memorandum should be read in conjunction with Mr. Bullard's note on slavery in the Hejaz forwarded to the Foreign Office under cover of his despatch No. 54 of the 9th June, 1924.

4. I am not making any distribution of this despatch and memorandum from this post.

I have, &c

W. L. BOND

Enclosure in No. 103

Memorandum on Slavery and the Slave Traffic in the Kingdom of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.

THE practice of slavery in the Hejaz and Nejd presents certain distinctive features peculiar to this country. It is not, however, the same as the slavery of those countries where slavery exists. In all cases, it is important to bear in mind from the start the moral and material conditions which govern the attitude of the Government towards the slave. It is not, therefore, a question of the degree of the slave's freedom, but of the degree of the slave's freedom.

2. The Government of the Hejaz and Nejd has, since the beginning of the century, been endeavouring to suppress the slave trade. It has, for this purpose, issued various orders and regulations, and has, in some cases, taken steps to enforce them. It has, however, been unable to do so in all cases, and the slave trade continues to exist in some form or other. It is, therefore, a question of the degree of the slave's freedom, but of the degree of the slave's freedom.

3. Although the present practice of slavery in Arabia in its diverse forms admittedly goes far beyond and outside the limits of Koranic sanction and, in fact, flagrantly contravenes Shar'a law, the treatment of slaves, so far as I have been able

to judge, is, taken all round, in conformity with the exhortations of the Koran. Socially, there is no stigma or degradation attached to their condition. They enjoy an equal social status with their masters. A slave, notwithstanding that he is a slave, may offer his prayers by the side of the king and may dine at the same table with the most respectable free man. He can transact business, buy and sell in his own name and of his own initiative. He can and does buy property in his own name, although such property is legally considered to belong to his master. A freed slave acquires on his manumission all the rights and privileges, moral and material, of citizenship. He can even marry a sheikh's daughter. A slave or his children can rise to the highest positions in the State. Islamic history is full of instances of rulers and luminaries of Islam who were originally slaves. To quote Lane Poole: "While a brilliant ruler's son is apt to be a failure, the slaves of a real leader of men have often proved to be the equals of their master." One of the most prominent members of Jedda society and the most active and influential on committees, over which he sometimes presides, is a slave.

4. This attitude of the people towards their slaves is reflected in the attitude of the slaves themselves. There are many instances of slaves of character and intelligence occupying positions of authority, who would have no difficulty whatever in purchasing their own freedom or of obtaining it from their owners on request, but who take no steps to do so for the reason that they are entirely satisfied with their state and see no acquisition of dignity nor other advantage to be gained in effecting a nominal change in their status. There have been many cases, too, of slaves who have taken refuge at the British agency in the heat of the moment, but who have changed their minds and have returned to their masters. Cases also occur quite frequently of slaves who have been repatriated to the Sudan and Eritrea returning to the Hejaz in spite of the risk involved. Many cases can be cited of slaves who left for the Sudan with their owners during the general exodus in 1924 and 1925, at the time of the Hejaz war, and who, voluntarily, and with their eyes

open, returned to their masters. There are examples, too, of dhows manned by slaves, who trade on the African coast and return to their owners, after several months, with the profits earned. There are, daily, a number of slaves who pass in and out of the British Legation itself, coming either for medical treatment or on business, who are fully aware of the opportunities offered for manumission and repatriation but have not the least desire to avail themselves of them. Some of these cases are obviously exceptional, but on the whole they may be taken as indicative of the attitude of the slaves in general.

5. If a distinction were to be drawn, the slaves in Arabia might be divided into those who were enslaved as children and have forgotten their people and country, and those who were enslaved later in life and retain a vivid memory of their homes and freedom. The former become more readily inured to their environment and conditions, not remembering anything better. As a rule they are not dissatisfied with their lot, and evince little or no desire to return to their countries of origin. Their aspirations, where the opportunity exists, centre on becoming free and being themselves slave-owners in the same way as they have seen come to pass in the case of other slaves, to their mind freedom, unless accompanied by assured conditions of life at least as good as those to which they are accustomed, would normally suggest very little improvement in their conditions. The latter class of slaves is the more to be pitied, and care is taken that no opportunity is given for them to escape and take refuge until eventually their desire for freedom is broken and they also become inured to the state of slavery. They are not brought to Jedda but on disembarkation are despatched straight into the interior.

6. The evidence thus tends to show that in the towns at any rate, especially the big towns, where facts can be more easily ascertained, slaves are better off now than they have been in recent years, and that their conditions are a distinct improvement on those, for instance, of the Hashimite régime. Information about conditions in the interior is less readily available and more difficult to control, but the exigencies of life in the desert almost compel the Bedouins to treat a slave as one of themselves. That numerous cases of ill treatment and cruelty exist, both in the towns and all over Arabia, is, however, undoubtedly true; this unfortunately is inherent in any system of slavery, and whatever may be done to ensure humane treatment generally these cases will always exist so long as the institution itself is allowed to remain. The fact that slaves are on the whole well treated is all to the good, but it does not of course, affect the issue.

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7. The average Hejazi, as has been said elsewhere, is by nature and opportunity a parasite, his view of slavery as it affects himself consists in a very lively appreciation of the material advantages of the institution and an equally strong disinclination to give it up. In the Hejaz and Nejd the most necessary and desirable of all possessions are slaves, male and female. On them depends the Arabs' comfort, enjoyment and indulgence, respect and dignity. They represent so much capital, and they are to Arab ideas the most paying form of investment. The desire to possess them is a ruling passion. The townsmen will sell their wives' ornaments and jewellery and the Bedouin their beasts of burden in order to possess a slave. A rich Arab would lose the respect of his fellow-townsmen if, for instance, he failed to give a female slave as dowry at his daughter's marriage. An Emir's dignity, influence and reputation, often his life, is dependent on the number and physique of his slaves. Slaves are the mainstays of the middle-class Arab townsmen's household and the most trusted of his servants, whilst in the case of the poorer Arabs they often earn their master's or mistress's livelihood when the latter have no other means of support. They commonly act in this way like devoted members of the family and are treated as such. They are used in every sort of capacity from camelman to Commander-in-chief. They serve as water carriers, labourers, clerks, cashiers, managers, fishermen, masons, housekeepers and everything else. They are employed inside and outside the house. Skilled workers are hired out or ply a trade and bring their earnings to their owner. A female slave is at once a wife and servant to a master who may not be able to afford to keep a regular wife. In fact, public opinion in Arabia is, as it always has been, strongly in favour of slavery, and, whilst it would probably be generally admitted by all educated Arabs that abuses have crept in, a suggestion that it is ethnically a vicious institution and should be abolished on that ground would scarcely be considered to merit serious consideration.

8. It may well seem a formidable task, therefore, for European Powers to attempt to bring home the crime itself and the degree of its iniquity to a people who, apart from any question of ethics, are distrustful of the West, and whose rise to a prominent place among the nations derived much of its motive power from an adoption of Western ideas and Western influences. Fortunately for the case at slavery, public opinion in the Hejaz and Nejd is not at present either coherent or powerful. It is the King who counts, and he himself, whatever his personal inclinations may be, is for reasons of policy, if for no other reasons, more likely to have regard for foreign opinion and to be influenced by it. He is, too, more closely connected with the slave trade than any other ruler in Arabia.

9. It may be asked why the Wahhabi ruler, declaredly pious, has not taken steps to suppress the present day abuses which he himself has admitted to be contrary to Koranic law. The answer is, I think, firstly that the matter touches in a high degree his own comfort, prestige and influence, secondly that he has never previously felt himself sufficiently strong to attack the deep rooted social system of the country, and has considered that any attempt to do so would have no other result than a loss of authority if it did not bring the whole social fabric tumbling about his ears.

10. Independently of political considerations, I greatly doubt whether he himself favours the abolition of slavery. His private practices at any rate are at variance with his official declarations. These latter may be summarised as follows—

11. On the 30th January, 1926, Mr. Jordan reported one of the several interviews on the subject which he had had with the King, in the course of which the latter had enquired whether, if he took the necessary measures to stop the importation of slaves on all sides of the territories under his control, His Majesty's Government would consent to cease giving refuge to slaves at the British agency.

12. The King's answer to this question was that if he took the necessary measures to stop the importation of slaves, he could not at that time go beyond his offer without a religious fetwa and possibly a religious decree. He stated that if slavery, on account of the stoppage of importation, would die out and the slave trade would be abolished, he would be glad to see it. He stated that he had received a religious fetwa obtained from the ulema of Mecca. At the close of the interview the King stated that he would be glad to see a religious decree issued by the British Government to go slowly and explore every possible channel in order to satisfy the people without the party of slaves. The King further promised to consult his ulema

and endeavour by persuasion to obtain from them religious arguments against the practice of slavery. The King further stated that he was very anxious to see his country acknowledged as a civilised Power and to that end was prepared to make many sacrifices of and modifications in the established customs of the country.

13. There are two other expressions of opinion by the King, prior to the Jeddah Treaty, which are perhaps worth recalling. Acting on instructions contained in Foreign Office despatch No. 48 of the 22nd April, 1926, Mr. Jordan made fresh representations to the King and informed him that the Secretary of State recognised

the prohibition of the importation of slaves into the Hejaz and Nejd. At the same time the King was informed that His Majesty's Government could not give up the right of manumission as had been requested. The King replied to the effect that it was not easy to abolish the slave trade for trifling reasons, that he could not

measures, however, to be effective, would, he stated, have to be taken gradually. He regretted that he could not make any further concessions.

14. Again, in September 1926, at an interview with the acting British agent, the King stated that his policy was to see that slaves already in bondage were treated properly, and, meanwhile, he was prepared to discountenance fresh importations. It was impossible for him to forbid slavery.

15. I mention these declarations as, to a certain extent, they serve to illuminate the present situation, that is to say, the situation subsequent to the signature of the Treaty of Jeddah, by which the King in article 7, undertook to co-operate by all the means at his disposal with His Britannic Majesty in the suppression of the slave trade, also, they are worth bearing in mind in connexion with any fresh representations which may be made. It will be recalled here also that, in the course of the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Jeddah, Ibn Saud made it clear that he would not agree to the inclusion in the treaty of a provision recognising the right of manumission by His Majesty's consular officers.

16. The effect given to article 7 of the Jeddah Treaty again reflects the King's attitude. Of active co-operation there has been none. No action, legislative or administrative, has been taken, no moral pressure has been exercised. In fact, nothing whatever has been done to suppress or to discourage the slave trade. This may or may not be due to the fact that the King's mind and time have been fully occupied with other problems, and no one but himself could hope to attack a problem of its dimensions with any success. No steps, for instance, have been taken to abolish the customs duty on slaves of 20 per cent, payable *ad valorem* or in kind at the ports of disembarkation. I believe that this is still imposed at the smaller ports down the coast. It is true that since the signature of the Treaty of Jeddah the importation of slaves as a cargo through the port of Jeddah has ceased. I imagine that the slave trade is still carried on, but for the most part it is carried on by the local authorities.

I do not think that there is any more creditable reason for it, as the trade is carried on by the local authorities, and it is carried on with the active support, of the local sheikhs. In other respects also, owing, no doubt to the Treaty of Jeddah, no facilities are officially given to the slave trade, but slave dealing is carried on undisguised in the houses of the brokers in the towns, and by dealers in the interior. Slaves are not at present being sold in Arabia in public market in the ordinary sense of the word, but this is due not to any grace on the part of the local authorities but to the cessation of wholesale importation.

17. The King's practices and his private attitude towards slavery leave little ground for anticipating his wholehearted support, whatever action he may be induced to take for reasons of policy. The demands of the Royal household do not decrease, and, although some degree of secrecy may be observed in meeting them, it is not so secret as it once was. The King is not so much interested in the slave trade as he once was. That this is regarded by the King as a normal proceeding may be seen from the fact that he has not taken any steps to suppress it. He has not impressed upon him the illegality and cruelty of slavery as practised in his dominions, and the enslavement of Takrum women and children on pilgrimage, he retorted by referring to the condition of his own slaves, and by saying that Takrumis were people

who lived like beasts, that they were much better off as slaves, and that if he had his way he would take all Takrini pilgrims as his slaves, raising them thus out of their depraved state and turning them into happy, prosperous and civilised beings.

18. The attitude of the King and of the people towards slavery indicates that the Hejaz and Nejd constitute essentially as keen a market for slaves as ever. There is no lessening of the desire to possess slaves. Thanks, however, in part to the fact that political considerations in Arabia are militating against the practice of keeping slaves, and in part to the measures taken independently of Arabia, the numbers actually employed are falling off, and there are signs that economic laws are operating to reduce them still further.

19. In my opinion, chiefly British public opinion, both in view of the closer relationship with other countries which is becoming necessary, but much more as a result of the signature of the Treaty of Jeddah, the right of manumission may be included under this heading. The preventive measures referred to may be divided into those taken (1) in the countries of origin, these do not concern this memorandum (2) en route to prevent slave-traders reaching the African coast, and, particularly, (3) in the Red Sea. I will comment on (2) and (3) later.

20. The declaration of the King as embodied in the Treaty of Jeddah was a great step forward. Although he has done nothing as yet to implement his undertaking—an undertaking given, he it noted in exchange for material advantages to be gained, the very fact that he is committed to do so has introduced an element of insecurity into the ownership of slaves, and has made it a doubtful investment to buy them. Also, so far as the big centres of slavery—Jeddah, Mecca, Taif, and even Medina—are concerned the possibility that a slave can at any time achieve manumission without difficulty at the British Legation makes would-be purchasers hesitate to pay the prices which are demanded.

21. I have referred above in connexion with the political considerations which militate against the slave trade. There are one or two aspects of the matter worth more particular mention.

22. Although the letters on the subject exchanged between the late Sir Gilbert Clayton and the King on the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah may be regarded as consecrating an existing right, which thus rests on firmer ground than previously the position now is in one respect weaker. In article I of the Treaty of Jeddah the complete and absolute independence of the King's dominions was recognised. In view of this stipulation, it appears to me to be more than doubtful whether, if the occasion arose, jurisdiction could now properly be claimed by the Legation over refugee Sudanese or Takrini slaves, even if there were no major political objections to claiming such a right. This leaves the door open for trouble if the local authorities desired to be obstructive. It is easy for the owner or for the Hejaz authorities themselves to accuse a slave of crime and to demand his trial and punishment. The Hejaz Government would, of course, claim jurisdiction. Accusations have, in fact, frequently been made in the past, but, so far, they have either been easily disproved or else it has been possible to find a solution without raising questions of principle. Although in one case in 1927 a slave accused of theft was temporarily and as a private arrangement handed over to the Hejaz authorities for trial under guarantees, matters were so arranged that the case was dismissed and the slave was brought back to the British agency. It might be no easy matter, however, in certain circumstances to insist on guarantees, and to protect a slave, if handed back to the Hejaz authorities for trial, from the barbarous penalties which are still sometimes enforced. It might even be difficult to get him back at all.

23. I have stated above that nothing positive has been done by the King so far to co-operate in the suppression of the slave trade. Nevertheless, it must, I think, be attributed in the main to his attitude, though it is a negative one, that no serious attempt has been made to suppress the slave trade. The Government or of the local officials, however, have been able to do so. In the case of the British Legation it would have been an easy matter to create trouble. Credit for this is largely due to the Governor of Jeddah, who is invariably friendly to the slave trade. The British Legation has been able to do so, but have not wished to be repatriated. has by tact and persuasion managed to secure their manumission by their owners. I should also like to acknowledge here the assistance which has been rendered by the British Legation at Port Sudan, and which has made the disposal of slaves an easy matter.

24. The exercise of the right of manumission, a fact which is thoroughly well known in Arabia, is, I think, a guarantee for the good treatment of slaves within reach of the British Legation as well as being a general principle of law.

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27 The exercise of this right has undoubtedly been one of great benefit but its chief importance lies, I think, in its value as a bargaining asset in any negotiations which may take place for the legal abolition of slavery, and the right should not be abandoned. I feel sure except, finally, if and when legislation to this end is passed and is rigorously enforced.

and is passed and is rigorously enforced.

20 The average prices of slaves have risen in the course of the past few years. It is not so marked as the increasing difficulties of importation might suggest. The comparative stability of prices is, I think, due to the fact that the demand for slaves is not so great as it was some years ago. As regards the dues collected from the pilgrims leave the Hajazis meagre pickings, so much so that the Hajazis are also suffering.

So, another factor affecting the demand for slaves is the introduction of motor cars into the country. A small degree has been the introduction of motor cars into the country. This means of transport for pilgrims encouraged as it is so much easier than the old method of carrying them on camels or mules. The demand for slaves for this purpose is thus disappearing.

4. Peaceful conditions and the security now prevailing also make it

32. It would be a mistake, however, to think that slave-trading within America is actually to be abolished to an extent which would warrant any relaxation of measures above, but before going on to consider them in detail it may be useful to review the sources of supply and the methods of the slave traders.

31. The demand for slaves in metal, to the extent that it can be met (1) by the

34 Such evidence as it has gone to show that by far Africa are transported to the territories. The transport effectively stopped as it would a further transport of slaves to the Red Sea at the Straits of Bab el Mandeb. The evidence is that the Red Sea is the only place where the slaves are sold and the cargoes on the Red Sea. The evidence is that the Red Sea is the only place where the slaves are sold and the cargoes on the Red Sea.

35. An important if not the most important factor in the Western world is North where, I am sure, there are a lot of people. From Moscow, as we shipped in small boats, other parts along the coast north and south. I see

that arrangements exist at all ports of any size for their reception and disposal. The details of the arrangement would depend on the circumstances existing at the time, particularly on the whereabouts of the sloops if known, but in most cases, I think, arrangements are made beforehand with specific agents.

36. One improvement that it is generally agreed may be written down to the credit of the last few years, thanks to the vigilance of His Majesty's sloops, and perhaps equally to the prestige which they enjoy, is the fact that the wholesale traffic in slaves has been reduced to very small proportions. It is not, under present conditions, worth the risk attempting to ship large cargoes across the Red Sea. The armed expeditions by sea also which used to be fitted out for the purpose of raiding towns and villages on the western coast of the Red Sea are no longer practicable. The traffic has become retail and more difficult to carry on in consequence. This has without doubt considerably lessened the volume of the trade from Africa, and although there have been no actual captures since 1924, this fact alone justifies and is a testimonial to the work of the sloops.

37 The retail traffic is extremely difficult to suppress either on land or on sea. 1,000 slaves, principally children and adolescent girls, imported into Arara. The measures taken in French Somaliland are, for whatever reason, fully admitted, I believe, except by the French officials responsible, to have been largely ineffective in checking the trade. The Italian land patrol in Eritrea does not transport slaves to the coast through Eritrean territory than through French Somaliland. In both cases, however, I greatly doubt whether the local officials have adequate means at their disposal to enable them, even with the best will in the world, to cope with the problem successfully. All things considered, I think that, whatever the present, their co-operation by action on the African mainland may for practical purposes be limited. The measures which may yet be taken by the Hejaz Government itself, or, in addition, by measures which may yet be taken by it, is to concentrate on improving the patrol by sea.

38. The patrolling of the Red Sea is, in theory, the duty of the French, Italian and British Governments. According to this theory, the French patrol a small portion of the coastline opposite Perim and the French Somali coast outside, and the Italians patrol the Eritrean coast, while the duty of patrolling all other coasts, as well as the Red Sea proper, devolves upon the British Government. In practice the French and Italian patrol appears to be of the most superficial nature. There is no French ship patrolling the Red Sea or stationed at a port of call, and the only semblance of a sea patrol is the occasional appearance of a French sloop which is attached to the Mediterranean fleet on a cruise in the Red Sea. I understand that the British Government has no ships stationed in the Red Sea.

control is carried out by two sloops, at present H M S "Cleopatra" and H M S "Dahlab". Actually, as a general rule only one sloop is at a time the other refitting in the meanwhile at Malta. The whole of the Red Sea from Akaba to Perim is patrolled, a few visits being paid to Aden and an occasional cruise being undertaken further east along the southern coast of Arabia.

40. It is obvious, therefore, in the nature of things that the preventive measures at present in force, whatever results they may have and however valuable they may be as a deterrent, must fall far short of achieving the object in view, if this object is to prevent slave-trading in the Red Sea altogether or to reduce it to such small proportions as to render it almost unprofitable. It is too easy to ship small numbers of slaves across five or six at a time possibly more. These slaves may be carried with other cargo and figure as part of the crew, or, in the case of children, as part of the family of the dhowman or as apprentices. The case may or may not be genuine. Their presence on board is not in itself a cause for suspicion. Dhows have been known to carry forty men and thirty apprentices and to have proved innocent. If the children carried are black, as opposed to brown, there is rather more ground for suspicion, but that is all. Outside the pilgrimage season

there is nothing so far as I know to prevent dhows from carrying passengers. In consequence, as the commanding officer of H.M.S. "Dahlia" has pointed out, no significance is necessarily to be attached to any arrangements for carrying a large number of persons. Dhows' papers are notoriously loosely drawn up, if carried at all, and it is as a rule impossible to obtain evidence, particularly from children, such as would justify the seizure and detention of a dhow, or would warrant its being towed long distances to the port of adjudication, Aden. I feel bound to express the opinion here, and I think that the Commissioner at Port Sudan would agree with me that, in spite of the assurances given by the Italian Government, dhows are still leaving Massawah with pilgrims. The control of the dhow traffic is therefore rendered so much the more difficult.

41. The work of the sloop is handicapped by the comparative ease with which dhows can ply within the reef area north of Kamaran, which covers over 10,000 square miles, and in the many other waters where navigation is impeded by reefs. The commander of H.M.S. "Dahlia" states in a report of his that no ships can approach the Arabian coast in the Red Sea, even in daylight, except at a few well

known points, and that after dark it is impossible to be adequately charted and passable for sloops, and that one only by daylight. Whatever the odds normally in favour of the dhows may be, these are enormously increased once they reach the reef areas, where the slave-runner can manoeuvre more freely, and if he hugs the mainland can lie concealed in the inlets or run his dhow ashore and escape into the security of the desert on sighting a ship.

42. Another thing that detracts from the effectiveness of the patrol is the lack of information about the movements of slave dhows. No organised intelligence service exists, at any rate on the Arabian side, through which such information might be obtained. I gather that a somewhat ambitious proposal for something of this nature was rejected in 1928 on the ground chiefly of expense. Personally, I find it well-nigh impossible, without something more elaborate in the way of an intelligence service than I have at present, to obtain any reliable information which would be of practical assistance in leading to the capture of slave dhows. Add to this the fact, which is, I think, established, that good workable arrangements exist by which slave traders are apprised of the movements, and on occasion also of the intended movements of the sloop, and it may well be conjectured how it has been possible to achieve any results.

43. There is another difficulty which I would like to mention, although it has already received consideration. It arises over the question of the sanctity of territorial waters. According to present arrangements His Majesty's sloop is debarred from operating in the territorial waters of French Somaliland and Eritrea. This embargo is a very real one, and experience has shown that any departure from the punctilious observance of international custom in this respect at once evokes a strong protest. I have already drawn attention to the illusory nature of the French and Italian patrol of these waters. I do not think that it can be disputed that slave dhows are practically free to sail northwards along the African coast without interference until they choose their time for crossing. This is doubtless known to the slave traders.

44. So far, I believe, no serious difficulties have arisen with the Hejaz or other authorities over the question of the right of search of Arabian dhows whether on the high seas or in territorial waters, as regards these latter, it is questionable what are territorial waters in the Red Sea, whether, that is to say, reef and island areas are included. Some difficulty arose in the early part of last year over the right of the British sloop to call at Hejazi ports without obtaining previous permission, notification of the expected visit alone having been given in the past. For a period of the year it was considered advisable that the sloop should abstain from calling, but the question is momentarily dormant. All these matters may require formal settlement with the Hejaz Government at any time, but a discussion of them does not fall within the scope of this memorandum. Nevertheless, I should like to record my opinion that setting aside the question of the French and Italian territorial waters to which I have referred above, the exercise by the sloop of the right of search in the Red Sea of dhows of all nationalities, whether on the high seas or in territorial waters, is an essential factor in the suppression of the slave trade. To my opinion, to yield to a possible request of the Hejaz Government to do so, a request which incidentally would raise the question of the treatment of all Arabian dhows

alike in this respect, as, failing similar treatment, all dhows engaged in slave running

45. In connexion with the right of search, it is interesting to note that during the last few years the majority of the dhows captured have been found to be of Hejaz nationality, although another eight or nine were possibly Hejazi also. Proof of nationality is, however, difficult to obtain, and dhows often carry a selection of flags for use as occasion may suggest. As the commander of H.M.S. "Dahlia" has reported, Arabian-owned dhows seldom fly flags of any scaled pattern. Red is the predominant colour, with white edges, crescent, daggers or stars added to taste. A purple chequered lion-cloth will serve just as well.

46. It is clear that the Red Sea patrol labours under considerable difficulties. On the other hand, it is not easy to see how matters can be improved to any appreciable extent without incurring further expenditure, expenditure of a substantial nature. I venture, however, to put forward the following suggestions, where expenditure is

(1) In order to make it easier to establish the innocence or otherwise of a ship, traffic should be exercised at the ports of departure on the African coast. This would involve the enforcement by international agreement of regulations regarding the possession of papers properly drawn up and recently endorsed. I would attach

There are, no doubt, many ways in which a control of this sort could be circumvented. In many ways, admittedly, it would not be effective. I feel sure, however, that the present irregularities operate greatly in favour of slave running. It is, however, possible to go some way towards improving matters. Any improvement here would be all to the good. I do not know whether there would be insurmountable difficulties in enforcing such regulations on Arabian-owned dhows, but I imagine that pressure could be put on them by administrative means when they enter African ports.

The point is also worth considering, I think, in connexion with a possible question of the necessity in order to make any control of the West African pilgrimage effective, that

(2) I have commented on the extensive protection afforded to slave dhows by the reef area north of Kamaran, which covers Medi. It seems to me that, in addition to the regular patrol of the sloop, some form of localised patrol is required, and I would suggest that some small craft of shallow draught, perhaps one or, better, two boats in the nature of or of the size of the motor launches used in the war might be based at Kamaran for the purpose of cruising inside the reef area. I am assuming that there would be no political objections to Kamaran being used as a base in this way, or, if so, that they could be overcome. It appears to me also that seaplanes based on Kamaran

(4) Although, as I gather, an elaborate scheme for obtaining advance information that something might be done towards this end by the employment of one or two boats, I think it would be useful in places where ready means exist of communicating with British political officers or with the patrol. If a local patrol were based at Kamaran it should not, I imagine, be impossible to establish contact with Medi and obtain advance information from there. An essential condition for the success of this or, for that matter, of any such scheme involving obtaining intelligence from natives would be the payment of large prizes for information leading to a conviction.

I have not explored the possibility of obtaining reliable local information from the ports that are at the mouth of the Red Sea. It would, I imagine, be largely a question of expense. It might not be impossible, but, on the

other hand, I consider that there are strong political objections in attempting to do so which would outweigh the problematical advantage to be gained.

(5) I presume that the question of having a localized patrol based on Perim, similar to that suggested above, limited to patrolling the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and operating, perhaps, as far as Aden, has already been considered. The effectiveness of such a patrol would, of course, depend largely on the facilities for obtaining advance information rapidly from the coastal tribes within range, and being able to use it.

(6) It would be useful I think, if more frequent visits were paid along the Southern Arabian coast, as far, perhaps, as Mokalla.

of the sloops themselves, but it is important, also, apart from the question of localized patrols, that the most suitable type of motor boat, as indicated by the experience of the past few years, should be carried for examining the inlets where the sloop itself cannot proceed.

(7) The idea of using armed dhows in the same way as "mystery ships" was mooted in 1926. His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa suggested then that, whilst being less conspicuous, they might be more numerous and possibly better adapted for keeping a close watch on the movements of other dhows. This suggestion was rejected. The Somali coast to suppress arms traffic had proved a failure owing to the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently fast craft and expert crews, and to the fact that their use had a demoralizing effect on the crews. If, as I believe, this proposal contemplated manning dhows with a naval crew, I think, too, that an attempt to employ them against slave dhows would not be more successful. The manning of dhows with native crews, however—again with the large prize as a bait—might, I think, give good results, particularly if these dhows worked in conjunction with a local patrol.

(8) Every possible precaution should be taken to ensure that the movements, intended calls at and departures from ports, should be kept secret (vide in this connection Admiralty letter to the Under Secretary of State dated the 3rd July, 1924).

(9) The idea of coming to an agreement with the French and Italian Governments with the object of throwing open the territorial waters reciprocally to the patrols of all three Powers was considered in 1928 as part of a wider scheme for co-operation in the suppression of the slave trade, a scheme which envisaged, among other things, the establishment of a joint patrol in the Red Sea. This scheme was entertained by His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, and so far as I know it has not since been pursued.

In his despatch to the Foreign Office No. 270 of the 3rd December, 1928, His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa suggested that one of the proposals made by the Powers, might be less open to objection than the others. He went on to say that,

foreign vessels of war to enter British territorial waters for the particular purpose in question, and for that only, he was inclined to think that an agreement to that end between His Majesty's Government and the French and Italian Governments (for Italian waters would certainly have to be included) would be useful. He saw no reason why, if negotiations were confined to this particular point without raising the more difficult and contentious problems involved in air patrol, it should not be possible of attainment. He therefore suggested that this matter might be taken up with the French and Italian Governments. An all round waiver of the sanctity of territorial waters could in the opinion of the British officers engaged on the patrol, make the business of the slave dhows more difficult even if it did not lead to actual capture.

I should like to associate myself with that view. It is important that the British sloops should be at liberty to inspect a dhow and examine her papers, if any. It would greatly help matters, of course, if they could take further action against a suspicious dhow, if only by towing her into the nearest port of her nationality to be farther dealt with there. If triangular agreement with the French and Italians proved impracticable, perhaps it would be possible to come to an agreement with one or other country separately.

(11) Failing any more definite agreement as suggested in the foregoing, it is suggested that an informal understanding not to insist meticulously on the punctilious observance of international rights, and if instructions were sent accordingly to local officers.

(12) I fear, in the light of past experience, that it would be useless to expect from local French and Italian authorities their whole-hearted and active support for any co-ordinated effort to suppress slavery. It might, however, serve to stimulate local individual effort if an agreement were made to exchange regularly information regarding numbers of dhows searched and other specific action taken, and if a procedure were evolved for doing so both locally and by the Governments.

47. In putting forward suggestions with regard to the naval patrol, I speak without technical knowledge, and there may be technical or service objections which escape me. I am also for the most part unaware to what extent the present proposals may have already been considered. I do not in any case wish to imply that their adoption would put a stop to the slave trade in the Red Sea altogether. I do think, however, that they would go a long way towards making it less profitable and more difficult to carry out at a reasonable cost. I think they would have a large moral effect in discouraging the slave trade, and should be adopted as soon as possible.

48. The number of Africans who are sold into slavery while on pilgrimage is equally impossible to calculate, but I am inclined to think that these cases also are not numerous. Were it otherwise, the fact would have come to the knowledge of this Legation. As it is, only one or two cases have been reported in the last two or three years. The trouble is, however, that very little control can be exercised at present over the African pilgrimage, which is in the hands of the local sheikhs, and that these sheikhs, both in Jedda and elsewhere in the Hejaz, as Mr. Bullard has pointed out, take an active part in the slave trade when they can and share in the profits. Appointed by the local Government, they are, taken all round, an unprincipled and rapacious band of rascals who grovel to authority and, to protect their own interests, are prepared to do anything. The Hejaz Government is entirely at their mercy and as stated, there are a number of ways in which the pilgrims are hoodwinked and sold into slavery.

49. From time to time reports of these sales are received from West Africans in this country. The particulars given are always vague and detection is impossible. In many if not in most cases, the informant has an axe to grind or wishes to get an enemy into trouble. In no case has it been possible to obtain definite proof of guilt or even good evidence.

50. I am convinced myself that the plight of these African pilgrims has in only one respect been really improved during the Saudian régime as a result of action taken by the Hejaz authorities, namely in the protection now afforded against brigandage and kidnapping along the road. These practices have now ceased, and pilgrims can proceed on their way in complete security.

51. As things are at present I see no means of effectually stopping these sales. The lines suggested last year would greatly help towards doing so. The application of such lines would greatly help towards doing so. The application of such lines would greatly help towards doing so.

52. The lines suggested last year would greatly help towards doing so. The application of such lines would greatly help towards doing so. The application of such lines would greatly help towards doing so.

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54. Given the necessary funds it should not be impossible to institute a simple system of intelligence to furnish information as to sales and other malpractices. The appointment of a paid agent in each of the towns of Jedda, Mecca and Medina would probably produce results, but so long as slavery as an institution remains and the present practices are condoned by the King, and African slaves continue to be sought after, it would be a waste of time, I think, to attempt to induce the local authorities to take severe action against offenders—action that is of a nature to discourage the practice itself—although possibly in the isolated cases that might be brought to their notice the authorities might make some sort of pretence of doing so as a step to British representations.

56. The threat alone to introduce regulations of this sort might, however, be useful as a means of coercion, and, if it were possible by a method for instance such as I have suggested above to obtain good evidence of cases of sales, it might serve to compel the King to take really effective measures to stop them. Action on these lines would, however, be much more effective if Dutch co-operation were secured in respect of the Javanese pilgrims.

58. The only radical solution of the whole question, however, lies with the King and with the King only. Unless he himself cuts out the demand for slaves, the supply will continue somehow. The various suggestions and recommendations made, if adopted, would do little more than disturb the surface of the problem a little more than at present without going deep. They affect the subject externally when drastic internal treatment is required. It may be inferred from the King's attitude in the past that, if he had his own way, he would prefer to leave matters as they are. The extension of his kingdom and the growth of his power has, however, brought him into more direct and closer contact with foreign countries who condemn the practice of slavery, and, whatever may have been his attitude in the past, he has to look to the future, and he has everything to gain by conciliating foreign opinion. It remains to be considered how to make that opinion felt and what is the best line of approach.

60 There may be a good opportunity, when the King returns and the first chorus of popular rejoicing is heard for the newly appointed British Minister to make a first impression on the popular imagination as understood by the treaty. The King's return to Mecca is likely to be particularly sympathetic to British aims and interests in the Hijaz and Nejd and these impressions may be carried to the new regime in Iraq under King Faisal. It is not outside the bounds of possibility, too, that he might envisage the admission of the kingdom to the League of Nations.

E 1658, 1064/91

Memorandum concerning the existence of Slavery and Slave Trading along the Eastern and South Eastern Coasts of Arabia.

Suppression of Slave Trading

92271

In conclusion, I wish your Majesty abundant good lasting happiness.

'E 1901/14/847

No. 106

The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India, New Delhi
(Communicated by the India Office, April 12)

SLAVE trade in the Persian Gulf. Reference your letter of the 4th December.
1829

I have waited before replying in order to make myself conversant with the local conditions of slavery, which, as pointed out in the enclosure to my despatch No. 837 of the 18th March, 1930, on domestic slavery, differ in different localities.

2. Before replying to the specific inquiries contained in your letter, I think it would be convenient to give a brief résumé of the slave trade in this area, various aspects of which have already been dealt with by my predecessors at different times. This résumé, read with my despatch quoted above, will give, I hope, some sort of picture of slavery in the Gulf as a whole.

3. There are three principal slave routes:—

- A. From India to the Oman and Trucial Coast, via Persian Mekran
- B. From Persian Mekran to the Oman and Trucial Coast.
- C. From Ibn Saud's territories in Hejaz and Nejd to the whole of the Arab coast.

6. The somewhat formidable term slave routes, with its suggestion of large convoys of slaves being moved about the Gulf, is, however, a misnomer, and suggests a state of affairs which—fortunately—does not exist. Nothing much more than what may be described as, at most, a steady trickle passes along these ways, and along one of them not even this. I am happy to state that it is of route A, for which the Government of India has the most responsibility, that this last statement can be made. About two years ago a case of four Indian boys, kidnapped from Karachi and sold on the Arab coast, gave rise to suspicions that this traffic might be the result of a regular organisation operating on a large scale. Investigation by Sir Lionel Haworth proved these suspicions to be groundless. He pointed out that such cases were very few, and that, when they did occur, almost all were recovered by this Residency. Various authorities in the Gulf reported that they had never heard of an Indian being employed in a pearling boat—where slave labour is most desired. The presence of Hindu merchants, too, at all the pearling and trading centres on the Arabian coast, who would immediately report the existence of Indian slaves (as they had done in the case of the four boys), was, in itself, a guarantee against such a traffic. (Buhars Residency letter of the 10th June, 1923.) The Government of India agreed with his views in their letter of the 22nd August, 1923.

5. Route B has two bifurcations, the northern from Bungi and Sirik to Katar, Abu Dhab, Kfar Falaq and Idku, and the southern from Sirik to Chahing, Chahing Parag, Puzim and Kunerk to the Batinab coast of Oman. The extent of traffic on this route was described by the political resident last October as a "steady, though small, trickle of slaves" (vide this Residency letter of the 15th October, 1929, to the British Legation, Tehran, copy forwarded to the Government of India under Bushire endorsement No. 2351 of the 16th October, 1929). The captures and enslavements in Persian Mckrab are carried out entirely by the local inhabitants, the chief slave supplier being a Baluchi chief, one Barkat Khan. A particularly

[illegible]

6. Route C covers the whole Arab littoral of the Gulf and Oman to Kuwait. It is impossible to say how many slaves are brought in by the "back doors" of the various sheikhdoms concerned. Probably the term already used for the Mekran coast "a small though steady trade" will be repeated here as well, and I formed a very different text that there is really little demand for slaves nowadays in Oman and Trucial Coast, as the number of existing slaves is sufficient for the requirements of the people.

7. It will be seen that, of the slave routes enumerated, the Government of India are only wholly responsible for the first, as a base on this operation is practically non-existent. On the other two (B and C) the Government of India have no responsibility whatever for the slave supply at source, which rests with the Governments of Persia and Neph respectively. The efforts of the Government of India, and their officers in the Gulf, and those of His Majesty's ships, to put down slavery are negatived because the above Governments will not, or cannot, exercise effective control in their dominions. Slavery is a question on which British and international opinion is rightly exercised, and I venture to suggest that if (and when) the subject of slavery in the Gulf is raised in public discussion, whether in Parliament or at Geneva, the Government of India—in its own interests—should give due publicity to this aspect of the case.

8. A further advantage of such publicity might well be to force from the Persian Government, who seem quite impervious to official remonstrances on the slave trade (vide Tehran letter No. 472 of the 7th November, 1924), but who are very susceptible to public opinion in Europe, some degree of co-operation in the suppression of slavery. The "Shafagh-i-Surkh," for instance, a Tehran Persian newspaper, in its issue of the 21st May, 1928, published a long leading article on a reply to a question (quoted by Reuter's) given by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons to the effect that the slave trade still existed in Persian Baluchistan. The article, of course, doubtless officially inspired, violently denied that such a trade existed, but the attention that was given the matter shows the value which the Persian educated classes attach to Western opinion on the question.

9. You ask how far it has been possible to bring pressure to bear on the sheikhs to suppress the slave traffic. I have recently returned from a tour of the Trucial Coast and took the opportunity of warning the sheikhs there of the displeasure of the Government if later attack they would incur in any connivance by them in the slave trade, or slackness on their part to suppress it, came to light. It must be borne in mind, however, that the life of a Trucial sheikh is a precarious one, he has to walk warily to avoid the attacks of his subjects or his people, and he would attach real authority. The isolation of the Trucial Coast will be broken down ultimately by the establishment of the air route, and with closer contact with the outside world that aircraft, wireless and improved means of communication will inevitably bring about. When this occurs it will be possible to obtain much better information of any cases of traffic in slaves that occurs, and to deal with it much more rapidly and drastically than at present the case. The danger will become a risky one and ultimately will be found to be not worth the candle. At present the only measures that can be adopted are to try and induce the Persians to stop the supply at the source, and to compel the sheikhs to surrender any slave brought into their respective territories from outside. The difficulty really is to obtain information about cases of slavery, since there is no open sale as in the pre-treaty days. The domestic slave is usually sold ~~where that~~ I can obtain his freedom by applying to the nearest British authority, the stronger brought to me. Moreover, since it frequently happens that cases of slave traffic are only brought to notice because the relatives of the slave seek him out, or he meets a compatriot who informs the Residency agent.

10 In Oman the Batinah coast is the principal centre of the slave trade. It is occupied by the Tel Sand, the largest Omani tribe, who are semi independent of the Sultan of Muscat. The following are the views of the political agent, Muscat (with which I agree), on the subject of slavery on the Batinah coast, expressed in a letter to this Residency written last September

"Although I do not think the immediate use of force would have come to the aid of the Batinah which is already under way and which will no doubt be carried out within the next couple of years, the consequent advent of motor cars and the formation of closer relations with Muscat will tend towards making this tract too conspicuous a venue as an entrepot for the slave trade. The trade will then probably cease automatically. The Muscat State will then be in a better position also to put a stop to the practice.

At Bahrein—as explained in my report on domestic slavery—there is no slave trade

11 It is no doubt that a small special secret service grant to be spent in assisting political agents and the Residency agent, Shargah, to obtain information as to the slave trade would be of great value. I suggest that a sum of 2,000 rupees be put at my disposal for the ensuing year for this purpose

12 Concerning the possibility of the arrest of Mohammed Dawar, the notorious slave dealer, to which you refer, and his disposal when arrested, I am of opinion that the Muscat State would be the best place to deal with him. His capture would be to hand him over to that State for punishment, who, I think, can be counted on to deal with him adequately, and his arrest would produce a salutary effect. The political agent, Muscat, recently reported that he had gone to Ibn Saud with camels, and would perhaps return via Kuwait or Bahrein. The capture of Dawar as mentioned above would give a greater chance of capturing this individual though the matter is far from being an easy one.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, and to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India to be read in conjunction with my report on domestic slavery a copy of which is being sent to him by me

H V BISCOE
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

Bushire, March 18, 1930

E 1900 1054/91) No 107

The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India, New Delhi —
(Communicated by the India Office, April 12)

Sir
DOMESTIC slavery in the Persian Gulf
As desired in your letter dated the 14th January, 1930, I have the honour to submit a note on the above subject

A copy is being sent direct to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for India

I have, &c.
H V BISCOE
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

Enclosure in No. 107.

Note on Domestic Slavery in the Persian Gulf

THE subject on which a report is asked is 'the Abolition of Domestic Slavery in Territories under British Influence in the Persian Gulf' (vide Mr. Mander's question in the House of Commons, attached to India Office letter of the 19th December, 1929). The area covered by this report, therefore, is the Arabian side of the Gulf (other than the portion belonging to Nejd), since there are no territories on the Persian Coast under such influence

2 The term "slavery" is often given such an indiscriminate signification, and vague terms such as "virtual slavery" and so forth are so widely used that to avoid confusion it seems convenient to decide what actually constitutes slavery. In the Geneva Slavery Convention of the 25th September, 1926, the following definition has been adopted —

Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised "

The cognate question of the slave trade or traffic in the Gulf I have dealt with in a separate report (vide my despatch No. 638, dated the 18th March, 1930). The two reports taken together give, I trust, some sort of picture of slavery as a whole in the Gulf

3 The Arabian coast, for the present purpose, may be divided into four areas

Oman, the Trucial Coast, Bahrein and Katar and Kuwait

The Hassa coast, belonging to Nejd, is outside the scope of this report

Oman

4 Domestic slavery is general throughout Oman, and may conveniently be considered under two categories, (a) household and (b) industrial. It is important to note that these two divisions exist all along the Arabian coast. Category (a) covers individuals employed as bodyguards to sheikhs (slaves being outside dynastic privileges), as coffee makers and domestic servants. The lot of slaves in this category is generally far from hard—as local conditions go—and not seldom compares favourably with that of the free tribesmen. The lot of slaves in the free tribesmen, as coffee makers and domestic servants. The lot of slaves in this category is generally far from hard—as local conditions go—and not seldom compares favourably with that of the free tribesmen. and the pearl diver, and it is with regard to these two classes that hardship exists, the latter, in point of numbers, being much the more important, since the whole of the Arabian coast to a large extent lives on the pearl trade, while considerable date groves are few. Mr. Thomas, the Wazir of the Muscat State, in the course of a valuable report, summarises the slave situation as follows —

"Shara Law is perhaps the most sacred and powerful institution in tribal Arabia, and no authority can defy its ordinances without being discredited if not incurring odium. By Shara Law the slave is property, and on a master's death the slave forms part of the estate and its value, subject to the usual rigid laws of Moslem inheritance. While a change of public opinion in recent years has greatly modified the once hard lot of the slave, and to-day there is no wholesale buying and selling as in pre-treaty days, the operation of the Shara Law sometimes entails the slave changing hands on a monetary basis "

5 As the pearling season approaches each year there is a great migration to the Trucial Coast—off which some of the best banks lie—from Oman, as many as 5,000 coming from the Batinah tribes, while perhaps 2,000 come from other districts. Of this total about 1,000 are believed to be slaves. The freeman enjoys the fruit of his labours, but of course, has to support himself for the rest of the year, while the slave's earnings go to his master who, however, has to support the slave in comparative idleness till the next season. At the end of the season divers return to Oman. Amongst the Omani divers, free and slave alike, the Trucial Coast is said to be unpopular as compared with Katar and Bahrein, where more equitable conditions prevail, the divers getting a fairer share of their dues.

6 We have a slave treaty with Muscat, and any slave can obtain his manumission by applying to the political agent of that place

[23271]

Trucial Coast

7. Throughout the Trucial Coast slavery is common, both household and still more industrial, since unlike Oman, which has other sources of livelihood, this desolate coast depends almost entirely on the pearl trade. The inhabitants earn enough from their share of the trade in the four pearling months (July to October) to maintain themselves—eked out by fishing—for the rest of the year. As already described, Omani divers come here in large numbers during the season, and are joined by the local divers—free and slaves. No estimate is available of the number of the latter. Slaves are concentrated in the villages of the coast, the local Bedouin who subsist with difficulty in the desert hinterland, being far too poor to maintain more than a very few. There is nothing approaching a slave-market on the coast, and no buying or selling of slaves on a large scale exists, though slaves occasionally change hands.

8. We have slave treaties with the Trucial chiefs, and any slave can apply for manumission to the residency agent at Shargah, who refers his case to the Resident.

Bahrain and Katar

9. It is satisfactory to be able to report that in Bahrain slavery is almost extinct; such individuals as still remain domestic slaves do so entirely by their own wish, since they have only to apply to the political agent to obtain their manumission. The State courts refuse to recognise the status of slavery in, for instance, testamentary disputes. The case of the pearl divers, to which public reference is sometimes made, is a very different matter. Slaves are not only used in the pearl-diving coming under the definition of slavery quoted in paragraph 2 above, but have been receiving the careful attention of the political agency and the Residency for some years past. I am happy to state that by a patient and judicious pressure brought to bear on the pearling merchants and other authorities concerned, and by the exercise of tactful supervision, the hard lot of these divers had been alleviated, and the system by which the latter—having received an initial advance—remained "wage-slaves" for the rest of their lives, was brought to an end. I attach as an appendix to this report a note by Mr. Belgrave, financial adviser to the Bahrain State.

10. Slave conditions in Katar generally resemble those on the Trucial Coast. We have a slave treaty with the Sheikh of Katar, but no resident manumitting authority. Bahrain is, however, within easy reach of the peninsula.

Koweit

11. It is estimated that there are about 2,000 household and industrial slaves in Koweit, the former considerably exceeding the latter. The number is now less than formerly, and many have been freed, since this is considered a virtuous act, enjoined by the Mahometan religion. The treatment of slaves here is reported to be the best in the Gulf, and is due to the influence of the present Sheikh, who is very humane. Slaves are employed in the pearl-diving of Koweit, and slaves are employed on it, though not, it is believed, in very large numbers.

12. There is no slave treaty with Koweit, and consequently we have there no manumitting authority.

13. The above short résumé gives a picture of the conditions under which domestic slavery exists in the Gulf. It will be seen that the system is widespread, and for it the inhabitants claim the sanction of their religion, and any attempt at its abolition would meet with serious political and economic consequences, while, as was pointed out in the reply to Mr. Mander's question in the House of Commons, in some of the areas mentioned the powers of the interference of His Majesty's Government are strictly limited, and this is notably the case on the Trucial Coast. At Koweit on the whole the situation is improving, a considerable number of slaves have been freed, the remainder are chiefly employed on not very arduous household duties, and their treatment is generally satisfactory. At Bahrain there is practically no slavery, while the virtual slavery of the free divers in the Gulf is being brought to an end. The political agent is fully alive to the necessity of maintaining a constant watchfulness to prevent a retrograde movement in the near future. Literacy is spreading, and many of the sons of the present divers will be able to read and write, and will there-

be able to check their own accounts and to ensure that they receive their just dues. On the Trucial Coast and in Oman the position is not so satisfactory. As I have explained in my despatch No. 638, dated the 18th March, 1930, on the slave trade, as distinct from domestic slavery, there is a small but steady trickle of slaves brought into this area, and constant vigilance of the British authorities is required to suppress this traffic. The Government of India, however, maintain on the Trucial Coast and at Muscat officials to whom the slaves can and do apply for manumission. The objection which may be made that slaves are prevented by force from so doing has little force, since slaves are, of course, not kept under any sort of restraint, but mingle freely with the community to which they belong. It is universally known throughout the Gulf that the British authorities do grant manumission to any slave applying for it, and there is no doubt that the large majority of the slaves could escape to them and obtain their freedom if they so desired. The reason that more do not do so is that in the large majority of cases the domestic slave is little worse off than the free man, they are both bound by the stern rules of economic necessity, and must obtain their livelihood in a territory where nature renders it peculiarly difficult to do so. The master of the slave, on his own interests, finds it more advantageous to use a slave than a free man, for the climate and provides him with a wife and a dwelling-place. I once had in my own employ a slave, when asked why he did not apply for freedom, he replied that his master had fallen on evil days and could not, therefore, afford to keep him, and had turned him out to earn his own living; if, however, he was at any time out of work his master always fed him till he got work, and he expressed his entire readiness to go back and work for his master whenever the state of the latter's finances permitted. This attitude is typical of the large majority of domestic slaves in the Persian Gulf—they are not concerned with abstract considerations, but with a much more practical one, that on the whole they obtain a modicum of the necessities of life without having to worry about the morrow. Further, many of these slaves have been born in their master's families, and regard themselves as members of his household and frequently are attached to him by ties of sentiment. Those that do seek manumission are chiefly persons who have recently been enslaved and who, of course, are under an entire separate category. The value of the British manumitting authorities, however, cannot be gauged merely by the number of slaves manumitted. The presence of such authorities is of great value in ensuring that slaves are reasonably treated by their masters, who know that in case of harsh treatment they may lose their property.

14. There is only one real remedy for the existing state of affairs and one means of definitely abolishing slavery on the Arab coast, and that is to extend our influence, increase our measure of interference and control and break down the isolation in which the Omani Arabs now live. This, however, is opposed to the policy which we have hitherto pursued, namely to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of these sheikhdoms and principalities provided they maintain a maritime truce and suppress the traffic in slaves. It involves many political considerations, and would certainly have many repercussions, and is not a change which I personally would advocate. It will probably come gradually; hardly any community nowadays can live in complete isolation from the outside world, and even Arabia will one day presumably be traversed by aircraft and visited by tourists. Meanwhile, however, all that can be done is to take all possible steps to prevent the import of slaves and the traffic in slaves, and to deal sternly with any cases of this that come to our notice.

Annex

Slavery and the Bahrain Pearl Industry

ALTHOUGH slavery was officially abolished in 1861, when the Sheikh of Bahrain made a treaty with the British Government by which he agreed to abstain from it in return for protection, the condition of the pearl divers was, until a few years ago, almost that of slaves.

The diving community consists of three categories: the shore merchants who do the big buying and selling and who either own or finance the boats, the "nakhodas" or boat captains, and the large inarticulate mass of divers, illiterate Arabs who were previously cheated and oppressed by their employers, or rather their

owners, the boat captains. About 15,000 local divers go out from Bahrain every season, and it has been estimated that about 100,000 men from the whole Gulf are employed on the banks every year.

The diving system is admirable in theory. Each boat's profits are shared proportionally between the captain, the divers and the pullers after the captain had deducted cost of food, general expenses, and the amount which he advanced to the divers at the beginning and end of the season.

In practice the system was abominable. When once a young man took a loan to dive, the debts were increased by enormous interest being charged on every advance, food and diving materials were debited against the diver at extortionate prices, and as the diver was illiterate he could never check his account. Most divers existed on the small bi-annual advances which were debited against them, with interest. These conditions were favoured by the improvident and extravagant nature of the Arab.

Divers were handed over from one captain to another, sometimes to captains from foreign ports and sometimes to private individuals in payment for debts. If a diver died his house and belongings were seized by his captain or if he had grown up sons they were compelled to incur their father's debt, if the sons were children they incurred the debt when they became old enough to work. Sales of pearls were conducted privately between captain and merchant, and usually the prices obtained were higher than the amount announced to the divers. The captains pocketed the difference. Infirm old men and young boys were forced to dive and any insubordination was punished by floggings and various tortures. No questions were asked about deaths if it occurred at the banks. During the off season the divers were made to work in the houses and gardens of their owners.

Attempts to improve the diving system met with difficulties. The divers were suspicious and apathetic, the merchants and captains were violently opposed to changes that would loosen their hold over the men, and until the present sheikh succeeded his father it was considered unpolitic to press for reforms. In 1924 his Excellency Sheikh Hamad, in conjunction with Major Daly, who was then political agent, and with the support of the Government of India, took the matter in hand. Only a very few of the more far-sighted merchants, and the Shia and Sunni Kadis supported the movement, but the reforms were finally pushed through mainly owing to the keenness and energy of Major Daly.

The principal features are as follows:

The amount of the advances and the amount of interest permissible is laid down by law. No other charges may be debited against a diver. Merchants and boat captains are compelled to keep regular accounts of all advances and interest. A number of diving clocks who are authorised by the Government. Every diver keeps a small book issued by the Government which shows his account with his captain. Boat captains are forbidden to sell the pearls privately but must do so in the presence of not less than three of the divers. When a diver dies his children are not made to take over his debts and dive for his captain, the debt becomes an ordinary one against the estate. No person who does not own a diving boat may take over divers for debt.

These, and various other reforms, have greatly improved the position of the divers. Although men who have been diving for a long time are still hopelessly indebted to their captain, and will remain so until they die, the new generation of divers are no longer in the position of slaves. Previously, a diver had no redress against his captain; a court existed, but it consisted of boat captains and its reputation was notorious. Divers now realise when they are cheated and appeal to the courts when they find that the diving rules are not being carried out by their employers.

There still remain many abuses, but the new laws and regulations have greatly improved the conditions and who continually try to upset and evade them. The strictest supervision is needed by the Government and the courts to prevent a return to the previous state.

E 1935/93 91

No. 108.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 75.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 23, 1930

I HAVE the pleasure to transmit herewith my report on the situation at the Hejaz, from the 1st of January to the 28th of February 1930. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jeddah, and to the High Commissioner for the Eastern Mediterranean, Constantinople, and to the High Commissioner for the Persian Gulf, Bombay. I am, Sir, very respectfully, Sir, your obedient servant, W. L. BOND.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 108.

Jedda Report for the Period February 1 to 28, 1930.

THE successful issue of the negotiations for the surrender of the rebels created a general improvement in the political atmosphere which augured well for the subsequent negotiations between the two Kings. Nevertheless, at one meeting, a meeting of the two Kings, the King of Iraq, King Faisal, and the King of the Hejaz, King Ibn Saud, were still in disagreement. The King of Iraq, King Faisal, was, however, prevailed upon by the British Government to accept a satisfactory settlement with Ibn Saud, but the Iraqi authorities were persuaded to modify their demands.

2. A preliminary meeting of Iraqi and Nejdji Ministers, held at the proposal of the King of the Hejaz, King Ibn Saud, was presided over by the High Commissioner for the Eastern Mediterranean, Constantinople. The question of the settlement of Ibn Mashhur was raised but was left for discussion at the meeting of the Kings.

3. The meeting between the two Kings took place on the 21st and 22nd February in H.M.S. "Lupin," near the Rooka Light Float outside territorial waters. The results were as follows:—

- (1) Letters were exchanged between King Faisal and King Ibn Saud to the effect that they would endeavour during the next six months to come to an agreement regarding the question of the desert posts. If they failed to agree, each King would appoint two representatives as arbitrators, and if an agreement were not then reached, they undertook to accept as president any person designated by His Majesty's Government.
- (2) It was agreed by both parties that either Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson or Major Fowle, as His Majesty's Government might decide, should preside over the tribunal which is to be set up under article 2 of the Bahrain Agreement, following on the undertaking given by Ibn Saud in his letter of the 27th January, for the settlement of past claims arising out of raids committed on the Nejd-Iraq frontier. The tribunal is to meet in Kuwait in June next.
- (3) Ibn Mashhur was to be pardoned by King Ibn Saud. King Faisal on his side undertook to induce Ibn Mashhur to return to Nejd. In the event of Ibn Mashhur's refusal to return, King Faisal would insist that he should leave Iraq territory. There was no provision for a *quid pro quo*.
- (4) and (5) The Kings agreed in principle to the draft of an agreement of bon voisinage between the two Kings, of which King Faisal is cited as King of Iraq and King Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and Nejd, which article provides for the exchange of diplomatic missions. There is to be a further meeting of representatives in three months' time to conclude a formal agreement on these lines.

4. The meeting was characterised by much outward show of cordiality. In private conversations with Sir Francis Humphrys, however, Ibn Saud frankly showed his distrust of Faisal, while the latter criticised the duplicity of Ibn Saud's Ministers.

5. At the close of the meeting both Kings asked Sir Francis Humphrys to convey to His Majesty's Government their deep gratitude for the hospitality afforded and for making it possible for the conference to be held. Letters were also subsequently received by Sir Francis Humphrys from King Ibn Saud and King Faisal as also from the Prime Minister of Iraq expressing gratitude for the efforts made to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries and showing appreciation of the facilities provided by His Majesty's Government.

6. Shortly before the meeting of the Kings a note was received from the Emir Faisal, temporarily in charge of foreign affairs, stating that the King wished to use the opportunity presented by the conference to discuss with British Government representatives certain outstanding matters, which he had previously raised, in connexion with affairs on the Persian Gulf (December report, paragraph 20). The Emir Faisal was informed in reply that, as the conference as arranged was only intended to deal with the questions outstanding between Nejd and Hejaz, His Majesty's Government regretted that it was impossible for them at such short notice to extend its scope or to despatch a representative with authority to discuss these questions as desired. His Majesty's Government explained that this was particularly the case as they had not yet received from the Hejaz Government sufficiently full information on all the subjects with which the King wished to raise to enable them to issue suitable instructions on the subject. They stated, however, that they would be glad to arrange for a meeting at a later date between the King and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, if the King so desired and if he were prepared in the meanwhile to supply them with a full and detailed statement as to his desiderata.

7. The situation on the Transjordan frontier has taken a turn for the worse. Three further raids by Nejd on Hejazian tribes were reported by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan at the beginning of February. On the 10th February news was received that the Emir Nejd had crossed into Transjordan territory with 1,000 men and was raiding Transjordan tribes, and it was established a few days later that Ibn Musaad, Governor of Hail, had with 2,000 men raided Transjordan tribes within Transjordan territory killing at least 20 men, looting 3,000 camels, and 1,000 sheep, and destroying 100 tents. There were also indications that further raids into Transjordan were being planned by the Emir Musaad. A strong protest was made to the Hejaz Government together with a demand for the restitution of the looted property and for compensation. The King was also asked to issue urgent instructions to the Emir of Hail to cease his raids and, in order to minimise the risk of further incidents, to withdraw his force from the vicinity of the Transjordan frontier. He was also informed that much resentment was being caused in Transjordan by the fact that the British force was led by high officials of the King and was living in supplies brought from Syria through Transjordan by caravans which, in accordance with the arrangement made last December with the Hejaz Government, were receiving special British protection on their journey. It was pointed out, moreover, not only that acute feeling had been aroused in Transjordan but that it had been necessary to withdraw British forces both to protect Transjordan tribes from further raids and to check any attempt on their part to make counter raids. In the circumstances, while anxious at all times to co-operate with the King in these difficult frontier questions, His Majesty's Government regretted that it would be beyond their power to continue to afford the special protection which had been gladly given in the past to caravans supplying the force in question.

8. In reply to these representations a message was received from Sheikh Faud Harza stating that the King had expressed his deep regret at the incident and his disapproval of the act, which had been committed without his sanction. He had also issued urgent telegraphic instructions to Ibn Musaad forbidding him to commit any further raids. A letter was subsequently received from the King confirming this, but at the same time referring to the Transjordan raids against Nejd and the resulting situation as a possible motive for Ibn Musaad's action. The King also again pressed for a speedy settlement of the problem. A similar reply to the above was received about the same time from the Hejaz Government, who stated that strict and definite orders had been issued to their people and officials to stop all raids.

9. The "Um-el-Qura" announces that the "Kiswa" factory is actively engaged in weaving the holy carpet for this year's pilgrimage and that this, it is expected,

will be completed about the middle of April. I am told that this forecast is somewhat optimistic although the factory is now working at high pressure. It was also reported that there was a deal of conversation between the weavers and the manager as a result of which eight of the weavers were to be repatriated from this agency on next dates, while the remainder of their expenses were to be met by the agency. There has been some delay in repatriating the weavers who arrived in Iraq at the end of January.

10. A scheme is under consideration for supplying Mecca and Jeddah with electric power from a station to be erected, probably at Bahra; this, so far as Jeddah is concerned, is intended to replace the present unsatisfactory arrangements by which Jeddah is dependent for its electricity on a small plant of inadequate performance which works on a contract with the Government. The subject, which was first broached two or three years ago and has occasionally been mooted since, is now being seriously canvassed. A special committee of local officials, dubbed for the purpose "experts," has been appointed by the Government to consider the scheme and, outside the benefits which would accrue from it. Several meetings have been held and among other resolutions it has been decided that a company is to be formed for carrying the scheme into effect, that two-thirds of the shares are to be taken up by the municipality of Mecca and the Ministry of Finance and that the remaining third is to be offered to the public for subscription.

11. The general feeling about the scheme is that, if properly managed, it will be a success but that the essential condition for this is European control at any rate in the engineering department. It is for this reason presumably that Bahra, which is outside the zone forbidden to non-Muslims, is suggested as the headquarters of the scheme. Abdulla Suleiman the Minister of Finance, who is apparently leaning towards the scheme, is considering the engagement of a European managing director to ensure the proper carrying out of the scheme, while the Government, royal assent for this has, however, not yet been obtained.

12. The chief criticisms of the project, as at present contemplated, are, firstly, that the proposed capital of £200,000 will not suffice to cover the cost of any effective scheme, and, secondly, that the people have no confidence in the honesty of the Government's intentions and fear for instance that the Government will not pay for the power it consumes. As the Government will probably be the largest consumer, this would probably be sufficient to wreck the scheme. The fate of the Saudi Motor Company, a concern which was launched in very similar circumstances, is fresh in the public memory. The public is showing little enthusiasm in taking up the shares offered and is waiting further developments before committing itself.

13. The scheme is at present in its embryonic stages, and, although in its broad outlines it has received the approval of the King, its details still require royal sanction. It is perhaps early yet for this to be considered as a serious project.

14. His Majesty the King has been pleased to approve the appointment of Sheikh Hafez Walid as Hejazesej Minister and plenipotentiary to London.

15. The Soviet agent and consul-general Nuzar bey Durakoff presented credentials as "Representative Plenipotentiary" to the Emir Faisal on the 2nd February. Speeches of a cordial tone were exchanged.

16. H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived in Jeddah on the 11th February and left on the 14th February. The usual visits were exchanged.

17. Some difficulties arose recently between the Hejaz Government and Messrs. Sharqieh (Limited) over the purchase of a sea-going launch. The launch, a craft about 40 feet long and 12 feet wide, at a cost of £4,000 was found on arrival to differ from the required specifications, and to be unsuitable for the purposes of the Hejaz Government and dangerous to take out to sea. Mr. Philby, however, arranged eventually to persuade the Hejaz Government to take it over. It has now been found upon the unfortunate discovery despite their protests and they are to pay for it by yearly instalments of £500. This action on the part of the Government has caused great indignation among the Hejazesej, who intend to petition the King when he comes to Jeddah, and who say with some justification that Mr. Philby should foot the bill himself. At the moment, however, they have no other choice but to comply with the Government's order as they are threatened with the loss of the launch by the Government on Government account for the landing of pilgrims in case of refusal, a course which would strike a severe blow at the Hejazesej means of livelihood.

18. It appears that arrangements have now been made for the purchase from Germany of a small second-hand yacht or glorified launch for coastal work, at a cost of £5,000. Small guns or machine guns are to be mounted on it, and it is to be used chiefly for coast guard purposes to prevent smuggling.

19. The total number of pilgrims who had reached Jedda by the 28th February was 37,544, of which 10,000 were British Indian subjects. The total number of pilgrims who had arrived by the 28th February from Indian ports was 2,473, out of which 842 were British Indian subjects.

20. No slaves have taken refuge during the period under review.

[E 1952/54, 91]

No. 109.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 333.)

Sir,

Cairo, April 3, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report that difficulties have risen again this year in connexion with the Egyptian Medical Mission which is annually sent to the Hejaz for the pilgrimages.

2. According to Sheikh Hafez Wahba, who is now here, the mission is rather more extensive than usual. He mentioned that there were eight doctors instead of four as last year, that the mission wished to have establishments at Jedda, Mecca and Medina, whereas formerly it used to establish itself only at Jedda and Mecca, and, after the Mecca pilgrimages, move with such pilgrims as went to Medina. More recently, however, the mission has been established at Medina. Ibn Saud, irritated by Egypt's refusal to recognise him, objected to this enlargement of the Egyptian Medical Mission.

3. At a meeting of the High Political Committee of State for Palestine, the various objections of the Hejaz Government were discussed with the Hejaz agent here. It was agreed that the mission should fly the sanitary instead of the Egyptian national flag. Permission was given to the whole mission to proceed, except to the motor ambulances. Further negotiations on this point are continuing. Dr. Shahn, the Hejaz agent, suggesting that these difficulties were being raised owing to the mission's refusal to recognise Ibn Saud, would tackle this larger question in the most sympathetic spirit.

4. I suggested to Sheikh Hafez Wahba that Ibn Saud was ill-advised to translate his resentment at his own non-recognition into the realm of pilgrimage relief. Such action would help the adversaries of recognition, who would have little difficulty in exaggerating the mission's difficulties. Wahba agreed, and said that he had already telegraphed to the Amir Faisal at Mecca, urging that it was not to be allowed to become a matter for the Egyptian Medical Mission.

5. The Sheikh expressed indignation at the tone of the press, inspired by the Palace. The "Times" and "The Daily Telegraph" had published some extremely offensive articles about the difficulties being made by the Hejaz Government over this mission.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

Acting High Commissioner.

[E 2068/54, 91]

No. 110.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 334.)

Sir,

Cairo, April 12, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 333 of the 1st April, that the Hejaz Government has accepted the Egyptian Medical Mission. The former Government has offered to put the mission at the disposal of the Egyptian Medical Mission, and the latter Government has accepted this solution.

2. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Jedda.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

Acting High Commissioner.

[E 2111/39, 91]

No. 111.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 119.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 24, 1930.

AS you are aware from your recent conversations with members of my office, the question of the raiding and counter-raiding on the Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan frontiers has been engaging the attention of the Departments of His Majesty's Government concerned. As a result, I have decided that you shall take an early opportunity after your arrival at Jedda of discussing the whole matter personally with King Ibn Saud.

2. While I am content to leave to you a wide latitude as to the manner in which the question shall be broached with Ibn Saud, it appears to me desirable to indicate in the first instance the general considerations which you should bear in mind in His Majesty's.

3. In recent communications on this subject King Ibn Saud has laid stress on the necessity of resolving the question of the claims arising out of past raids. As the Hejaz Government are aware, His Majesty's Government, acting in accordance with Ibn Saud's own suggestion that they themselves should arbitrate on these claims, have appointed Mr. Macdonnell to investigate and report on the claims in order that His Majesty's Government may be enabled to give their arbitral decisions thereon, and it is proposed that he should begin his task as soon as he has been able to see King Ibn Saud. The necessary steps are thus being taken to liquidate the past.

4. Turning to the present and the future, the earnest consideration which His Majesty's Government have for some time past devoted to the raiding situation on the Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan frontiers is that it is only by strenuous and simultaneous efforts on the part of the authorities on both sides of the frontier that an amelioration of the present regrettable position can be attained. The authorities of Transjordan have recently put into force new measures designed to increase their control over the Transjordan frontier, and to facilitate the prevention and the punishment of raids into the Hejaz and Nejd. The principal of these measures is the establishment of the Transjordan Frontier Board. His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem is being instructed to furnish you direct with detailed information regarding the Board, already constituted by an order, the punishments which it has inflicted, and the loot which has been recovered from raiders and returned to the Hejaz-Nejd. In addition to the establishment of this board (a) the local police force has been strengthened in order to facilitate punitive and preventive action against raiders, and (b) mechanical transport is being provided for the Transjordan Frontier Force. It is hoped that these measures will support and assist you in case of need be called upon to furnish in execution of such punitive and preventive action. You are at liberty to make what use you think fit of the above information, with a view to indicate to Ibn Saud that the Transjordan authorities on their side are taking steps to improve the situation in so far as concerns their side.

5. As stated above, however, it is evident that measures should also be taken by King Ibn Saud to deal with his own tribesmen. The information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government does not lead them to suppose that any effective action has—recently, at any rate—been taken by him either to punish his subjects who have perpetrated raids, or to prevent raids occurring. The particulars to be supplied by Sir J. Chancellor will show that the Transjordan authorities have inflicted punishment in various cases upon Transjordan raiders. But His Majesty's Government are not aware of any punishments having been inflicted upon Hejaz-Nejd raiders, and in any case no loot has been returned by the authorities of the Hejaz and Nejd to the authorities of Transjordan. You should leave Ibn Saud in no uncertainty as to the views of His Majesty's Government on these points and in addition should refer to the Hejaz-Nejd Agreement, under two of Ibn Saud's military leaders, Ibn Musa ad and Ibn Neshmi, which constituted an infraction of articles 2 and 10 of the Hadda Agreement. Even in this most serious case, so far as His Majesty's Government are aware, no punishment has been inflicted on the guilty.

6. As regards preventive action, Ibn Saud will appreciate the fact that His Majesty's Government are prepared to make every allowance for his re-occupation in Eastern Nejd. But with the removal of his difficulties in that direction to which His Majesty's Government were happy to contribute they have

my help in this matter. Once face to face with King Ibn Saud, he would challenge him to quote a single precedent from Arab history to justify the demand that he was making for the surrender of a fugitive. He had rehearsed the scene before me. With arm thrown out, pointing the admonitory finger at an abashed Ibn Saud, he would declaim: "O, Abdul Aziz, tell me, on your honour as an Arab, that you would do as you ask me to do if you were in my place, and I will agree to surrender Ibn Mashhur." "You will see," he had said to me, "that Ibn Saud will have to admit that I am right and give up his demand." Unfortunately, when the moment arrived, His Majesty lost his nerve. The question of Ibn Mashhur had scarcely been opened between us when King Faisal, declaring that this was a question which primarily concerned King Ibn Saud and the British Government, excused himself and withdrew somewhat precipitately to another part of the ship. There was nothing that I could do but to assure King Ibn Saud that the surrender of Ibn Mashhur had never been promised by a representative of my Government, and that the question was one for settlement between himself and King Faisal, which I would do my best to facilitate. I therefore brought the two Kings together again, and, after King Ibn Saud had agreed to pardon Ibn Mashhur, King Faisal remarked that the matter was settled. When pressed by King Ibn Saud to explain he said that, in view of the pardon, he would not allow Ibn Mashhur to remain in Iraq and would do his best to induce him to return to Nejd.

9. At this point we all retired to the "Nearchus," where King Faisal entertained the company to luncheon, which, in sharp contrast to the feast on the "Patrick Stewart" of the previous evening, was served in European fashion. After luncheon we discussed the settlement of claims for raids committed by Nejdite on Iraqi tribesmen. Both Kings agreed to the convening of a tribunal on the lines of the Beirut Agreement of 1907. It was agreed that Major Fowle or Colonel Dickson should be the president of the tribunal. In private, however, King Ibn Saud informed me that he had no confidence whatever that the tribunal would be able to arrive at a settlement satisfactory to both parties, and he asked me to persuade King Faisal to name some reasonable sum which he would accept in lieu of the claims. The Nejdite tribesmen had heavy counter-claims which they would put forward, and said that much acrimonious and indeterminate wrangling would be avoided by fixing a lump sum. I promised to consider this proposal on my return to Bagdad.

10. At this point I discussed the draft of the Agreement with the two Kings. The most important provisions of which were mutual recognition and exchange of diplomatic missions, the principles having been agreed on by the two Kings. It was decided that a further meeting of representatives of both countries would be convened after three months to conclude a formal agreement on the basis of the draft. It was now 5 p.m., and, as the conference had disposed of all outstanding questions, I returned to the "Patrick Stewart." It remained for the Ministers to complete the draft letter which was to be exchanged between the two Kings on the subject of the desert posts.

11. At this stage a most unfortunate *contretemps* arose, which seemed at one time to be likely to wreck the success of the conference. The sub-committee of Ministers had agreed to the wording of the draft, a copy of which was typed and brought by Naji Suwaidi about 7 p.m. I found that Naji Suwaidi, without consulting King Faisal, had inserted the words "To His Majesty Ibn Saud, King of the Hejaz and Nejd" at the beginning of the letter. King Faisal was furious with his Prime Minister for conceding, in a private letter, the principle of recognition, which was meant to be embodied for the first time in the treaty of bon-voisinage, and flatly refused to sign the letter. The Nejdite Ministers were sent for and excitedly declined to agree to the omission of the words "King of the Hejaz" from the letter. A stormy scene ensued between the Ministers and King Faisal, and a complete deadlock was reached. As it was now 8 p.m. and the "Patrick Stewart" was due to sail that night, I had another letter typed and signed by King Faisal, in which he agreed to sign the duplicate. I then proceeded to do my utmost to persuade King Ibn Saud to sign the duplicate. I then proceeded to the "Patrick Stewart" and found King Ibn Saud furiously angry at the turn which events had taken. After we had dined, I saw him alone in his cabin, and he told me that he had formed the impression that, in spite of his friendly protestations, King Faisal had determined to play him a trick over the question of recognition and the return of Ibn Mashhur. It was only after two hours' debate, from which the

Nejdite Ministers were overruled, and King Ibn Saud signed the duplicate letter.

12. The conference was adjourned until the following day. King Ibn Saud and I went to the "Patrick Stewart" to see King Faisal. He was very friendly and we discussed the settlement of claims for raids committed by Nejdite on Iraqi tribesmen. Both Kings agreed to the convening of a tribunal on the lines of the Beirut Agreement of 1907. It was agreed that Major Fowle or Colonel Dickson should be the president of the tribunal. In private, however, King Ibn Saud informed me that he had no confidence whatever that the tribunal would be able to arrive at a settlement satisfactory to both parties, and he asked me to persuade King Faisal to name some reasonable sum which he would accept in lieu of the claims. The Nejdite tribesmen had heavy counter-claims which they would put forward, and said that much acrimonious and indeterminate wrangling would be avoided by fixing a lump sum. I promised to consider this proposal on my return to Bagdad.

13. It is too early yet to say what the effects of the Lupin Conference will be, but the results achieved so far have exceeded my expectations and are a good augury for the future. It can at least be claimed that the two Kings, who have hitherto regarded one another with the darkest suspicion, if not with positive abhorrence, have been brought together in a friendly atmosphere and have listened to a frank expression of each other's difficulties and embarrassments. It is, perhaps, not too much to hope that, if nothing spectacular has been achieved, each King will be more ready to listen to the other's proposals. The fact that there is no longer any insuperable obstacle to friendship between the two Arab peoples, King Ibn Saud professes to take the view that peace and friendship between Nejd and Iraq will still be impossible to maintain without the constant mediation and good offices of the representatives of His Majesty's Government. He made it clear to me, however, that, so far as he was concerned, his faith in the genuine desire of His Majesty's Government to promote goodwill between the peoples of Arabia had been strengthened by recent events, and that he was ready to place complete reliance on British impartiality and broadmindedness. I feel convinced that the generous hospitality of His Majesty's Government, which made possible the meeting of the two Kings, will be found to have been well worth while if only because of the personal contact which has been established between them for the first time.

14. The conference was adjourned until the following day. King Ibn Saud and I went to the "Patrick Stewart" to see King Faisal. He was very friendly and we discussed the settlement of claims for raids committed by Nejdite on Iraqi tribesmen. Both Kings agreed to the convening of a tribunal on the lines of the Beirut Agreement of 1907. It was agreed that Major Fowle or Colonel Dickson should be the president of the tribunal. In private, however, King Ibn Saud informed me that he had no confidence whatever that the tribunal would be able to arrive at a settlement satisfactory to both parties, and he asked me to persuade King Faisal to name some reasonable sum which he would accept in lieu of the claims. The Nejdite tribesmen had heavy counter-claims which they would put forward, and said that much acrimonious and indeterminate wrangling would be avoided by fixing a lump sum. I promised to consider this proposal on my return to Bagdad.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Government of India, the Hon. the Resident in the Persian Gulf, His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah, and the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have &c.

P. H. HUMPHRYS

High Commissioner for Iraq

Enclosure 1 in No 112

Telegram from His Majesty King Ibn Saud to His Excellency the High Commissioner, Bagdad (Received under Political Agent, Bahrain, Note of February 26, 1930).

Ramadhan 26, 1349

WE have the pleasure to express our gratitude to your Excellency for your good efforts in binding the friendly relations between us and our neighbor His Majesty King Faisal, and also between our two Governments and two nations. We are waiting for your Excellency to fulfil your promise to us in the last meeting in setting

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the question of Iraq acknowledging clearly the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, as also in settling the question relating to Ibn Mashhur and others, who entered Iraq from among the rebels in a satisfactory manner. In doing so you will strengthen the relations and remove every cause which may lead to misunderstanding between the two neighbouring kingdoms. In this connexion, we thought it fit to bring to your Excellency's notice the matters awaiting settlement between Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, and Iraq, which were discussed during the last meeting. (1) The friendly neighbouring treaty, which was discussed and settled between the delegates of the two Governments, leaving nothing except entering into it in a legal manner; (2) the question of the forts, in which we agreed to the desire of the British and Iraq Governments, as was mentioned in the letter exchanged between us and our dear brother, (3) the question of plunder of the two States, which we authorised our dear brother Faisal to settle. He should either suggest a solution acceptable to us or suggest its transfer to the British Government on the condition that the meeting should not be fixed before the month of Safar. If this is desired, we should see to it before the month of Safar. (4) The question of Ibn Mashhur, (5) the Extradition Treaty. The proposals suggested by us in this connexion were handed over to the Iraq delegates by our delegates when they were in Koweit, which were discussed and nearly settled in Jedda when the discussion took place with the regretted late General Clayton. The most important matter about which the Hejaz and Nejd people are anxious is the question of executing your undertaking which you promised us. We request your Excellency to reply us very early on the questions mentioned above, so as to reach us before we reach the interior of Nejd. As you know, nothing will remove doubts and strengthen relations between the two countries except the execution of your last promise to us. Please reply soon (Usual ending.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 112

Copy of Telegram from His Excellency the High Commissioner, Bagdad, to His Majesty King Ibn Saud (sent to Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire, under Note of February 27, 1930)

I THANK your Majesty for your friendly letter of 26th Ramadhan. It was a great pleasure to me to read your Majesty's letter and I share the hope that the meeting between your Majesty and His Majesty King Faisal will pave the way to permanent friendly relations between the two Kings and a satisfactory settlement of all outstanding questions between the two Governments and territories. Your Majesty may rely upon me to spare no effort to ensure this result, which is a matter of the deepest interest to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

E 2111.89/911

No. 113

Mr A Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda)

(No. 67) R.

Foreign Office, April 26, 1930

YOUR telegram No. 29 and your despatch No. 65 of 16th March Nejd-Transjordan raiding

If you consider some interim reply essential, you should explain to Ibn Saud that it is only by concerted action on the part of the authorities in both countries to control their respective territories and punish raiders that an improvement in the situation can be attained. His Majesty's Minister is due to arrive at Jedda in the very near future and I feel confident that matters will be more profitably discussed by His Majesty with Sir A. Ryan than in further written communications.

As regards the request contained in the note enclosed in your despatch that steps should be taken for the solution of the question of justice in this Majesty will be aware that the investigator into these claims has been appointed, and it is proposed that he should begin his task as soon as he has been able to see the King.

E 2374/1/911

No. 114

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, May 6, 1930.

YOUR telegram.

In response to continuous pressure from me, King Faisal has given me a promise that he will do his best to force Ibn Ma'at to return to Nejd. In any case he will not permit him to stay in Iraq. He is writing to Ibn Saud on question of safe conduct for Ibn Mashur.

(Repeated to Jedda and Bushire.)

E 2421 54/911

No. 115

Mr. Bond to Mr A Henderson.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 81)

Jedda, April 3, 1930

1 I HAVE the honour to enclose my report on the 1929 pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

2 In compiling this report I have received considerable assistance from the Indian vice-consul. I am also indebted to the Malay pilgrimage officer and the Indian doctor for much useful information.

3 I regret that, owing to pressure of work, it has been quite impossible for me to despatch this report earlier.

4 I am sending copies to Simla, Singapore, Cairo and Khartum.

I have, &c

W L BOND

Enclosure in No. 115

Report on the Pilgrimage of 1929

(1) — Introductory and general.

2 — Statistics.
3 — General remarks.
(4) — Itinerary.
5 — Travelling.
6 — Expenses.
7 — Medical services.
8 — Local administration.

9 — Indian pilgrimages.
10 — African pilgrimages.
11 — Malay pilgrimages.
12 — Chinese pilgrimages.
13 — European pilgrimages.
14 — American pilgrimages.
15 — Japanese pilgrimages.
16 — Persian pilgrimages.

(1) — Introductory and General

NO sooner was the 1928 pilgrimage concluded than the political horizon began to cloud over and ominous appearances were foreshadowed all for the pilgrimage of 1929.

2 The first of these was the death of the King's father, Abdurrahman-el-Faisal-al-Saud immediately after the Haj, an event which in the nature of things, threatened to give rise to domestic trouble and internal strife. It was feared that the King's brother, the Emir Mohammed, who was in a position to exercise considerable influence over certain powerful tribes with whom he was connected by ties of relationship, might revolt. The King, however, showed wisdom and tact in dealing with the situation, and there were no untoward developments.

3 Trouble of a serious nature was brewing nevertheless and culminated in the Akhwan revolt under Faisal-ed Dowish, Ibn Bujad and other powerful leaders who did not see eye to eye with the King over matters of policy and who interpreted the inauguration of new measures of reform on the part of the King as being reactionary opposed to their traditions and religion.

4 All measures taken to effect a compromise or a reconciliation proved unsuccessful and there ensued a period of anarchy in Northern Arabia which might have been disastrous to the pilgrimage had its true dimensions become generally known to the outside world.

5 The King's victory over the rebels at Sabilla in March 1929 settled matters for the time being. Had the result been different, the lives of many of the pilgrims might possibly have been in danger.

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17 Under the conditions prevailing it was easy setting aside the question of security, for pilgrims to come by boat from any port on the coast near Karachi or on the eastern side of the Persian Gulf, to enter Nejd and to proceed thence to the

25 As regards revenue, custom dues on articles and goods brought in by pilgrims produced about the same amount as in the previous year but next year

resulted to the Government by the raising of the Kushan tax levied on pilgrims who travelled to Medina by car.

26. The comparative abundance of motor-buses and keen competition among the several motor companies caused the rate of transport between Mecca and Medina to drop from £15 to £9, inclusive of the Government's "Kushan." This, however, while making the journey to Medina easier for large numbers of the poorer pilgrims, did much harm to trade generally. Nearly 80 per cent. of the goods stored by merchants in Mecca and Jeddah for the pilgrim season could not be sold as a great many pilgrims went on to Medina immediately and had no money on their return for disbursement in the country. The Government is likely to be a loser on this account, as the merchants will probably import considerably less goods for the 1930 pilgrimage, and there will be a corresponding diminution in the customs receipts in respect of general merchandise. Some compensation may, however, be forthcoming from increased importation of grain. The Government has instructed traders in Nejd to buy this commodity in the Hejaz itself, despite the fact that grain coming from India, the principal country of origin, takes ten days only to reach Nejd by way of the Persian Gulf, as against twenty days, involving so much increased freight, when it is imported via Jeddah. This is perhaps intended to enrich the Hejaz at the expense of Koweit.

2.3. Statistics.

The number of pilgrims who arrived by sea and their countries of embarkation are as follows:—

Country of Embarkation.	Number of Pilgrims.	Country of Embarkation.	Number of Pilgrims.
India	19,856	Syria	962
Dutch East Indies	28,277	Mekalla	772
British Malaya	4,297	Russia	207
East Africa	305	Turkish ports	317
Sudan	2,334	North Africa	4,396
Mussowa	652		
Egypt	20,490		82,584

The transport of pilgrims was carried out by ships of the following nationalities:—

Flag.	Number of Pilgrims.	Flag.	Number of Pilgrims.
British	56,588	French	3,806
Dutch	20,199	Russians	324
Italian	652		
Egyptian	815		82,584

Pilgrims were of the following nationalities:—

Nationality.	Number of Pilgrims.	Nationality.	Number of Pilgrims.
Javanese	31,119	Egyptians	18,525
Malayans	1,455	Syrians	962
Various Far Eastern pilgrims	1,115	Palestinians	128
Bokharans (Russians)	207	Turks	314
Indians	16,146	Tripolitarians and Cyrenaicans	132
Senegalese	73	Entreans	33
Persians	3,808	Algerians	2,200
Muscatis	229	Tunisians	1,496
Iraqis	207	Moroccans	700
Hejazis	968	West Africans and Nigerians	2,328
Hadramis	772	Sudanese	1,373
Yemenis	1,867	Other unclassified pilgrims who came by pilgrim ships	880
Afghans	1,703		
Nejdies	62		88,558
Southern Arabs	13		
Southern Arabs	240		
Southern Arabs	13		
Zanzibar and East Africa	42		

The discrepancy between the figure of 82,584 given as the total of the first two lists above and that of 88,558 shown in the third list is due to the fact that the first two lists are compiled from agents' data for the shipping companies and are based on payments of quarantine dues, whereas the latter figure is supplied by the local Government, and includes infants whom the shipping companies do not take into account.

The number and nationality of ships employed on the pilgrimage were as follows:—

Nationality.	Number of Ships.	Nationality.	Number of Ships.
British	109	French	2
Dutch	32	Soviet	1
Italian	22		
Egyptian	2		168

(B.)—Quarantine.

(A.) Kamaran.

Pilgrims of all classes again complained vociferously of the formalities to which they were subjected at Kamaran.

Their complaints generally related to the following points:—

(a) *Disembarkation.*—Women and children, as also weak or sick persons, are exposed to the sun in lighters which are unprotected by any sort of awning. As a matter of fact the same thing occurs in Jeddah, but possibly as it is the pilgrims' first impression of the Holy Land this is not made a subject of complaint.

(b) *Transfer from Quay to Quarantine Station.*—Pilgrims have stated that they have to traverse the distance, about a quarter of a mile, over hot sand in the sun, and that this involves hardships for their women and children.

(c) *Baths.*—Objection has been raised against the present system of compulsory baths whereby all pilgrims without any sort of distinction, except for the few who choose to hire a special bathroom at a cost of 5 rupees, have to bathe together in one big hall. Better class pilgrims and those who have a greater sense of cleanliness seem to object to bathing with lower class and dirtier pilgrims. It would not, however, appear possible to provide an alternative unless pilgrims are prepared to pay for the luxury of a separate bathroom.

Similarly, the women have to take their bath together wrapped only in a short lungi. Protests were received to the effect that this offended Mahometan conception of decency and sense of purdah, and that it was highly resented.

It is complained that the bath given entails risk to the pilgrims' health and is thought to have given rise to protracted disorders from which pilgrims suffer occasionally after leaving Kamaran. It is stated that pilgrims have to wait for some time in the open air after leaving the bathing room dressed only in wet lungis while they search for their clothes, which are thrown in heaps on the ground after disinfection.

Some objection has been raised to the mixing of clothes of better class pilgrims with those of less cleanly and lower class pilgrims. This, apart from other and more obvious objections, is stated to cause inconvenience to pilgrims when they attempt to identify their clothing after the bath. The arrangements for disinfection were criticised also on the ground that only such clothing as the pilgrims have on their persons is disinfected, whereas the entire luggage, other dirty clothes, bedding, &c. which they leave on board ship, are ignored.

(d) *Food Supply at Kamaran.*—The food-stuff generally sold in the market is said to be of inferior and unwholesome quality.

(e) *Thefts of Pilgrims' Belongings.*—Complaints were also received of pilferage alleged to have been committed on board ship during the absence of the pilgrims in the quarantine camp. Furthermore, passports, return tickets and money are said to have been taken or lost when the pilgrims' clothes were removed for disinfection.

Since the introduction of compulsory vaccination and inoculation among the Javanese pilgrims these do not land at Kamaran, and their ships stay there for a few

from malaria. Fortunately, however, fatal cases were few. Pneumonia, bronchitis, fever, and influenza are the common ailments, and in Italy cases of these ailments were stated by the pilgrims to have been contracted during the quarantine stay at Kamaran.

Mortality

5. A percentage of 6 per cent, or 540 deaths were reported among the Indian and Malay natives, whereas on the part of the Chinese the Dutch vice-consul reported that as many as 100,000 died. As regards the Europeans the largest percentage of deaths was reported from the Dutch. A large proportion of the Hong Kong Chinese died in the same manner. At Manila and the death rate was of those killed by the earthquake was 100 per cent. The total number of deaths was 1,200,000, or 1 per cent of the population. The total number of reports received from the various countries was 1,200,000.

"The temperature in the shade at Mana was 115 degrees as against 124 degrees in the sun. The only protection against the intense heat was the low, thatched tents, a meagre protection against the intense heat. The poorer class of pilgrims could not even afford such shelter and wandered about in the heat of the sun, some of them performing their prayers or when proceeding to offer sacrifices or to perform other similar rites, others while wandering in search of their companions.

Sanitary Conditions (General)

7. Other factors conducive to illness were as follows: The average pilgrim, staying in the city for 10 to 15 days, had to stay in the Hajaz and not find time to visit the other parts of the country. Most of the pilgrims are ill and sick, and they do not have any means of getting fresh food or in such filthy rooms. Proper drainage is not provided for the pilgrims, and the water supply is not adequate. The pilgrims are not properly looked after, and the Hajaz is not a healthy place. The pilgrims are not properly looked after, and the Hajaz is not a healthy place. The pilgrims are not properly looked after, and the Hajaz is not a healthy place.

8. The Government has so far done nothing towards building public lavatories. Pilgrims who for want of lavatories resort to the streets and camps in the streets have no other lavatory but the streets themselves, and consequently the stench within yards of any wall is almost overpowering. Such efforts as are made to clean the streets apply to the areas where the pilgrims reside are entirely inadequate. In fact the Health officials appointed to look into the question of pilgrim housing are not only aware most lax in carrying out their duties, but that the Government is greatly to be blamed for this state of affairs.

9. The pilgrims themselves, however, were not entirely blameless. In many cases they failed to observe the regulations and custom for maintaining a proper order and abstained from the slaughter of animals. Pilgrims occasionally took advantage of the local officials' laxity and slaughtered their animals wherever they happened to be, subsequently leaving the remains to decompose in the immediate vicinity. The intense heat of the sun alone saves the Hejaz from outbreaks of serious epidemics every year from this cause.

Water Supply

10. At Jeddah there was no difficulty in obtaining water as the demand was not great. The highest recorded did not exceed 600 per acre.

11. The water supply at Mecca was also sufficient, the prices varying from 2 to 4 annas per tin. At Arafat, Mecca, however, where the demand was heavy and water carriers were not available in adequate numbers, the price rose to 12 annas per tin. There was no lack of water, however, for those who were prepared to pay the required price. At Arafat, a small well had been dug by a Meccan merchant at a cost of £12,000. This well was situated in the neighbourhood of the Kaaba. The Government also built new wells both at Muna and Moezifa, and in addition six reservoirs were erected where free water was distributed to the poor.

4. Dysentery and its attendant diarrhoea were common in the Hajj. It was an epidemic disease, the symptoms of which were not always accompanied by unhealthy latrines and the presence of contaminated water and food. It was also exposed to fly-borne infection. Dysentery was responsible for the largest mortality among the pilgrims causing 400 out of a total of 700 deaths. The Indians were particularly susceptible to it. A large percentage of the Indian pilgrims suffered

Relief Measures at Mecca, Muna and Arafat.

12. The Hejaz Government maintained a central hospital at Mecca with branches in each quarter of the city. It was, however, of little value to the pilgrims as it was inadequately equipped and staffed. The medical officers employed were with two exceptions, Syrians. Besides being unqualified to treat the pilgrims, these men appeared to be far more anxious to catch the pilgrims than to attend to their ailments. They were unsympathetic in their treatment, and charged high fees to outside patients.

13. Arrangements were made by the local Government for doctors and tents to be stationed along the road from Mecca to Arafat. Each tent was provided with a large canvas cistern containing water, and was supplied with the necessities of life. The arrangements for the treatment of pilgrims suffering from sunstroke were good. Litters carrying the injured were provided, and in cases of serious illness and conveying them to the nearest first aid station, after which they were transferred to the central hospital in Mecca. Covered cars were supplied to remove the dead.

14. The Egyptian Government was the foremost in providing medical aid for their pilgrims. They kept up a large well-equipped dispensary at Mecca and Medina, and field hospitals were also brought for the season and stationed at Jeddah, Mecca, Muna and Arafat. Two ambulances were imported to attend to the pilgrims at Muna, but the local authorities forbade their circulation.

Government of India Dispensaries.

15. The agency doctor reports that the total number of Indian pilgrims who attended the agency dispensary was 2,821. Of these, 1,054 were at Mecca and the rest at Medina. He treated 3,480 cases among pilgrims and 1,111 cases among British subjects between the 24th January and the 15th July.

The table given below gives a rough percentage of the different cases treated in the Indian dispensary:—

MEDICAL	Percentage
(1) Malaria and its complications	20.50
(2) Dysentery	15.25
(3) Diarrhoea	8.00
(4) Other diseases of the digestive system	2.50
(5) Respiratory diseases	10.27
(6) Circulatory diseases	4.00
(7) Nervous diseases	2.25
(8) Urinary and venereal	31.20
(9) Eye	3.45
(10) Ear, nose and throat diseases	2.50
(11) Diseases of women	5.00
(12) Skin diseases	2.25
(13) Heat prostration	1.50
Total	97.95

STURGICAL	Percentage
(14) Wounds, sinus, fistulae and ulcers	6.25
(15) Abscesses	2.05
(16) Fractures, dislocations and dislocation of joints	7.50
(17) Injuries and contusions	2.00
(18) Carious teeth	1.00
Total	19.05

16. The Indian doctor is considerably handicapped when at Muna and Arafat by the fact that, as things are at present, he, as also the Indian vice-consul, is compelled to camp in an out of the way, and unfrequented locality. Although pilgrims may know of the existence of the dispensary, they experience great difficulty

in finding it. It is very necessary that the tents both of the Indian doctor and of the Indian vice-consul should be pitched in a conspicuous and accessible locality and signboards erected to advertise their presence to the passers-by. At Muna the only suitable place is in the main thoroughfare, which the pilgrims traverse while on their way to prayers. The houses at Muna are not only in a wretched and unsanitary condition, but the rentals demanded are exorbitant (an ordinary house cannot be leased for less than £100 for three days). It is therefore suggested that in future the pilgrims should be accommodated in a special season of anything up to £30 for the dispensary and for the Indian pilgrimage officer.

Dispensary Staff

17. This year the Government of India supplied a military sub-assistant surgeon and the Government of the Straits Settlements a dresser, who worked in conjunction with the Indian doctor. This is not an ideal arrangement, and it may become necessary to make other recommendations in this connexion (see also observations below under the heading of the Malay pilgrimage regarding the appointment of a Malay dresser).

18. It has been represented to me by the agency doctor that it would be preferable that a private assistant surgeon (M.B.B.S.) should be engaged instead of a sub-assistant surgeon as hitherto, and that, if this is not found possible, an older and more experienced sub-assistant surgeon might be selected for the post. In either case it should be clearly brought home to possible incumbents that at least seven hours' daily work will be demanded of them, and that they are debarred from engaging in private practice.

19. Dr. Muzaffar Ali, who was in charge of the Government of India dispensary, performed his duties with zeal, and his services were of great value to the pilgrims.

(5) —Transport

The year 1929 showed a considerable increase in the number of motor vehicles used. The total is said to have reached a thousand. Comparatively few touring cars were available, as, owing to their smaller carrying capacity, and to the fact that they pay the same kushan tax and mutawwif's commission as lorries, their use leaves but little margin of profit for the owners. Consequently, even the better-class and wealthier pilgrims had in most cases to travel in motor lorries. In many cases those who had secured cars for Medina could not, even by paying a higher rate, obtain cars for their return journey, and had to put up with all the discomforts of a journey by lorry. There were frequent overhauls of the cars, and it was rarely possible, unless strong representations were made by the Indian pilgrimage officer himself, to obtain a refund of the difference between the car and lorry fares. In some cases, however, the motor owners concerned blamed the Government and proved that their cars had not been tampered with. In other cases, when pilgrims were detained in Medina for lack of transport, motor companies were obliged to send cars to Medina to fetch their respective pilgrims.

2. Complaints in connexion with transport were also concerned with the following points:—

(1) *Motor Accidents.*—Several reports were received of the overturning of motor buses, resulting in some cases in deaths. Among the British pilgrims several injuries were seriously hurt, although there were no deaths among these. The accidents were mainly due to the incompetence of drivers and to reckless driving.

(2) *Transportation of families.*—The use of motor cars between the pilgrims' quarters at Mecca and the pilgrims' quarters at Medina is not allowed to enter the pilgrims' quarters at Mecca, but are obliged to put at a point anything from a mile to 2 miles from the pilgrims' quarters. The pilgrims have to hire arabs to carry their families and baggage for the remaining distance. The rate of hire is exorbitant, ranging from £1 to £2 or even more during the rush period.

(3) *The Auction System at Mecca.*—For a period of a fortnight immediately succeeding the Hajj that is, during the rush period, the existing

arrangements for issuing the kushans are entirely inadequate. The pilgrims have to wait for long hours at the Kushan Office, and money is often extorted before they are allowed to take their turn. It is proposed to take up this matter with the local authorities with a view to inducing them to issue the kushans beforehand to the motor companies, thus avoiding the delay caused at the Kushan Office.

(4) The arrangements for the examination of cars at Jedda prior to their departure for Medina often involved the pilgrims in considerable delays. They were sometimes kept waiting for as long as twenty-four hours before the final formalities were completed. The motor companies were also guilty of delays in despatching their cars, and in many cases the intervention of the police had to be sought. A certain Syed Siraj Wahi, who besides being the owner of a motor company is also a mutawwif for the Malabaris and for certain other Indian pilgrims, was one of the chief offenders.

(5) *Over-charging on fares by Mutawwifs.*—The local authorities were induced to make a regulation to prevent the mutawwifs, who possessed cars for hire, from charging the pilgrims a higher rate than that allowed by the Government. This regulation, unfortunately, was allowed to lapse, as is often the case with regulations in the Hejaz. Representations to the Government and to the police were, however, to some extent successful in redressing grievances.

(6) *Refund of return Motor-hire in respect of Pilgrims who died at Medina.*—The local Bait-el Mal makes no attempt to collect the return half of the motor fare of pilgrims who die at Medina when it takes over the estates of such pilgrims. Steps are being taken with the Hejaz authorities to protect the estates of deceased pilgrims in this respect.

3. The Saudieh Motor Company and a few influential persons, finding themselves unable to withstand the competition of other motor companies and to make a profit, approached the King in order to obtain the sanction of a law regulating motor traffic. In consequence, a "Nakaba" (a committee for the control of the motor traffic) was appointed, and the motor traffic came under the direct control of the Government. All journeys were booked through the "Nakaba," and the motor companies could only transport pilgrims at their own risk. This put an end to the competition prevailing, and the rates for motor hire were fixed. To travel by any car or lorry, good or bad, which might be available at the time, to meet the expenses of the "Nakaba," a tax of 2 piastres for Mecca and 5 piastres for Medina was imposed, per passenger, on the motor companies.

4. The mutawwifs lost much of their brokerage through the constitution of the "Nakaba." They were therefore anxious to abolish it. Finding no other pretext available they began to charge to their pilgrims, and quoting the example of the Prophet Muhammad, urged them to perform Hajj on foot, secured greater merit in the eye of God, than if performed by car. The pilgrims were easily duped, and resumed travelling by camel in large numbers. The diminution in the number of persons travelling in motor vehicles affected Treasury receipts, and the Government, partly out of their own pockets, took the matter to the King with the result that the Royal decree establishing the "Nakaba" was, as an exceptional measure, rescinded. The motor companies, having once more a free hand began competition afresh, and this resulted in the motor hire falling from £15 to £8 or even £8½ in the case of the journey to Medina, and to 12s. as against £1 5s. in the case of the journey from Jedda to Mecca. This, however, did not benefit the pilgrims, as they still had to pay the higher rate, the difference between the higher rate and the reduced rate going into the pocket of their mutawwifs, who hired cars for them at the lowest prices available. Protests made against these malpractices of the mutawwifs were ineffective, some though by no means in all cases.

5. Another regulation affecting motor transport was the restriction imposed by the Government on the import of motor vehicles into this country, by which no car could be imported without the previous sanction of the Viceroy. This arrangement greatly profited those persons who had a monopoly of motor transport (Limited), among others, deterring competition and thus leading to a checked and disproportionate increase in the supply of cars as compared with the demand.

Motor Drivers

The motor drivers were mostly of the Arab race, and for skill and good behaviour were highly valued. The wages of a driver was highly popular among the pilgrims, and it was reported that the recent bid for drivers from India, which was made by the Government, was of the order of £100 per month. A certain Syed Siraj Wahi, already mentioned, who engaged drivers at Bombay at very low salaries, was reported to have been engaged by the Government to serve him for fourteen months, in default of which they were to pay him 1,000 rupees in compensation.

7. It is suggested that, in order to safeguard the interests of ignorant drivers not well acquainted with the conditions of the Hejaz, the Government should, before the pilgrimage season, inform persons who seek such service of the conditions prevailing here.

Camels

8. Apart from the poorest class of pilgrims who travelled on foot, the majority of the pilgrims travelled by camel. Camels were easily obtainable and plentiful, and the hire of camels was not very high.

9. Camel hire between Jedda and Mecca this year was approximately the same as last year, but the prices for the various journeys, and also of other sundry expenses connected therewith, were as follows:

	By Shuqduf. Rupees.	By Shabriah Rupees.
(i) Journey from Jedda to Mecca —		
Camel hire	14/4/-	18/6/-
Two earthenware jars for water ..	6/-	6/-
Shuqduf hire	2/8/-	2/8/-
Two baskets for jars of water ..	2/8/-	2/8/-
Two mats to cover Shuqduf ..	2/8/-	2/8/-
Municipal tax	1/4/-	1/4/-
Wages of servant accompanying to Mecca	1/8/-	1/8/-
Bahra halt charges	1/4/-	1/4/-

NOTE.—The amounts in both cases are for two pilgrims, and include the kushan tax of 10s. in each case.

(ii) Return journey from Mecca to Jedda —

The camel hire was increased from £1 to £2, while all other expenses remained the same. The increase was due to the higher price of camels, and to the fact that the pilgrims had to pay for the hire of camels, and for the hire of servants, and for the hire of mats, and for the hire of jars, and for the hire of baskets, and for the hire of water, and for the hire of food, and for the hire of other expenses. The pilgrims were not able to pay the higher price for the hire of camels, and for the hire of servants, and for the hire of mats, and for the hire of jars, and for the hire of baskets, and for the hire of water, and for the hire of food, and for the hire of other expenses.

(iii) Journey to Muna and Arafat and back to Mecca.

	Rupees.
Camel hire, £3	41/-/-
Shuqduf hire, £1	18/8/-
Mats, lighting, servant, and other expenses ..	5/-/-
	59/8/-

NOTE.—This amount is for two pilgrims, and includes the kushan tax of £1.

Camels for this journey were easily obtainable, both for the reason given above, and for the fact that the large numbers of Indians who were for Hajj, and who were going to Arafat, were not able to leave Mecca until a day or two before the Hajj, and so the necessity of hiring camels at Arafat in the heat for several days of tents.

(iv) The journey from Mecca to Medina and back to Jodda:—

	Rupees
Camel hire for Medina, £12 10s. ..	176
Shuqduf hire	12
Wages of a servant	10
Miscellaneous expenses of lighting, &c.	5

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This, again, is for two pilgrims, and includes kushan tax of £8, or, approximately, 50 rupees. The above are the fixed rates, and pilgrims have never managed to obtain cheaper rates owing to the great number of camels available.

(6).—Customs

Customs formalities in the case of pilgrims entering the country were tightened up owing to attempts on the part of pilgrims and local merchants to use pilgrims' baggage as a means of importing goods in some quantity without paying customs dues. From a desire to do a very thorough search of pilgrims' baggage with the result that there was great congestion in the limited space of the custom-house. It would be a pity if a general warning were issued to pilgrims not to attempt to smuggle goods into this country on their own account or on behalf of other persons. In the case of goods which are exported by the pilgrims, no special attention is given for stores, as is the case with customs, it would save a certain amount of trouble in the custom-house if pilgrims were advised to take it into the proper lengths where they are sold. If brought in as stores, it is not subject to the payment of customs dues, whereas if it is not it is subject to customs dues are charged. This was frequently the subject of complaint.

2. Several cases of theft at the custom-house were reported by pilgrims. The custom-house officials are, for the most part, of low class, and are poorly paid, and they are not averse on occasion to purloining articles if the owner's attention flags during the customs search.

3. On leaving the country the pilgrims are not searched, but it is the custom to charge them with carrying Zemzem water and dates at the rate of about 1s. a case. The pilgrims resent this charge, they were, however, still louder in their protestations when, on embarkation, their Zemzem water was thrown overboard by the ship's crew who was afraid of its value and was only concerned with its commercial protection. It would be well if pilgrims had their cases of Zemzem water labelled as such.

(7).—Mutawwifs

The attitude of the mutawwif is the governing factor in the pilgrim's comfort or discomfort in the Hejaz. On landing at Jeddah the pilgrim realises at once, and he is forced to realise, that he is no longer a free agent, but that his mutawwif is the sole arbiter of all his actions and movements. A good-natured or well-intentioned mutawwif will ensure a peaceful stay. These are few and far between, and the mutawwif is as a rule an unscrupulous and venal who causes infinite trouble to the pilgrims; in fact, the mutawwif's neglect and carelessness has sometimes resulted in loss of life.

2. The chief difficulty lies in the fact that no proper official control is yet exercised over the mutawwifs. No amount of reforms in other directions will be satisfactory until the mutawwifs are subjected to rigorous control and severely punished for malpractices. The Indian vice-consul has in many cases, particularly in 1926 and 1927, succeeded in having fines imposed. This had a salutary effect for a time. During the 1929 pilgrimage, however, conditions became for the worse. On the one hand, the intervention of the British consul was misinterpreted by the King by certain influential Indian agitators as having a political object. On the other hand, the mutawwifs succeeded in entangling themselves behind some of the bigger officials and were backed up by some of the shipping clerks. At Jeddah it was still possible to keep the mutawwif situation in hand, but at Mecca it was often very difficult to obtain satisfaction and complaints regarding the mutawwifs

there were more frequent than in the two years preceding. It is, furthermore, often impossible to secure conclusive evidence of guilt owing to the fact that complaints are generally made verbally, and that there is a disinclination on the part of the pilgrims to substantiate them in writing.

3. A general source of complaint was the fact that the mutawwifs charged high sums for motor hire and for expenses at Arafat, which they collected in advance, while the transport which they eventually provided was thoroughly bad. The accommodation given at Arafat was also of the poorest description, and there was much overcrowding. Many cases of theft were reported at Muna and Arafat. In Mecca thefts took place from the persons of pilgrims in the Holy Mosque itself.

4. Misappropriation of the cash of deceased pilgrims was also of common occurrence. It was usually proved by the small amount of cash and effects which were handed over to the British agency in relation to the number of the deceased and their circumstances. The amount of the effects, including cash, of deceased pilgrims handed over was in fact obviously and scandalously short.

5. The present chief of the mutawwifs, the Sheikh-el-Mutawwifien, obtained approval for a tax of 10s. per pilgrim for the purpose of paying a tax of 10s. per pilgrim for himself, the amount so taken being the perquisite of the Viceroy, as was generally known, and not being credited to the Government Treasury. The Sheikh-el-Mutawwifien by this means acquired considerable influence and took to collecting, simultaneously with the 10s. tax, 1s. per pilgrim for himself. All the mutawwifs now, with the support of their sheikh, which carries with it that of the higher Government officials, are able to insist upon the payment of excessive charges.

6. This change in the official attitude has affected pilgrims' affairs generally. The reforms introduced last year are being allowed to fall into abeyance and abuses are again creeping in. Unless serious steps are taken to check this growing tendency on the part of the mutawwifs to evade regulations and abuse their position, they will quickly revert to the same malpractices which prevailed under the Turkish and Sheressian régimes.

7. The remedy for the present state of affairs lies to a certain extent in our own hands. According to present regulations, the pilgrims, with the exception of those of certain provinces, have a liberty to choose whichever mutawwif they like. This liberty of choice can be used with advantage to bring the mutawwifs to heel. A list of mutawwifs of good reputation might well be drawn up at the British Legation and sent to the authorities at the pilgrims' ports of embarkation. These authorities might then be asked to direct the pilgrims to the mutawwif of their choice. Such a system would be independent of the Hejaz Government, and would, I think, serve the purpose and induce the Hejaz Government to take proper steps itself.

8. The following suggestions are also put forward for consideration:—(a) The British Legation should be empowered to refuse a visa for territory under British control to any mutawwif who gives serious cause of complaint or is found guilty of malpractices. The existence of a Black List for the purpose would act as a powerful deterrent, and I do not think that it would be found necessary to refuse many visas after the first one or two cases. Such action is already taken by the Dutch consul in Jeddah, and he is helped by the fact that no Dutch consul other than himself is authorized to grant a visa for Jeddah to a Hejazi national, save in exceptional cases.

9.—(i) There would appear to be some collusion between the mutawwifs and certain Moulvis in India, particularly in Bengal, tending to circumscribe the pilgrims' freedom of choice of their mutawwif. The Moulvis in many cases, it is stated, pose as pilgrims, and at the same time, at the same time, when the pilgrims are asked to state their choice of mutawwif, they direct them to the highest bidders among the mutawwifs who are congregated at Bombay. Information has been received that pilgrims have been passed on in this way at prices amounting to as much as 30 rupees a head. It follows that a mutawwif who has heavy overhead charges of this nature, involving probably his own and a servant's journey to India, can only make a profit if he has recourse to illegal methods. It would be a good thing if some means could be devised for bringing these Moulvis to book.

10.—(ii) It would be advisable to keep a watch over mutawwifs' movements in India. In particular, judging by the complaints received, it is suggested that a close surveillance should be exercised over their activities in the pilgrims' rest camp at Bombay.

11. There is an idea on foot of farming out the Mahometan world to mutawwifs by auction, every Mahometan district being assigned for pilgrimage purposes to the exclusive exploitation of the mutawwif who bids highest. The system is a pernicious one, although it is calculated to bring in a greatly increased revenue to the Government, as it would place the pilgrims at the mercy of the mutawwifs, and would expose them to various forms of extortion.

12. This system is actually in force in respect of pilgrims from Madras, Ceylon, the Malive Islands, Bihar and Orissa, Malabar and Burma, these pilgrims having no choice but to accept the mutawwif appointed by the Hejaz Government for their respective provinces. These mutawwifs run no risk of losing clients, and therefore they have no need to nurse their reputation. The pilgrims from these provinces have often complained about their mutawwifs. The mutawwif for Malabar and Ceylon, Syed Siraj Wali, who has already been mentioned in connection with other malpractices, appears to be the worst of them, to judge by the complaints received about him. The matter is engaging the attention of the British Legation, and it is hoped that when the King returns to the Hejaz it will be possible to secure greater freedom of choice of mutawwif for the pilgrims from the provinces above mentioned.

13. Perhaps it is only fair to add a word in defence of the mutawwifs, however objectionable they may be as a class. The greater proportion of the taxes which are collected nominally on behalf of the mutawwifs are in reality collected on Government account as supplementary to the more recognised and open forms of Government taxation. In fact, the proportion allowed to be retained by the mutawwif is often far too small to enable them to gain a livelihood by legitimate means in the exercise of their profession. As long as this is the case the mutawwifs, in order to obtain enough money to carry them through the lean season, will continue to extort money from pilgrims in different ways with the connivance of the local authorities.

(8)—Religious Intolerance

The British agency did not receive the usual number of complaints from the pilgrims of interference in the performance of their religious observances, nor was any particular hardship suffered by pilgrims reported from Medina. The main reason of this was that the local Government took precautionary measures, warning the mutawwifs against taking their pilgrims to places where there was any likelihood of disturbance. At Mecca, a wall was built round the site of the tomb of Khadija to screen it from public view.

2. Complaints of interference which used to be received in past years in connexion with observances at the Prophet's Tomb in Medina, came almost entirely from the educated and wealthy section of the pilgrims who were prevented from having access to the tomb. These pilgrims induced the Nepthi soldiers by offering them a small bribe of a few piastres, to allow them to touch the railings surrounding the body of the Prophet. The poorer section of the pilgrims were subjected to a mild stroke of the whip when they attempted to touch the railings, but no formal complaint was received from them at the British agency.

(9)—Indian Pilgrimages

The number of pilgrims who sailed from Indian ports for the Hejaz this season was 19,832, including 178 children, as against 21,109 last year. Of this total, British Indians accounted for 14,997, their number being 1,043 in excess of that for 1928. This increase was largely due to an increase in the number of Bengali pilgrims, of whom there were 7,227 as against 5,105 in 1928. The other provinces showed a diminution in numbers.

2. The following table indicates (1) the number of pilgrims from each province, India, and the ports at which they embarked, and (2) the approximate numbers of foreign pilgrims who reached the Hejaz by way of Indian ports.

(A.)—BRITISH SUBJECTS

Province	Bombay	Karachi	Canton	Total
Bengal	6,160	38	1,009	7,227
Punjab	353	1,445		1,798
United Provinces	1,043	33		1,108
Bombay	904			1,011
Madras	91	2		72
N.W.F.P.	80	184		264
Baluchistan	16	349		368
Sind		775		780
Central Province	17	28		343
Delhi	15	46		117
Burma	117			238
Hyderabad (Deccan)	237	1		10
Nepal	1	1		206
Bihar and Orissa	206			8
Ceylon	5			1
Mauritius	1			
	10,620	3,368	1,009	14,997

(B.)—FOREIGNERS

Nationality			
Afghans	20	1,142	1,162
Chinese	25	17	72
Persians	60	2,607	2,674
Bahreinis	5	201	206
Iraqis	7	80	96
Hejazis	377	27	404
S. Africans	42		42
Russian Turkestan	6		6
Yemenis	13		13
Bokharans	1		1
Javanese, Malays, and other East Indies	157		157
	722	4,119	4,836

3. Little difficulty was experienced in securing return passages for the pilgrims as there was no lack of steamers. The number of pilgrims detained at Mecca for want of accommodation was consequently small. The local agents of Messrs. Nemazee and Co., however, were, as last year, responsible for a certain amount of inconvenience to pilgrims as having little or no money to appear in detention in securing of the return passage they were slow in repaying the balance of passage money (30 rupees) due to pilgrims who, having paid for the double journey from Calcutta to Mecca and back, were, on their return to be conveyed only as far as Bombay.

4. In many cases the members of a family or of one party were separated from one another owing to the fact that some of them had return tickets, while the others were in possession of deposit paid passes. In these cases the local agents of the Nemazee line after considerable persuasion were induced to refund 30 rupees to the return ticket holders. The latter, however, refused to entertain the claims of the deposit paid passengers, these latter eventually to be sent back to India on ships of the Mughal line. However, the return passages are deemed as settled beyond the period allowed a few pilgrims of the Shikhar line being alone so detained.

5. It was anticipated that owing to the opposition of M. Ismail Ghaznavi and other leading Indian Wahabite dignitaries who will be expected this year over the constitution after the pilgrimage of the locally organised Haj Committee, which has met each year since 1927 under the presidency of the Indian vice-consul for the purpose of drawing up a list of the return passengers and of obtaining from steamer companies accommodation for their return journey to India in the order of their arrival at Jeddah.

Shipping (General)

Brought in				Expended		
	1891	1892	1893	1894	No. of travellers	Per diem expended
Mugul Lake	10	10	21,313	2	12	10,000
Nemane Lake	10	10	4,438	3	3	3,017
Shobari Lake	10	10	3,200	2	3	2,512
Total	30	30	28,951	7	18	15,529

	Number of 150 runs in 100 miles			
Mogul Line	1	100	100	1 175
Newater Line	2	100	100	1 438
Shustari Line	100	100	100	478
				3 080

23. Apart from the Indian pilgrims leaving from and returning to Indian ports the following numbers of persons other than Indians were carried by Indian pilgrim steamers to various ports in the Red Sea and the Arabian coast:-

	Mogul Line	Netmizer
Aden	78	98
Kamaran	94	
Mokalla	182	
Modetda		56.5
Jibouti		88
	354	781

	Arrivals	Departures
Bombay	11,196	12,807
Karachi	7,457	9,760
Calcutta	1,023	
	19,676	16,567

26. The number of pilgrims who purchased single and return tickets or made money deposits in India may be stated as follows:

	Subsidiary Ticket.	Return Ticket.	Deposit Passport.	Total.
Bombay	661	10,236	290	11,187
Karachi	2,958	4,352	147	7,457
Calcutta	—	672	331	1,003
Total	3,619	15,260	768	19,647

27. The subjoined list shows the number of ships available on given dates for the repatriation of pilgrims; the number of pilgrims on each line awaiting repatriation, and the number actually repatriated on each date.

District	No. of pilgrims waiting at port	Pilgrims in transit				Pilgrims remaining				Various other pilgrims
		T	M	N	Z	T	M	N	Z	
Meerut	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Delhi	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200
Aligarh	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300
Mathura	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400
Jaipur	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500
Bikaner	600	600	600	600	600	600	600	600	600	600
Udaipur	700	700	700	700	700	700	700	700	700	700
Rajasthan	800	800	800	800	800	800	800	800	800	800
Madhya Pradesh	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900
Uttar Pradesh	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
Bihar	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100
Orissa	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
Assam	1300	1300	1300	1300	1300	1300	1300	1300	1300	1300
West Bengal	1400	1400	1400	1400	1400	1400	1400	1400	1400	1400
East Bengal	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500
Sumatra	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600	1600
Java	1700	1700	1700	1700	1700	1700	1700	1700	1700	1700
Sumatra	1800	1800	1800	1800	1800	1800	1800	1800	1800	1800
Java	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900
Sumatra	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000
Java	2100	2100	2100	2100	2100	2100	2100	2100	2100	2100
Sumatra	2200	2200	2200	2200	2200	2200	2200	2200	2200	2200
Java	2300	2300	2300	2300	2300	2300	2300	2300	2300	2300
Sumatra	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400
Java	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500
Sumatra	2600	2600	2600	2600	2600	2600	2600	2600	2600	2600
Java	2700	2700	2700	2700	2700	2700	2700	2700	2700	2700
Sumatra	2800	2800	2800	2800	2800	2800	2800	2800	2800	2800
Java	2900	2900	2900	2900	2900	2900	2900	2900	2900	2900
Sumatra	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000
Java	3100	3100	3100	3100	3100	3100	3100	3100	3100	3100
Sumatra	3200	3200	3200	3200	3200	3200	3200	3200	3200	3200
Java	3300	3300	3300	3300	3300	3300	3300	3300	3300	3300
Sumatra	3400	3400	3400	3400	3400	3400	3400	3400	3400	3400
Java	3500	3500	3500	3500	3500	3500	3500	3500	3500	3500
Sumatra	3600	3600	3600	3600	3600	3600	3600	3600	3600	3600
Java	3700	3700	3700	3700	3700	3700	3700	3700	3700	3700
Sumatra	3800	3800	3800	3800	3800	3800	3800	3800	3800	3800
Java	3900	3900	3900	3900	3900	3900	3900	3900	3900	3900
Sumatra	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000
Java	4100	4100	4100	4100	4100	4100	4100	4100	4100	4100
Sumatra	4200	4200	4200	4200	4200	4200	4200	4200	4200	4200
Java	4300	4300	4300	4300	4300	4300	4300	4300	4300	4300
Sumatra	4400	4400	4400	4400	4400	4400	4400	4400	4400	4400
Java	4500	4500	4500	4500	4500	4500	4500	4500	4500	4500
Sumatra	4600	4600	4600	4600	4600	4600	4600	4600	4600	4600
Java	4700	4700	4700	4700	4700	4700	4700	4700	4700	4700
Sumatra	4800	4800	4800	4800	4800	4800	4800	4800	4800	4800
Java	4900	4900	4900	4900	4900	4900	4900	4900	4900	4900
Sumatra	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000

28. From the statistics given the following facts may be deduced :—

The ships had in some cases to wait at Jedda, as a sufficient number of their respective pilgrims were not available at the time. The steamships "Englestan" and "Akbar" were obliged to leave with 371 and 143 pilgrims on board respectively, and that at a time when many pilgrims of the Shustari Line were awaiting the arrival of a Shustari steamer. If a deposit system had been in force, this would not have occurred. Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. were able to deal with their returning pilgrims without much difficulty. Their steamers left at short intervals, and many pilgrims holding return tickets of the Shustari Line, who could not wait for the arrival of a Shustari steamer, purchased fresh tickets from the Mogul Line, registering at the British agency their claims for refund of money spent on their original tickets.

29. Certain other difficulties were experienced with regard to shipping, which, though of minor importance in themselves, caused not a little inconvenience at the time. These are briefly mentioned for the information of the Government of India —

- The shipping companies, considering on occasion that the number of pilgrims booked for Karachi was not sufficient to warrant their calling at that port, proceeded direct to Bombay. This naturally evoked many and violent protests from pilgrims whose homes are in Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab or the North West Frontier Province. It is not known whether the companies can be compelled to call at Karachi in such cases, or failing this, the pilgrims may be informed accordingly.
- Pilgrims holding return tickets issued by the Shustari and Nemazee lines, who for some reason or other did not return to India, experienced great difficulty in obtaining the refund of their return passage money. It is desirable that the local Jedda agents of these companies should be instructed by their principals to comply strictly and promptly with the regulations on the subject.
- This year these two companies issued a few tickets marked "free for the return journey." Holders of these tickets did not in many cases reach Jedda until after the departure of the last steamers belonging to these lines, and the agents refused to provide an alternative passage, as is done in the case of the usual return ticket holders. The persons concerned in most cases became destitute, and were repatriated at the expense of the Government of India. It would assist matters if the companies in question were requested to refrain from issuing such tickets, a course which involves the Government of India in unnecessary expenditure. Alternatively, if the companies insist for one reason or another on issuing "free" tickets, they should themselves take measures through their local agents to ensure that such persons are not left stranded in Jedda after the pilgrimage.

30. The following points in connexion with the pilgrim traffic are also worth consideration —

- The shipping companies should endeavour, as far as possible, to employ Moslem crews. This measure would certainly go a long way towards reducing the complaints at present being continually made by pilgrims against the shipping companies. If this is not entirely practicable, it is suggested that, at any rate, ships' doctors, compounders, clerks and water distributors should be Moslems.
- It is desirable that the loading and unloading of pilgrims' luggage in Jedda harbour be undertaken by the shipping companies in the same way as ship's cargo, namely by engagement of labour and the use of derricks. The companies are in the habit of unloading 40,000 to 50,000 packages at any one time, and there would appear to be no sound reason why the system should not be extended to cover pilgrims' baggage. This is a ready practice in the case of the Javanese pilgrimage.
- Connected with the foregoing is the question of landing the pilgrims at the quay. Here, also, arrangements are necessary, such as may spare the pilgrims any dealings with the dhowmen, whose main object is to fleece

them in every way. This question has already, I understand, been considered by the Government. The persons who deal with the Indian pilgrimage are apparently strongly opposed to it, and despite the fact that the system has been proved to work satisfactorily in the case of the pilgrims of the Indian Government, no such system in this connexion have not so far been adopted. The matter, however, is important from the pilgrims' point of view, and it is worth noting that the dhowmen themselves, to judge from their own statements, would welcome a system which would relieve them of the necessity of collecting their fares individually from the pilgrims.

The rates for the pilgrims are as follows: for the outer harbour, the middle harbour and the inner harbour. The rates for the pilgrims are 1/4/- rupees, 1/- rupee and -/10/- rupees for the three harbours respectively. In 1928, on the suggestion of the Indian vice-consul at Jeddah, the Government decided to collect the fares of the pilgrims irrespective of the distance. This proposal was submitted to the Hejaz Government, but in the absence of the King it fell through. It is suggested that if the Government cannot collect the fares, the shipping companies should book pilgrims from a rate to share. If this is done, the fares would be collected and added in the cost of the passage. Such a course would benefit both pilgrims and dhowmen alike.

- (4) Better arrangements should be made for the distribution of water on board the pilgrim ships during the voyage. The quantity of water supplied should also be increased.

The present water allowance, 1½ gallons per pilgrim per day, is altogether insufficient. The Mogul Line have in the past stated that they supplied their pilgrims with much more water than the quantity to which they were entitled, while Messrs. Nemazeo have for years been supplying free water. This would indicate that the companies themselves recognise that the ration of water as originally fixed is inadequate. If, however, the companies are compelled to supply food to the pilgrims while on board, the water question will automatically be solved and the above quantity will be more than enough.

In any case whatever the decision taken on this point may be it is recommended that extra pumps be installed for the distribution of water, one pump on each deck. This would enable the pilgrims to obtain the water more easily and would do away with many of the complaints which at present arise on this score.

- (5) The question of supplying food to the pilgrims during the voyage was recommended in last year's report. It has been argued, however, that an experiment in the use of the proposed system was tried by the Mogul Line but that it proved a failure. If this is so, the reason for the failure would appear to be that the pilgrims had already purchased their food before embarkation as they were ignorant of the fact that food could be obtained on board. This explanation was supported by the evidence of several of the leading pilgrims. Pilgrims as a general rule wish to travel as economically as possible, and it is obvious that the aggregate individual expenditure of a shipload of pilgrims on food is much greater than would be the case if the catering were done by the companies.

Experience has shown that pilgrims are generally prepared to pay high steamer fares. In 1927 as the result of keen competition between the various companies, tickets for the return journey were bought by the pilgrims at the low rate of 100 rupees while the season average for an equal amount of pilgrims paid 195 rupees for the same journey. If, therefore, the companies would add a further 12 to 15 rupees to the cost of their steamer tickets on account of food, it would make no appreciable difference to the numbers of pilgrims booking passages on their ships. But, for such a measure to be effective it is essential that prior notice of it be widely published and its benefit explained to intending pilgrims.

- (6) During the season over 7,000 Bengalis sailed from Bombay. On arrival at Bombay from Calcutta they find themselves in a strange country where their language is not understood and they pay the usual toll taken from strangers. It would seem to be greatly preferable that Bengali pilgrims

should be induced by legislation or otherwise to embark at Calcutta. This would also benefit the shipping companies who would then have to deal with a practically uniform class of passenger having the same tastes in food and the same customs. The journey from Calcutta to Bombay is made purely in the mutawwif's interest at present.

- (7) It is recommended that Indian ships should use four ladders for the embarkation and disembarkation of pilgrims instead of two only. This is already obligatory by law in the case of the Egyptian pilgrims, and these operations are greatly facilitated thereby. In this connexion care should be taken to see that the ladders are not placed in close proximity to the discharge of the circulating water or else that the circulating water is not discharged while pilgrims are being embarked or disembarked.
- (8) Pilgrims travelling first or second class have made the following complaints:

(a) There is no special deck for them and they have consequently to confine themselves to their cabins. Even the gangways outside their cabins are crowded with deck passengers.

(b) In the Mogul Line ships the saloon is reserved for the officers, and pilgrims, though travelling first-class, are not allowed to use it. The Nemazeo and Shustari lines actually utilise the saloons as space for carrying pilgrims who are prepared to pay something slightly in excess of the fare for deck passages. It is suggested that this question be considered with a view to reserving separate deck and saloon accommodation for first- and second-class passengers.

(c) It often happens that on the return journey all the first-class passengers of any one line assemble at Jeddah at the same time, and on account of the multitude of applicants are unable to obtain immediately the first-class accommodation for which they have paid. They are accordingly offered by the companies the choice of waiting for a later steamer or of travelling as deck passengers. If they choose the latter course, they are induced to sign a declaration to the effect that they are travelling as deck passengers of their own free will and that they have no claim for refund of the balance of their fare. The shipping companies should, I think, be compelled to return the balance of the fare in such cases.

- (9) Masters of ships should be requested to extend to the Indian vice-consul all facilities necessary for visiting pilgrim ships in Jeddah Harbour and getting into touch with pilgrims for the purpose of receiving the effects of deceased pilgrims. It has been found that if complaints are attended to on the spot much trouble is spared to all concerned. In this connexion it would be of advantage if the Indian pilgrimage officer, acting under the authority of His Majesty's Minister in Jeddah, were empowered, *mutatis mutandis*, to act under Appendix B, Bombay Act V of 1915 entitled Protection of Pilgrims (clause 8), and his name inserted in this article.

- (10) Before disembarking at Jeddah, pilgrims should be requested to leave their effects behind them on the quays or in the dhows. This would not, as a rule, delay a ship for more than an hour. Hitherto ships have sailed as soon as the last pilgrims have embarked, thus leaving them no time to ascertain whether all their luggage has come on board. Here, again, an appropriate article might be inserted in the Act mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

- (11) The embarkation tickets issued by Messrs. Turner, Morrison are small in size and are consequently easily lost. It is desirable that they should be made larger and that they should consist of two portions, one portion to be retained by the pilgrims. It would also be of assistance if the class of a pilgrim's ticket were entered on the embarkation ticket, as much confusion results at present in the absence of this.

Detention of Pilgrims.

31. This year a small number of pilgrims only—limited to those of the Shustari Line—were detained in Jeddah for lack of shipping accommodation beyond the period

allowed, the following table shows the number of pilgrims thus detained, the period of their detention and the total expenditure thereon as a compensation.

No. of Pilgrims	No. of Days Detained.	on proportion Rupees.
1	15	15
1	14	14
2	12	24
6	8	48
19	6	114
9	4	36
7	3	21
6	2	12
17	1	17
		301

32. Of the total of 301 rupees shown above, 38 rupees was returned by well-to-do pilgrims who had been detained for the same reason as above.

33. The compensation allowed for detention is 1 rupee per day for passengers of all classes, first and second class passengers included in this in the ground that the cost of living is higher in the Hejaz than in the Indian subcontinent and that a considerable number of pilgrims are detained in the Hejaz on the ground that they are unable to pay for their passage. The Government of India has been asked to consider the question why the Government of India should be asked to pay for the cost of living of pilgrims who are detained in the Hejaz. It is pointed out that the cost of living is always extremely high in the Hejaz at the time when the pilgrims are waiting to return home.

Destitutes.

34. The question of the repatriation of destitute Indian pilgrims has been the subject of discussion for several years. Since the introduction of the deposit and return ticket system, the number of destitute pilgrims has been greatly diminished. A considerable number of pilgrims, however, are still detained in the Hejaz by the overland route through Nejd. They make declarations at Karachi, but do not return to India. It is pointed out that the cost of living in the Hejaz is very high and that the pilgrims are unable to pay for their passage. It is recommended that the authorities concerned, particularly at Karachi, should take special care to distinguish between the various classes of pilgrims in this respect.

35. Another factor which operates to reduce the number of destitutes this year was the fact that destitute pilgrims have been told that the Government of India would not pay for their repatriation. It is pointed out that the wealthier pilgrims are able to pay for their repatriation, but the poorer pilgrims are unable to do so. It is recommended that the authorities concerned, particularly at Karachi, should take special care to distinguish between the various classes of pilgrims in this respect.

36. In regard to the question of destitutes at Karachi, it is pointed out that the Government of India has a system of issuing tickets to pilgrims except in the case of first and second class passengers. The system at present in force is not intended to prevent pilgrims from travelling to the Hejaz, but rather to prevent pilgrims from travelling to the Hejaz without adequate means. It is recommended that the authorities concerned, particularly at Karachi, should take special care to distinguish between the various classes of pilgrims in this respect.

37. At the end of the season, a number of pilgrims from Karachi travelled to the Hejaz furnished with adequate means. Those who have arrived are for the most part persons of restricted means and several of them will in all probability eventually have to be repatriated as destitutes. This is to be deprecated.

38. The problem presented by pilgrims travelling overland through Nejd is one which is likely to become more difficult to deal with as time goes on. During the Hajj season, the overland route is closed to all intents and purposes, and the pilgrims are forced to travel by sea. The situation has now changed, and the roads are safe. Ibn Saud's officers, in fact, have in some cases secured free conveyance

from Riyadh to Mecca for those pilgrims who had travelled to the capital of Nejd from the Persian Gulf. It is pointed out that if the overland route may become more popular. Should this occur, the Government of India will find itself involved in increased expenditure on account of repatriation of destitutes, and it is, therefore, desirable that restrictions be brought into force with a view to reducing to a minimum the numbers of pilgrims travelling by this route.

39. The method of dealing with destitutes at this Legation is as follows —

No hint of possible repatriation is given until the last minute before the various ships sail. The object of this is to induce those who have money and are concealing the fact to buy a ticket for themselves through fear of missing the steamer, so that only the genuine destitutes may be left. Secondly, many destitutes during the waiting period receive charity from the richer pilgrims sufficient to enable them to buy a ticket, and there are also many rich pilgrims who take destitutes with them on board at their own expense. The expenses incurred on behalf of repatriation are, in this way, reduced to a minimum. For instance, the number of destitutes who originally applied for repatriation after the Hajj reached approximately 300, but, by following the above system, the numbers were greatly reduced, and those actually repatriated amounted only to 139.

40. If the news of repatriation were made public earlier in the return season, then those even who possessed tickets would apply for repatriation and either attempt to sell their tickets locally or apply for a refund on them on their return to India.

41. This practice of not disclosing until the last minute the fact that there will be any repatriation at Government expense, a practice which is essential if expenses are to be kept down, makes it practically impossible for the Legation to furnish the Government of India beforehand with information as to the number of destitutes to be repatriated. Furthermore, up to the last moment, the number continues to be increased by arrivals from the interior.

42. It would, therefore, be in the interest of the Government of India, and it would greatly facilitate matters at this end, if the British Legation were empowered to repatriate in anticipation of sanction. In this way it would be possible to obtain the cheapest rates from the shipping companies, for the Legation would be enabled to take advantage at any moment of the competitive prices which it is possible to obtain when steamers of different lines are in harbour at one time. To illustrate this, it may be pointed out that in 1928, when early sanction was received, it was found possible to secure destitute passages at the rate of £1 per head on account of the competition between the companies, in 1929, however, there being only one steamer in port when the sanction arrived, and consequently no competition, the price was higher, namely, 25 and 35 rupees.

43. The total expense incurred on account of repatriation of destitutes this season was 4,011 rupees, which included the sum of 351 rupees for food on the voyage. Food was supplied at the rate of 3 rupees per head by the Pilgrim Food Supply Company under the supervision of the master of ship.

44. In case it may be of interest to the Government of India the following list has been compiled, showing the proportion of destitutes repatriated according to their provinces of origin —

Name of Province.	No. of Pilgrims
Punjab	34
Madras	27
Sind	22
United Provinces	18
Baluchistan	17
N W F P	8
Bengal	12
Central Provinces	2
Bombay	1
	139

45. Of the above destitutes, ninety-nine travelled to the Hejaz by the overland route and forty by sea. The latter had made declarations in India.

Deposit System.

46. The advantages which would accrue from the universal application of the compulsory deposit system have already been submitted to the Haj Enquiry Committee in detail. One recommendation, however, which I should like to urge again is that pilgrims should be induced as far as possible to deposit an additional 30 rupees per head at the time of the deposit made to cover the return journey. This would save them all the inconveniences to which they are subjected on their return to Jeddah as a result of lack of funds. This sum could be paid to the pilgrims in Jeddah by the agents of the shipping companies, by arrangement, when the embarkation tickets are issued.

47. In this connexion it may be pointed out that, under the existing regulations, the refund of a deposit is made only in India. Those pilgrims who do not intend to return to India are obliged to apply to the Legation to obtain a refund and their passes have to be forwarded to India for the purpose. This entails considerable delay for the pilgrims and not a little extra work for the Legation staff. It would, therefore, be of advantage if refund could be made in Jeddah, and it is suggested that in the interests of all concerned the name of His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah or of the Indian pilgrimage officer be inserted in rule 68-J of Government of India notification No 1734, Health, of the 15th December, 1926.

Pilgrim Passes

48. In view of the introduction of the deposit system, several alterations in the form of pilgrim pass were suggested in last year's report for the consideration of the Haj Committee. It was recommended, for instance, that photographs should be attached to the passes in the same way as is the case of regular passports. Another year's experience has confirmed the desirability of this.

49. As regards pilgrims of foreign nationalities, it is recommended that there should be supplied with a special form of emergency pass different from that issued to British pilgrims. This would simplify the procedure at Jeddah in dealing with foreign pilgrims.

50. Twenty-six emergency passes were issued by the British agency this season, of which sixteen were granted to Indians whose passes, not having been deposited in the usual way, were lost or stolen, while the remainder were issued to foreigners travelling to India.

Cost of Pilgrimage

51. The cost of the pilgrimage this year was approximately the same as last year. Pilgrims should therefore be advised that they should be in possession of not less than 600 rupees when they undertake the journey, that amount being necessary to enable them to travel by rail to the Hejaz, and, if they propose to travel by car while in the Hejaz they should bring a further 100 rupees with them. Considerable difficulties are constantly experienced through pilgrims arriving in Jeddah from India with insufficient funds. These have either to endure hardships or beg for charity. One reason for this is that charity tickets are often supplied by well-to-do merchants in India, and that no provision is made for the pilgrims' subsistence while in the Hejaz.

Staff

52. I have great pleasure in testifying to the industry and devotion with which Mr. J. M. J. [Name] has discharged his duties. I can thoroughly endorse all that was said last year by my predecessor. His work is wholly admirable and deserves recognition.

(10.)—Afghan Pilgrimage

Owing to civil war in Afghanistan during 1929, the number of Afghan pilgrims was considerably reduced. The total number of Afghan pilgrims who embarked at Karachi and 20 at Bombay, while 44 came from Suez. No notable Afghans made the pilgrimage this year.

The Turkish representative in Jeddah claimed that he represented Afghan pilgrims who were unable to pay the fee for the return journey. As a result of this, according to all reports, no money was forthcoming.

The British agency staff, however, have the thankless task of dealing with all the various questions in connexion with the loss of Afghan passports and return tickets, &c. Forty Afghans lost their return tickets this year. Of this number, ten were given emergency passes to enable them to travel as far as India.

There were several Afghan deaths this year. Most of these, however, occurred as a result of competition between the various companies vying to get the pilgrims to India. Some of the pilgrims were taken in charge by the local agents who at once arranged for their repatriation by the Mogul Line. The company, however, eventually decided to carry them free.

(11.)—Malay Pilgrimage

The Malay pilgrimage season began on the 1st December 1929, on which date the steers departed from Jeddah for Singapore with 410 pilgrims. The total number of arrivals from Malaya ports during the period under review was 2,809, including 246 pilgrims who had been in the country for 1 year or more. The pilgrims were received at the Haj Terminal, the last of which arrived at Jeddah on the 20th April 1929.

2. The number of pilgrims actually from British Malaya, as shown in the register, was as follows:

Straits Settlements—	
Singapore	242
Penang and Province Wellesley	128
Malacca	64
Federated Malay States—	
Perak	224
Selangor	92
Negeri Sembilan	52
Pahang	61
Unfederated Malay States—	
Johore	168
Kedah	100
Perlis	43
Kuala Lumpur	142
Ipoh	74
Brunei	14
Lahor	4
Total	1,455

3. This is the lowest number on record since 1924, the year in which the system of registration of Malay pilgrims was begun. The cause may be ascribed to the lack of funds of pilgrims, the depression in the rubber and tin trade existing in Malaya, taken with the figures for the two previous years:

In 1927	12,184 pilgrims.
In 1928	4,418 pilgrims.

The average works out at 8,019 pilgrims a year for the last three years of the period during which the system of registration of Malay pilgrims has been in operation. It may perhaps be considered the normal figure.

4. The number of Malay pilgrims who came to India this year was thirty-three. It could be noted that the Malay pilgrims (thirty-three to be exact) were all from the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States. The pilgrims from the Straits Settlements were particularly numerous, and it is suggested that the practice of giving a visa on the pilgrim pass for the journey to India may be discontinued. This would save confusion in the registration of

Sheikhs or Mutawwifs.

17. No complaints of a serious nature were brought by Malay pilgrims against their sheikhs or mutawwifs or, for that matter, against anyone else, so that the Malay pilgrimage officer had little occasion to go up to Mecca in this connexion.

Health.

18. There were again some cases of small pox, though only of a mild nature, among the Malay pilgrims this year. Compulsory inoculation and vaccination before embarkation will, however, obviate these troubles in the future.

Mortality.

19. The first intimation received by the Malay pilgrimage officer of the death of a pilgrim was the application of the relatives accompanying the deceased for his burial. Of the death of pilgrims at Jeddah no intimation is received by the Malay pilgrimage officer until the bodies are sent to the Hejaz Railway Station, where he receives the list of deaths from the British Consul. The following tables give the number of deaths among the pilgrims during the season as reported to him up to the date of his departure on the 6th July 1929.

Straits Settlements—

Singapore	18
Penang and Province Wellesley	3
Malacca	4

Federated Malay States—

Perak	12
Selangor	3
Negeri Sembilan	3
Pahang	14

Unfederated Malay States—

Johore	7
Kedah	6
Terengganu	7
Kuantan	7
Tringganu	7
Labuan	3

Total 80

This figure represents 8 per cent. of the year's arrivals.

Effects of Deceased Pilgrims.

20. Practice requires that the effects of deceased pilgrims be their next of kin in Mecca were successfully dealt with. It should be remembered that effects deposited in the British Consulate during the season do not remain the British Consulate's property until the Malay pilgrimage officer leaves the country for Malaya at the end of the season. It was the duty of the Malay pilgrimage officer in dealing with enquiries regarding deceased pilgrims' effects if officers issuing passes would see to it.

- that the names of two or more accompanying relatives be given in the pilgrim passes, thus to ensure that one of them will be allowed to receive the effects from the Bait-el Mal, in case of death of the pilgrim;
- that the names of the pilgrims and their "accompanying relatives" be written in clear Jawi (Arabic) characters, as well as in English.

In the case of enquiries for effects, district officers would also facilitate matters at this end if, with a view to establishing whether or not a claim is genuine, they would insist on the production of the pilgrim passes of the deceased by the accompanying relatives who claim the effects. It would also be useful if officers would state in all applications—

- The registration number of the passes and the year of issue
- The year the pilgrim in question is reported to have died

- The amount and nature of the effects with names of two witnesses (number of witnesses' passes to be given also) who may have knowledge concerning the effects.
- The name of the deceased's sheikh, if possible.

Pilgrims returning to Malaya.

21. The Malay pilgrims, as in the case of the Indians, were embarked for their return journey in the order of their arrival in Jeddah and were conveyed back to Malayan ports in eight ships of the Blue Funnel Line, the first on the 27th May and the last on the 28th June.

Appointment of a Malay Dresser.

22. A Malay dresser was seconded from the Federated Malay States for service in the Hejaz to assist in attending to the medical needs of Malay pilgrims. According to arrangement, and as he was to be sent to the Indian sub-assistant surgeon sent from India for service at Mecca during the pilgrimage season. Unfortunately, the latter did not arrive in Jeddah until very late in the season. The Malay dresser, not being qualified to do the work of the dispensary, was thus obliged to spend four months in Jeddah instead of taking up his work at Mecca when needed. If the present system continued, the Indian sub-assistant surgeon and the Malay dresser should arrive at the same time. This would mean either that the sub-assistant surgeon should be sent to the Hejaz earlier, in fact, than is necessary for purely Indian purposes—or else that the Malay dresser should arrive later in the season—that is to say, some time after the Malay pilgrims have arrived in Mecca and need medical attention.

23. It is a moot point, however, whether, under the present conditions, the Indian dispensary being some distance from the Malay quarter, it is worth while engaging a Malay dresser at all. The answer is to be found in the separate Malay dispensary at the Hejaz, which is a fully qualified Malay doctor. It is doubtful, however, whether the expense is warranted, and also whether a fully qualified Malay doctor would be available and willing to come.

24. The total number of cases treated by the Malay dresser in Jeddah during the first four months of the year was forty-two. Of these, thirty-six were male and six female. The total number treated in Mecca was 422, of which 379 were male, thirty-eight female and five children.

Staff.

25. Hajj Abdul Majid was seconded from the Federated Malay States Education Department for the fifth time to act as Malay pilgrimage officer attached to His Britannic Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah. As usual, he performed his duties with competence and efficiency, and his work was carried out without a hitch. The question of the appointment of a permanent Malay pilgrimage officer, possibly with the title of British (Malay) vice-consul, with a permanent clerk under him, has not as yet been settled. The services of a Malay officer to assist His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Jeddah in dealing with affairs of Malay pilgrims are, however, in any case, indispensable.

(12)—West African Pilgrimage.

According to the statistics issued by the local quarantine authorities, 2,335 British West Africans and Nigerians arrived in Jeddah this year from Suakin, the recognized point of departure for the Hejaz. There is no doubt, however, that a large number also travelled from Massawa in sambucs and landed at the Hejazi ports of Lath and Qunfida, where they proceeded on to Mecca. It is ascertained in spite of the undertaking given by the Italian Government not to allow the 20th October, 1928, to the effect that they would not permit the transport of pilgrims from Massawa to Jeddah unless by steamship. From enquiries made, it would appear that as many as 2,000 Nigerian pilgrims arrived at Lath and Qunfida from Massawa during the year, but it has been impossible to obtain an accurate estimate.

2. In the return season a large number of applications were received from Nigerians for repatriation to their homes via the Sudan. A certain number of these had come to this country from the Sudan and Eritrea both before and after the introduction of the present pilgrim laws by these Governments. All such applicants were informed that they should return to their homes by the same route and following the same route as in their journey to Mecca. In some cases of hardship, facilities were made, even for those who had arrived from Mecca to return via the Sudan, but destitution which relief was afforded were less numerous than in the previous year.

3. I have already mentioned a separate scheme proposed by the Nigerian Government for the West African pilgrims. It is in principle greatly in favour of such a scheme. It may be useful to co-ordinate the action of the Government of the Sudan, the Government of Nigeria and this agency in dealing with these pilgrims.

(13.)—Sudanese Pilgrimage

The Hejaz quarantine authorities report that 1,371 Sudanese pilgrims were carried by Kermak and other steamers toward from the Hejaz this year. These pilgrims, who were in possession of pilgrim passports and return tickets, returned to the Sudan immediately after the pilgrimage. A few pilgrims lost their papers of identity at Mecca, and after enquiry, return tickets were issued. The consular agents of the Kingdom of Mecca, Haifa, and other ports were good enough to grant passages gratis to those pilgrims who were able to prove that they had actually left the Sudan for the Hejaz, where the pilgrims had had possessed documents at the outset.

Two separate contingents of pilgrims arrived in Jedda just after the departure of a ship for the Sudan and were compelled to remain in Jedda for ten days. Meetings in protest were held in the agency courtyard and the fact that they were in each case invited to appoint a representative body to submit their grievance, but found great difficulty in doing so. In the case of the first contingent a deputa- tion was appointed to the agency. In the case of the second contingent a servant of a wealthy man at the Sudan showed great readiness to assist. He was the sole delegate, going with several other men for protests of his disappointed but duly accredited friends. Both contingents returned happily, but it was made abundantly clear to them that there was actually no ship for the time being to take them back.

3. Sixteen Sudanese pilgrims are reported to have died at Mecca and three in Jedda during the season.

(14.)—Iraqi Pilgrimage

The number of Iraqis who entered the Hejaz through the port of Jedda this year is given as 42. They travelled via Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and Egypt. Ninety-six reached the Hejaz via Indian ports.

2. As I have mentioned before, in order to obtain pilgrim passes from the Health Department, and to secure a deposit of 100 rupees before leaving the country. This obligation greatly retarded the pilgrims' departure with destitutes. Instead of the waste, expense and unnecessary hardship which has been caused to the pilgrims in former years, which can be illustrated by the fact that instances to be referred to Bagdad, an applicant who had a good case was helped and dealt with in a few minutes, advances being made against the deposit.

3. No difficulties were experienced by the Iraqis in obtaining a conciliation on board ship in the return season. These Iraqis, or foreign pilgrims who came from or via Iraq, and who were subject to the new regulations, however, the Iraq pilgrims, were as a rule in possession either of a return ticket or of a letter of pilgrimage, accepted by the local shipping agents for the homeward passage in conformity with requirements. No special arrangements had to be made for the issue of a pilgrim pass. A few pilgrims lost their return travel documents, but the shipping companies issued duplicate papers once they were convinced that the applications were genuine.

(15.)—Palestinians

The number of Palestinians issued with pilgrim passes by the authorities in Palestine this year is reported by them to have been 563, an increase of ninety-two on last year's figures. The majority of these pilgrims came via Egypt, and travelled to and from the Hejaz on ships of the Khedivial Mail Line.

2. According to the official statistics issued by the health authorities, seven Palestinian pilgrims died at Mecca. No deaths are recorded as having occurred in Jedda.

3. In the return season no pilgrim applied to this agency for advances on the sums deposited by them in Palestine, and, consequently, no cases of destitution were brought to the notice of this agency. The Government of Palestine increased the compulsory deposit by £1 as compared with the figure of the previous year.

(16.)—Sarawak Pilgrimage

Twenty-two natives of Sarawak arrived on pilgrimage. There were no cases of disease or of destitution among them.

E 2260 62/91}

No. 116

Mr Bond to Mr A Henderson. (Received May 5.)

(No. 2)
Sir

Jedda, April 8, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period March 1 to 31, 1930.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad (2), Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Suez, Singapore, the chief secretary to the Government of the Federated Malay States, Klang through Port Sudan, Lagos 2, the senior naval officer Red Sea Station, H.M.S. "Albatross" at Haifa.

I have, &c

W. L. BOND

Enclosure in No. 116

Jedda Report for the Period March 1 to 31, 1930.

THE meeting of the two Kings on board H.M.S. "Lupin" was followed by a meeting of Iraqi and Nejd delegates at Bagdad, where, on the 9th March, a Bon Voisinage Agreement was drawn up and initialed by the Iraq Prime Minister and, on behalf of the Hejaz-Nejd Government, by Sheikh Fuad Hamza and Sheikh H. W. H. The agreement is between the Kingdom of the Hejaz-Nejd and its Dependencies, on the one hand, and the Kingdom of Iraq on the other, thus implying mutual recognition. It includes an article based on the Bon Voisinage Treaty of Angora and also contains provisions for the exchange of representatives, reference to arbitration attached to the agreement, the prevention of officials from crossing the frontier and mingling with the tribes, and the prevention of foreign tourists from crossing the frontier without permission.

2. The "Um-el-Qura" has not so far published any commentary on the meeting of the two Kings in the Persian Gulf. This omission on the part of the semi-official Government organ, in respect of a meeting unique in the annals of modern Arabian history, and a meeting which would tend to give some basis as to the sincerity of the motives which actuated Ibn Saud in attending the meeting, or it might be interpreted as a desire to forget an episode of little moment in Arabian politics.

3. The Hejazi is inclined to be cynical and only to see in this meeting a conference between irreconcilable foes, whose interests for the moment have so coincided as to demand a spectacular demonstration of goodwill. He does not expect permanent results, but at the same time he applauds British diplomacy for securing a settlement for the time being of the troubles, extending over a period of years, on the Nejd-Iraq frontier.

(31271)

X 3

by them. He is reported to have had several conversations with Mr. Philby, who has urged the exploitation of the natural resources of the country as a means of providing a further source of revenue to the State so that it need no longer be dependent on the pilgrimage for its existence.

19 M. Margret, the French Chargé d'Affaires, left for Beirut on the 20th March. It is rumoured that he has been instructed to open negotiations with Sheikh Fuad Hamza, who is said to have been appointed as delegate of the Hejaz Government in connexion with the renewal of the Franco-Hejaz commercial treaty.

20 The "Um-el Qura" published on the 28th March the text of a new regulation dealing with the registration of motor-car drivers. The new rules are apparently intended to penalise the incompetent and careless driving which has been far too prevalent hitherto on the part of native and Indian chauffeurs. The motive underlying these apparently business-like regulations is the desire of the Government to establish a more effective control over all chauffeurs for its own reasons. The requirements of the regulations are such that they often find it necessary to commandeer both motor vehicles and their drivers for Government purposes.

21 Among recent arrivals in Jeddah are Suleiman Shafik Pasha, at one time Director General of the Egyptian Railways, and Sheikh Ali, a prominent Khashabi Ibn Saud's agent in Baniyas and Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-Fozari, who was the representative accompanied the Emir Feisal on his journey to Europe in 1926.

22 The total number of pilgrims who had reached the Hejaz by the end of the month was 40,727, as compared with 37,573 for the corresponding period last year. Of this total Malay pilgrims number 2,281 and Indians 2,526, as opposed to 1,164 and 3,516 respectively for the same period in 1929.

23 Generally speaking, health conditions in the Hejaz have been normal during the month. Sixty-nine cases of smallpox, which were reported, thirty-seven cases of which proved fatal. A heavy snowfall, which fell at the beginning of the month has improved the prospects of cultivation, and such vegetation as there is has greatly benefited thereby.

24 During the period under review seven slaves, all of Sudanese origin and from one village near Jeddah, took refuge at this Legation and applied for repatriation. They were sent to their homes by way of Suakin.

E 2285 29 91

No 117

Mr Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 5)

(No. 91.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to Tehran despatch No. 816 of the 27th December last regarding the appointment of a Persian delegate representative in the Hejaz, a copy of which was forwarded to me and to inform you that Mirza Hafez Ali Khan Hoveida arrived at Jeddah on the 6th of this month and has taken up his duties. He has been accredited as "Représentant diplomatique et Chargé d'Affaires".

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Tehran.

I have, &c.
W. L. BOND

E 2214 905 91

No 118

Mr A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jeddah)

(No. 77)

Telegram No.

My despatch No. 110 of 1st May. I received service from His Majesty's Government are anxious to establish a regular air service between Basra and Baghdad, in connexion with the pending peace conference which will last until October. Owing to difficulties with private companies service might possibly have to be carried out by service aircraft. They therefore desire Ibn Saud's permission for British service aircraft to fly over Hasa coast.

It would also be necessary for aircraft to be able to land on Hasa coast in emergency and for this purpose one or two emergency landing grounds would have to be located and marked out on Ibn Saud's territory. This work could be carried out by the Royal Air Force in Iraq, but if Hejazi Government would prefer it, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to leave it to Hejazi Air Force.

I leave it entirely to your discretion how to put this proposal forward including desirability of approaching the King direct as suggested by Mr Bond in his telegram No. 30 of 20th March, and of emphasising fact that, since re-establishment of normal conditions in North-Eastern Nejd and employment of Hejazi Air Force in that area, objections originally put forward by Hejazi Government no longer apply.

For your information I would consider that solution would be feasible if there was a Ministry with a prepared to undertake payment of suitable rent for emergency landing ground.

(Repeated to Bushire, No. 68)

E 2896/905/91

No 119

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 85.)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah May 22, 1930

YOF R telegram No. 77

After a careful review of the correspondence relative to air matters since 1927 I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that proposal regarding pearling flights in the present form will be most unacceptable to Ibn Saud. My principal reasons are as follows—

1. Proposal to use service aircraft for scheme, which he might dislike even if it were a purely commercial proposition put forward on behalf of Imperial Airways, will cause the King to suspect His Majesty's Government of ulterior motives. Protest despatch with your telegram No. 72 to which I replied by telegram is significant in this connexion.
2. I do not consider creation of a new air force has had the expected effect of making him more favourable to British air transport. Our frequent suggestions for service air that force through various ways have with the best intentions, have probably given us the appearance in his eyes of wishing to interfere with its management. My telegram No. 62 shows my serious intentions.
3. Whenever we have previously broached the question of emergency landing grounds, the King has discovered pretexts for putting us off, and he will probably find fresh pretexts in reply to argument that the situation is most difficult.
4. Ibn Saud's own suspicions will probably be fanned by Fuad Hamza, whose position still appears to be strong.

I feel bound to submit these considerations, as I fear that if I broach this question of landing flights at the time when I have to see my way carefully I shall not only fail to secure success but may even cause them to be put off indefinitely. If however you think these risks should be faced, my next course will be to send His Majesty personally at interview for which he is expected to be in Jeddah this week or next and see how far I can go. In that case I should be glad to learn whether you consider more than one emergency landing ground essential, and whether I can give any indication of probable position of such a ground or grounds.

(Repeated to Bushire, No. 78)

E 2693/2693/91]

No. 120

Mr Bond to Mr. A Henderson.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 102.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 2, 1930

WITH reference to your despatch No. 127 of the 29th June last, I have the honour to report the arrival of a Polish delegation consisting of Count Edward Raczyński of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Grand Mufti of Poland.

2. The delegates are the guests of the Government
3. The object of the mission is, I gather, an exchange of letters or the conclusion of the commercial treaty referred to in your despatch.
4. The King is expected to come to Jedda from Mecca on a fly visit, principally, I imagine, in order to meet the Polish delegation, although he will no doubt hold other receptions also.

I have &c
W L BOND

E 2695/334 91]

No. 121

Sir A Ryan to Mr. A Henderson.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 109.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 2, 1930

WITH reference to my telegram No. 53 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to state that I left London for Jedda on the 22nd April and arrived here on the 6th May via Marseilles and Port Said. At the latter place I was very hospitably entertained by the commandant Major D. S. R. Thompson and had the advantage of discussing with him many matters of Red Sea interest.

2. The arrangements for transporting me from Port Sudan to Jedda in H.M.S. "Dahlia" were carried out most admirably by Commander R. A. Jackson, R.N. I should be grateful if a suitable expression of thanks could be conveyed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, provided you see no objection.

3. The Hejaz authorities went out of their way to show attention to me on my arrival. The Governor of Jedda sent the officer commanding the garrison to welcome me on board the "Dahlia," and himself came down to the landing stage to receive me. In addition to his own greetings, he brought me complimentary messages from the King of the Hejaz and its dependencies, including an expression of regret that His Majesty had had to leave Jedda (where he had been spending a couple of days), and would be unable to receive me until after the pilgrimage. After responding suitably to these courtesies I drove to the Legation in a car provided by the Governor.

4. In the evening the King caused further messages to be telephoned to me, and again confirmed them next morning. In addition to replying in the same manner, I asked the Governor, when calling on him on the morning of the 7th May, to convey my warmest thanks to the King, as he, the Governor, was about to go to Mecca for the pilgrimage. At this visit the Governor after a cordial exchange of compliments, I succeeded in getting some length in the improvement made by the King in the arrangements for the pilgrimage, his desire to improve them still further, and his anxiety to collaborate with His Majesty's Government in doing as much as possible to ensure the well-being of pilgrims, especially from the sanitary point of view. I assured the Governor that His Majesty's Government appreciated what had been done, and would be most ready to harmonise their efforts in the same direction on behalf of British pilgrims with those of the King of the Hejaz.

5. I am happy to think that everything connected with my arrival went in such a way as to create a good local impression and to emphasise the importance of the decision of His Majesty's Government to appoint a Minister here. By a fortunate coincidence, my arrival took place on Accession Day. The firing of a further salute and the dressing of ships, including a large number of pilgrim ships, in honour of that anniversary, gave additional dignity to the visit of H.M.S. "Dahlia."

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6. On the 7th May, I wrote to the Emir Faisal as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to ask formally for an audience to present my credentials. Although I have had no reply as yet, I have reason to think that the audience will be fixed for an early day after the 12th May. Sheikh Faisal Hamza returned to Jedda from his journey to Mecca on the 12th May, but has not yet notified his resumption of his duties as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c
A. RYAN

E 2679 2679 91]

No. 122

Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A Henderson.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 161.)

Sir,

Constantinople May 21, 1930

WITH reference to your despatch No. 805 of the 10th December, 1929, I have the honour to state that herewith is a translation of the Treaty of Friendship concluded between the Kingdom of the Hejaz and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic on the 3rd August, 1929, as published in the *Hakimiyet Milliye* of the 15th May.

2. This treaty was duly approved by the Grand National Assembly at its session of the 1st May last.

I have, &c
W S EDMONDS

Enclosure in No. 122

Extract from the "Hakimiyet Milliye" of May 15, 1930.

(Translation.)

The following Treaty of Friendship has been signed between the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic—

1. There shall be inviolable peace and perpetual and sincere friendship between the Government of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic, which recognises the complete integrity and independence of the above-mentioned State.

2. The high contracting parties are agreed to establish diplomatic relations between the two States in conformity with the principles of international law. They further agree that their plenipotentiary representatives of each party in the territory of the other shall enjoy, subject to reciprocity, the treatment prescribed by the general principles of international law.

3. The high contracting parties agree not to grant to the citizens of the other party in their respective territories treatment less favourable than is granted to the citizens of any third party as regards establishment, trade and administrative procedure.

4. The high contracting parties undertake to initiate negotiations for a separate consular and commercial convention to cover their respective territories.

5. The present Treaty, drawn up in Turkish and Arabic, shall be ratified and the ratifications exchanged in Angora at the earliest possible moment. The treaty will come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications.

Signed in duplicate at Mecca on the 3rd August, 1929 (27th Sefer, 1348)

E 2775/1308/91]

No. 123

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 28)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda, May 28, 1930.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent me under cover of a personal letter copies of letters addressed to the King and myself on 25th May to King Faisal and Mr. M. de la Soudrie, Minister for Foreign Affairs, respectively. These letters are in form very friendly, but express the view that "bon-voisinage" will be exposed to continual danger unless definite measures are taken to stop criminal activities against both countries which would be a conclusion of a new agreement. The writers therefore consider that such an agreement should be negotiated before the coming of the Nejd-Iraq Treaty of friendship and Bon Voisinage, to which the King has agreed in principle. They propose that necessary negotiations should be undertaken with a view to settling the matters of local jurisdiction.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me only to request that in my mission, Bagdad, to inform Iraq Government of despatch of letters and to acquaint that Government with their nature if questioned as to their contents.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 98)

E 2807 1308/91]

No. 124

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 28)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic) R

Jedda, May 28, 1930.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I have just covered this. This subject with Faisal Hassan this morning. I said I would not discuss it at all except under instructions but that if my personal opinion was asked would be put forward. I said that I was aware that question of extradition had been raised with the Iraq Government in other stages but that it had not been raised at time of "Lupin" Conference, and that postponement of definite conclusion of latter treaty might be a period necessary for negotiation of extradition treaty would greatly increase results achieved at conference. Faisal Hassan said matter had been agreed upon at Kuwait just before the conference that there had not been time to deal with it on board the "Lupin"; and that when bon-voisinage agreement had been initiated at Bagdad the moment was not suitable for reverting to extradition treaty proposals as Nejd delegates were already taking certain risks in dealing, as regards bon-voisinage agreement, with an Iraq Government which was known to have no right.

I have heard somewhat of the matter but not in detail. If I wish to make any statement I represent that there would be no advantage in doing so before the matter as I expect to be received by His Majesty on that or the following day. I guess that Faisal Hassan himself would be glad if I were then able to say something to the King.

May I have copy of bon-voisinage agreement as initiated if available?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 99)

E 2741/2353/91]

No. 125.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 28)

(No. 200.)

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to Mr. A. Henderson, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note to the Persian Government dated the 17th May on the subject of Muscat in Persia.

Tehran, May 19, 1930

Enclosure in No. 125.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. Faruki

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, May 17, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Highness that, according to reports which I have recently received from Bushire, the Persian authorities in the Gulf ports continue to treat all the inhabitants of the southern littoral of the Gulf as Persian subjects, levying a fine of 24 krans 50 cents on them on the ground that they are not in possession of Persian passports, and confiscating whatever passports or other certificates of identity they may have on entering Persia.

2. On several occasions during the last year I have been compelled to protest against this entirely unjustifiable conduct on the part of the officials concerned, and have pointed out that the subjects of a State such as Muscat, to which, as far as I am aware, the Persian Government has never laid claim, cannot possibly be regarded as Persian subjects, and are entitled to exactly the same consideration as any other foreign national who may visit this country. This applies with equal force to the natives of Oman and Kuwait. The responsible local officials admit, moreover, that they do not know what justification there can be for the procedure of which I have complained, and state that they are simply carrying out the orders which they have received from Tehran.

3. In these circumstances, I should be grateful if your Highness would be so good as to investigate the matter as soon as possible. If, as I can only presume, this treatment is due to a misunderstanding of the orders issued to the local authorities by the Central Government, I should be glad if amended instructions might be issued forthwith, and if I might be informed of the action taken in the matter.

4. At the same time, I have the honour to bring to your Highness's notice another report which I have received from His Excellency Mr. Faruki, Governor of Bushire, according to which the Governor of the Gulf ports has recently addressed two letters to the Sheikh of Dubai, the first concerning the murder of a man whose family is of Persian origin but has been settled in Dubai for four generations, the second concerning an injury inflicted on a Persian resident of that State. Your Highness will doubtless be aware that by the terms of his treaties with His Majesty's Government the Sheikh of Dubai, as a local ruler, is precluded from corresponding with any other Power. His Excellency the Governor was doubtless not aware of this fact, and I should be grateful if your Highness would be so good as to acquaint him with the position, in order that in future, as in the past, such questions may be referred either to myself or to His Majesty's Consul General for the necessary action.

I avail, &c

R. R. CLIVE

E 2686 906 91

No. 126

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office May 31 1930

YOUR telegram No. 65 of 22nd May Arabian air route

His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree that application should be deferred for the present in view of the fact that if certain requirements were made they would be of great value at local service and might be universally collected.

For the following reasons, however, the question is now becoming more urgent. —

1. It is desirable to secure satisfactory renewal of the agreement with Persian Government for use of South Persian route, which expires in April 1932. It may then become matter of urgent importance that it should be possible to use the Arabian air route. Sufficient prior experience of route is necessary to enable Air Ministry. It has also been assumed hitherto that such preliminary flights as those now proposed would be the most effective way of ensuring a favourable atmosphere in 1932.

2. Telegram has just been received from High Commissioner for Iraq to effect that German Junkers Company, who already operate service between Bagdad and Tehran, would like to form subsidiary company for purpose of conveying pilgrims next season between Kerbela and Mecca by air. His Majesty's Government and Iraqi Government are unlikely to adopt favourable attitude towards this proposal but Junkers may make direct request for permission for service in Arabia through German Government to Hejazi Government, regardless of attitude as regards Iraq of His Majesty's Government and Iraqi Government. If Ibn Saud gave permission, it would mean that first air service in Arabia would be instituted not by British, but foreign aircraft, and British prestige would suffer accordingly, while if Ibn Saud refused he would be provided with precedent for refusing future British requests. If possible, therefore, it would be a good thing that His Majesty's Government should anticipate Junkers in approaching Hejazi Government.
3. A project for a possible geological survey by air over country between Hedjaz and Kuwait, extending to 100 or 200 miles inland, has been proposed to both Junkers and Imperial Airways by American oil interests. Since Junkers will no doubt ask Hejazi Government for permission through German Government, it may be difficult for His Majesty's Government to refuse to approach Hejazi Government in the matter if requested by Imperial Airways to do so. It seems possible that request for permission for inland flight of this type, although civil aircraft would be used, might be even less opportune than one for flights down Hadda coast by service aircraft, and if made first have even more undesirable reaction on main scheme.
4. Force of your argument regarding Ibn Saud may well suspect that His Majesty's Government are trying to interfere in affairs of Hejazi air force is appreciated. Air Ministry cannot however that owing to lack of facilities for renewals and repairs, condition of that force in two months time may have deteriorated. In that case, although here forbidden by what we would be, however more favourable than now.
5. If it is a possibility likely, Ibn Saud leaves for Nejd soon and does not return to Hedjaz till next year, action may have to be postponed for a dangerous long time or a relatively difficult negotiation would have to be carried on by correspondence which might offer greater scope for misunderstanding than personal observation at the present time.
6. Once the peacetime season which offers no valid consent reason for suggesting special service is over, it seems probable that permission could only be asked on general grounds, justification of which might be more difficult.

Having regard to the above considerations, might it not be desirable and possible to sound the King or Hejazi Government informally, with a view to obtaining more definite indications of their probable reactions but without putting forward any definite proposal? It seems that His Majesty's Government have not approached them directly with regard to the general question since 1927.

On the other hand, we realise that it might conceivably be better that the idea of peacetime flights should be dropped altogether, and that our energies should be reserved for determined effort next year to obtain general permission for flights in connexion with Indian air route. This request once made would have to be pressed, and it is arguable that it would be better not to expend our energies before and

It is left to your discretion to take any action you may think desirable before the King leaves.

Please telegraph a full report.

E 2807 1306/91]

No. 127

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Rynn (Jedda)

(No. 83)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, May 31, 1930

YOI R telegrams Nos 68 and 69 of 26th May. Bon-voisinage and extradition agreements between Iraq and Hejaz-Nejd.

Subject to any observations that the High Commissioner for Iraq may have to offer, you are authorised to make official representations to Ibn Saud on the subject of your conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Bagdad)

E 2917 1/91.

No. 128

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, June 4)

(Telegraphic)

REFERENCE my telegram of 6th May [see No. 114]

The following is the gist of a personal and secret letter which I have received from King Feisal—

I am glad to hear that I have been successful in persuading Ibn Mashur to remain in Nejd. I am sure that Ibn Saud will keep his word by permitting Ibn Mashur and his family to remain in Nejd, thereby fulfilling my promise to the King. It is of special importance to me to come out of this affair with a clean conscience and I am sure that I have done so. I am writing Ibn Saud to obtain advance permission for Ibn Mashur to remain in Nejd. I am sure that Ibn Saud will give his consent. I am sure that Ibn Mashur will be able to leave Iraq for Nejd at once.

Recently I protested to Feisal regarding a report which I had received to the effect that Ibn Mashur was planning to return to Syria. I trust that in the event of a safe conduct being received from Ibn Saud, there will no longer be any doubt about his return to Nejd.

(Repeated to Jedda)

E 3036 92 91]

No. 129

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson—(Received June 10)

(No. 109)

Sir

Jedda, May 3, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz Nejd and the period the 1st to 30th April, 1930.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad (2), Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding at Tel Hadya and Tadmor, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Suez, Singapore, the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Federated Malay States, Khartoum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloop, and His Majesty's Consul at Haifa.

I have &c
W. I. BOND

Jedda Report for the Period April 1 to 30, 1930

VERY few events worth recording have taken place in the Hejaz in the course of the past month. During the latter part of the month everything has been hanging fire in anticipation of the King's return to Mecca. The thoughts and energies of the people have been directed hither to making feverish preparations for his reception as it was known that he was about to arrive when he was likely to arrive. Everybody at Mecca has expected a large army, but it has been in Mecca have been requisitioned in order to accommodate the multitude of his expected following. Householders who protested were in several cases turned bag and baggage into the street.

2. The King arriving from Riyadh reached Mecca on the 30th April. His retinue was estimated to consist of some 1,000 persons. The royal party itself numbering over 200 persons included Ibn Ja'ali, Emir of Hassa and leading elements of the army. Ibn Saud brought a large number of Meccan and the members of his own family as well as a host of relatives. He has now seventeen sons with him in Mecca. It was reported that he had a large gathering, and an indication also that the King desires to remain there for some time to come. Three hundred camels were used in the transport of the King and his retinue to Mecca which was accomplished in three journeys. Riyadh is reported to have been completely evacuated. It is stated that Faisal ibn Dhu'ayb, the Buzurg, and a large number of sheikhs of doubtful sympathies have also been despatched to Mecca.

It is rumored that the future heir of the throne, Prince Yung, arrived by the King in Mexico in his own person and the people so widely expressed locally that he will replace his brother as Viceroy of the New Spain.

4. ~~Ships are being~~ Like a y the King to satisfy the war the ready hand of
from Moscow in the late Sept. It was so serious that the people
troubles last year with the Alaska, and it should be made in the last time

5. An interim reply has been returned to the King with reference to the passage reserved from him the 14th March 1904, the situation on the Tigris after the March report, and the fact that the British Government as regards the general question that it has proposed to Mr. S. C. V. is not at all ready to accept the action on the part of the British Government to control their respective tribunals and punish the British Government in the situation can be attained. His Majesty's Government express the conviction, however, that had this matter previously been discussed in conversation between the King and Sir Arthur B. B. who is now to arrive shortly, they might have written something more. As regards the King's request that the question of the lost property may be resolved in an early date, the King is informed that the investigation who is to examine the claims in this connection is already well prepared and only awaits the opportunity of meeting him in order to begin his work.

[illegible]

9 On the 18th April His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires communicated to the Hejaz Government the text of a draft commercial treaty which has been drawn up in deference to a desire for it expressed by the Hejaz Government last year.

9 Pilgrims are now arriving in large numbers. The total arrivals by sea calculated up to the end of April numbered approximately 75,000, a figure which falls by some thousands to fulfil expectations. Of this total, approximately 13,000 are Indians, this figure being over 2,000 less than that recorded for the corresponding date last year. Some 1,200 motor vehicles of all kinds and conditions, lorries for the most part, are in transit to the Holy City. This represents a considerable increase in the use of motor transport, and as a result of it pilgrims are no longer detained in Jeddah or Mecca for indefinite periods as in the past for want of transport facilities. This is all to the good, but from all accounts there is little control to see that the authorized rates of hire are applied, and the mutawwifs

[illegible]

14. A _____ officer of the general hospital at Mecca, but it was
 15. _____ great difficulty, and without drawings to persons or
 16. _____ sure to have been the record of certain financial
 17. _____ hit on various allegations which are being
 18. _____ himself

A consignment of goods was received from Mecca on April 18, 1927, with no opposition appears to have been made by local merchants to the landing of the cargo as occurred, it will be remembered, in the case of the steamship "Tomp" in November 1927. This forbearance may be due to the fact that the cargo was this time consigned to a Hejazi merchant and not to the so-called Soviet commercial agency, the commercial pseudonym for the Soviet Legation, and that no attempt was made to undercut local prices.

13 Another Soviet ship which called at Jeddah during the month was the steamship "Rabotchie." This arrived on the 20th April with 379 Persian and Iraqi pilgrims from the Persian Gulf.

14 A Polish delegation arrived in Jeddah towards the end of the month, consisting of Count Edward Raczyński of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Grand Mufti of Poland. The object of the mission appears to be the conclusion of some form of commercial treaty. The delegates are being entertained as the guests of the Government.

13 Mirza Habibulla Khan Hoveida arrived in Jeddah on the 8th April to take up his appointment as Persian diplomatic representative and *Chargé d'Affaires*.

18 No slaves were repatriated during the period under review. One, an Abyssinian boy, took refuge at this Legation and applied for local manumission, but after staying seven days, he disappeared and returned to his master.

[E 3039, 334/91]

No. 130.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received June 10)

(No. 114.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 18, 1930.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 58 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to state that King Ibn Saud came from Mecca to Jedda on the morning of that day and received me in the forenoon for the purpose of my presenting my credentials. The ceremonial was carried out in accordance with the rules forwarded in Mr Bond's despatch No. 332 of the 28th December last. The duties of Master of Ceremonies were performed by Hamdi Bey, the Officer Commanding the garrison in Jedda, who conducted me from my residence to what has been dubbed the "Green Palace." This is a modern house of some pretension built by the Director of Customs, a gentleman of poor origin, who, by assiduous application to the duties of his office, has, in recent years, acquired considerable wealth. It is possible that he has already carried out a rumoured intention of presenting the house to the King, who has, hitherto, made use of the barracks, or of the houses of certain resident notables, when he has visited Jedda.

2. My staff and I with Hamdi Bey were conveyed to the "Green Palace" in two very moderate cars driven by still more moderate chauffeurs and not otherwise attended. As we were about to start, one of the telephone posts opposite my front door swayed towards me and gently deposited its load of wires in the fairway. This was the only untoward incident. Military honours were rendered at the Palace, but naturally without any playing of the National Anthem, which might be considered appropriate in an oriental setting, were music not abhorrent to Wahabite principles. The arrangements generally were simple but sufficiently dignified. I was received by Sheikh Fuad Hamza at a coffee table in the drawing room. Hamza is the Master Designate in London. After a short interval, I was conducted with Mr Bond and the Legation interpreter to the audience chamber where the King in solitary state awaited us and his own officers. After he had shaken hands with me I delivered the speech which I had prepared and handed to His Majesty my letter of credence. When my interpreter had read an Arabic version, the King's reply was read by his secretary, Yussef Yassin, and then in a very good English translation by Sheikh Fuad Hamza. I next formally presented my staff consisting of Mr Bond (who, I said, it was hardly necessary to introduce as he has been exercising the functions of agent and consul and, later, Chargé d'Affaires), Mr Wikeley, Munshi Ihsanullah, the British Indian vice-consul, and the interpreter.

3. I had been told that the King would not dismiss me at the end of the formal part of the audience, as it was his custom to detain the representative and wait for the latter to make a personal introduction to him. Following the practice His Majesty invited us all to be seated and had coffee and lemonade served in succession. We exchanged ordinary official courtesies, but I was surprised to hear after the King's speech making special reference to his desire for a year ago. He expressed pleasure on hearing how well I had found His Majesty when I kissed hands. He emphasised his desire for good relations with Great Britain, to which I replied that I had had evidence of a reciprocal sentiment of the same kind in all circles at home, when I was preparing to come to Jedda. After this exchange of compliments I retired, my staff and I having bowed and then, in accordance with European etiquette, a touch which, I think, was duly noted. King Ibn Saud again remained alone, while his officers escorted me to the antechamber.

4. King Ibn Saud indulged rather less than I had expected in high flown phrases, but his reception was in every way cordial. He was perhaps a little fatigued. At any rate his voice was somewhat hoarse, owing, it is said, to the number and length of the theological discourses which he has recently had occasion to pronounce at Mecca. His bearing was stately and impressive in his loose robe, one of the usual Arab type but of a rich material and richly embroidered. His feet were bare. The audience chamber was a room of moderate size, well-carpeted, but otherwise furnished in a debased French style. The most conspicuous object was a green panel high in the wall behind the King, embroidered with the Moslem profession of faith and a hefty sword underneath.

5. After the audience Sheikh Fuad Hamza asked whether I had any objection to a photograph being taken. On my acquiescing an Egyptian photographer from Cairo, who works for the "Globe" and other papers, took several pictures. In the meantime the King himself had, apparently at the suggestion of some of his officers, intimated his willingness to be photographed also, and a final photograph

was taken, in which he occupied the centre of the group with myself on his right. I then took leave of the King and left the Palace with the same ceremony as when I arrived.

6. I have ventured to describe these proceedings at some length, as it was the first occasion on which a British Minister presented credentials although Mr Bond and I have been in the Kingdom for some time. I enclose a copy of my speech* together with the English version* of it read on the 17th instant. It is a somewhat long speech, but it is a most important matter of ceremonial which I had discussed with Fuad Hamza. Later in the morning of the audience I visited the latter in the manner described in my note. We had a cordial conversation on things in general and the system of examination for the British Diplomatic and Consular Services in particular. He took an opportunity of drawing my attention to the extremely democratic ways of his Sovereign who did not lay the same stress on titles as other rulers. This remark was possibly intended to explain the very different quarters made by an inexperienced Consul from consular practice.

7. Following what is I understand a usual practice, Sheikh Fuad Hamza entertained me at dinner on the evening of the 17th May at the local office of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The company of fourteen included the leading local notables, Hafez Wafar and the British Consul Mr Taylor. Messrs Ghalib, Hafez, and Mr Pasha were served upstairs, but I was free to smoke in the drawing room. The dinner was served upstairs, but I was free to smoke in the drawing room. The dinner was served upstairs, but I was free to smoke in the drawing room.

8. Ibn Saud left Jedda on the evening of the 17th May. His destination was Taif where it appears the Emir Ajman, Emir Sa'ud, and other rulers are to meet him. He is expected to arrive at Taif on the 19th May, and during which I was to meet the prince at another party of Fuad Hamza's. Fuad Hamza, himself, is also returning to Mecca to-day. In these circumstances, I cannot hope to do any personal business with either him or the King before the 25th May, but I have reason to expect that they will both be in Jedda in the course of the week beginning on that day.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Palestine and to the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c

ANDREW RYAN

[E 3040/2693 91]

No. 131

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 115.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 18, 1930.

WITH reference to Mr Bond's despatch No. 102 of the 2nd instant reporting the arrival of the Emir Ajman, Emir Sa'ud, and other rulers at Taif, I have the honour to report that the members of this mission were received by the King on the 3rd instant.

2. I have somewhat of a speech delivered by him on this occasion which has been published in the "Globe" and "The Times." It is a most important matter of ceremonial which I had discussed with Fuad Hamza. Later in the morning of the audience I visited the latter in the manner described in my note. We had a cordial conversation on things in general and the system of examination for the British Diplomatic and Consular Services in particular. He took an opportunity of drawing my attention to the extremely democratic ways of his Sovereign who did not lay the same stress on titles as other rulers. This remark was possibly intended to explain the very different quarters made by an inexperienced Consul from consular practice.

"Your Majesty's reputation as the most pious King and the greatest defender of religion is well known and spreads far among your Moslem brethren in Poland, who have lived in the far north for many centuries. These Moslems have been treated by the Polish nation as brothers because of their excellent reputation and because of their heroism and bravery in the defence of their homeland, along with their Polish brothers, when enemies attacked their country."

* Not printed.

[22971]

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settled that I should deal with matter in a covering letter to Minister for Foreign Affairs enclosing record and pointing out that Mr. Donnell was bound by his instructions but that I would ~~have~~ ^{be} stating the King's view to the effect of His Majesty's Government.

The most serious difference was over the facilities for MacDonnell's movements in the Healy-Northern Territory. The King insisted that any entry into his territory would be unnecessary and inadvisable. It proved necessary to omit all mention from the report but in covering letter I have indicated with a statement of His Majesty's reasons in order that I may submit the matter for your instructions. I reserve comment until I receive note.

I have, &c
ANDREW RYAN

No. 134

(No. 75)

Jeddah, June 11, 1930

Letter, June 11, 1930

YOUR telegram No. 76

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the King has definitely decided to ~~take the~~ use the route via Yemen to Jeddah. He asks whether (1) permission can be given to fly over Kuwait, Iraq and Transjordan, as the direct route across the desert is impracticable, (2) facilities can be given by the British authorities for the supply of fuel, &c., (3) a Royal Air Force officer could be lent to pilot the fourth aeroplane in place of Hamilton.

Equipment will be sent by sea via India

improvement mentioned in your despatch No. 126, and promised to enquire how long that work would take.

I should be glad of an early reply

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Jerusalem, No. 107.)

No 185

(No. 74.)

Jeddah, June 12, 1934

(1, 2, 3)

YOCR telegram of 31st May

I made allusion to representations to Ibn Saud at audience on 11th June under following heads, taking as my basis personal views which I had already expressed to Arab Minister for Foreign Affairs and Hospital ~~arrived~~ to the Council Office of 5th May —

2. Value of agreement, apart from an agreement else, as instrument involving recognition of Ibn Saud's position by Kingaisal, who had only consented to this recognition under pressure from the Government.
3. Difficulty, and indeed present impossibility, of extending the treaty if only owing to prospect of breakdown over the border between the two countries.

His Majesty reiterated his conviction that *bon coinage* agreement was worthless without extradition treaty. He countered my argument that treaty of latter type normally marked advanced stage in relations between States by saying that present case was different as all questions between Iran and Iraq related exclusively to criminal activities. He had, however, acted throughout in deference to wishes of His Majesty's Government. If we definitely wanted him to conclude a *bon coinage* agreement, he would do so, but must make it clear that he could not hope to give any genuine effect to it without extradition treaty.

13

This can hardly be taken as formal assurance, but affords useful basis for future action, before taking which I should be glad to have final text of *bon voisinage* agreement and to know also how Iraq Government have reacted on their side. Personal letter from High Commissioner to Ibn Saud might help. He will be at Taif for some little time.

It is clear from conversations on this and other subjects that the King is full of resentment over the Mosul. He suggests that responsibility for his surrender lies with His Majesty's Government. I have contested this every time, but I have, without giving away High Commissioner's telegram of 31st May to Colonel (D) & Co., expressed the hope that the matter will be liquidated in the near future.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 111.)

E 3163 89 91,

No 136

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 13, 1930

YOUR despatch No. 119.

I discussed Transjordanian frontier situation with Ibn Saud on 11th June. I took as text remarks of his at outset of MacDonnell conversations that it was necessary to explore causes of and find cure for a disease. I said that His Majesty's Government wished to get away from atmosphere of retaliation and counter-protest, but that successful treatment of disease must depend on parallel and sustained action on both sides. MacDonnell inquired whether I pointed out the past and I then made careful statement based on paragraphs 4 to 6 of your despatch.

King made light of results obtained up to date by Transjordanian authorities, whose action, he said, had produced little effective result. I was unable to pursue this subject very far, as I have not yet received detailed account of work of Tribal Control Board. He made the following statements—

- (1) He had recently issued stringent orders for punishment of any raids on his side and the return of loot.
- (2) He had dealt severely with Ibn Musaid whose enterprise he disapproved of and regretted; though he would not admit it was a raid in ordinary sense, it was punitive action under provocation, and it was not certain that it had been carried into Transjordanian territory. The infliction of public punishment would depend on Transjordanian authorities taking similar measures.
- (3) He had not implemented article 3 of Hadda Agreement because he had had no confidence. He was now taking steps to do so, and hoped soon to put his authorities at Jauf and Kaf into contact with Transjordanian authorities.

I welcomed these statements, especially the last. I said I hoped to discuss the question again at a later date when I had myself studied it in greater detail.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, telegram No. 112.)

E 3173 906/91)

No 137

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 14, 1930

YOUR telegram No. 82

Having repeated the ground in the manner described in my despatch No. 126 I broached the question with the King on 12th June. I repeated more briefly what I had already said to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to general setting in which I hoped he would see any communications made from time to time about his air force and about flying over his territory.

As regards latter, I said that, while realising his special difficulties, our desire was to see him come into general movement of mutual accommodation which aerial developments were imposing on the nations generally.

I then explained frankly the position regarding pearling flights. Purely commercial service of the Gulf, it was suggested, had been made to the service should be restricted to the coast with a view to the safety of the territory. No restrictions were put to a formal proposal, but rather to our own mind.

His Majesty said that the matter was not one on which he could express views off-hand. He said spontaneously that objections he had had three years ago no longer existed, and that he was not unduly impressed by the danger of misrepresentation (Latter remark was significant, as I had been led to expect the argument that, if he now allowed flights, he would be reproached by tribes with having repressed rebellion only to allow flights). He said, however, that the matter required serious consideration, and he must consult the local authorities before pronouncing himself.

I said that I quite understood. What I most wanted was that he should not only consider the matter in its present form, but should, having regard to his position in the Persian Gulf, take into the future the possibility of the world movement which I had described. I mentioned necessity for one or two emergency landing grounds in connexion with any schemes involving flights over his territory, and I noted of flight and landings without definitely offering a plan.

King has already left and I may not see him personally again for a month, although present prospect is that he will spend some time on this side of the peninsula. I still do not expect any definite result this year, but his general reaction was more favourable than I anticipated. I am convinced that nothing is to be gained by forcing the pace, and that it would be a mistake to press question of pearling flights unduly. If you approve my action so far, I can, even in His Majesty's absence, tell what I have said to him and what I have said to the present with object of impressing on him advantages of liberal policy. It would be useful for me to have some copies of Air Convention.

In discussing at same audience two quite unconnected matters, on which I am reporting by despatch, the King emphasised his desire to work with and seek assistance of His Majesty's Government. There may be something more than conventional amity in this, if only because his resources are said to be very low.

E 3204 3204 91]

No 138

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 120.)

NR.

Jedda, May 28, 1930

IN the note on various matters of protocol enclosed in my despatch No. 114 of the 18th instant, I referred to the question of formal visits by foreign representatives to King Ibn Saud's Heir Apparent as one which had not been raised in my conversations with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and which need not arise at present. I have the honour to state that it has in fact arisen much sooner than I anticipated.

2. Late in the evening of the 25th May, I received a telephone message from the assistant to the Governor of Jedda to the effect that the Emir Saud was arriving early next morning, and would receive me the next morning at 10.10 A.M. On enquiry, I found that the intention of the Prince was to receive the foreign representatives officially, and that the reception would be appropriate. He received us in succession, beginning with the Soviet Minister, at the Green Palace, which, Sheikh Fuad Hamza tells me, is now definitely the property of the King. I took with me the same party, minus the Legation interpreter, as when I presented credentials. The Prince who was attended by Sheikh Fuad Hamza, paid me on a sofa beside him. The reception was on the same lines as the less formal part of the proceedings when the King himself received me.

3. The Governor of Jedda had issued invitations for a dinner, given also at the Palace, but apparently by the local authorities, in honour of the Heir Apparent. It was a hot evening and it was happily arranged that the European guests might wear ordinary evening dress, in which vogue of attire a black dinner jacket, though all do not own to it, is still the high-water mark in Jedda. Having surmounted the perils of a staircase roughly laid with a carpet almost completely unsecured by rods, Mr. Bond and I were conducted to the roof. Having been welcomed by the Governor,

[22371]

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King should send his aeroplanes to Hinasid to be equipped with the improvements in question by experts who understood them.

9. I think it is very important to find Hinasid may serve a useful purpose. I am confident that it will be worked as they were used in at least to the harm provided a small firm them in general comes to the King thereby reducing the danger of their being not interested. I feel that they receive them with every appearance of sympathy and acquiescence. At the same time I still feel that caution should be used in advancing specific proposals of such a nature as to alarm Ibn Saud and that we should go very slowly at least until I have built up, if I can, a stronger personal position with him.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Bagdad and to the British Resident at Bushire in the former case with a short covering despatch explaining how I came to engage in the conversation.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

(E 3304/1/91)

No. 140

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, June 20)

Bagdad, June 17, 1930

K. N. F. ISM has sent the copy of letter written by him to King Ibn Saud on 14th June in which he says that he has told Ibn Saud that he is returning to Nejd if he does so he will be pardoned and accorded with sympathy and courtesy. He also said that Ibn Saud appears very anxious to return to his old allegiance and he asks Sir Sand to inform that he will be pardoned and to send word to this effect direct to Ibn Saud.

I suggest that Ibn Saud might be informed now that this letter is on its way (Repeats to Jedda and Bushire)

(E 3280/2/91)

No. 141

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(Nos. 90 and 91.)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, June 22, 1930.

1. Your telegram No. 75 of 11th June. Proposed transfer of Hejaz Nejd Air Force to Jedda and development of Arabian air route.

1. His Majesty's Government have no objection to proposed flight of Air Force, on its way to Jedda over Hejaz, Iraq, and Transjordan. They are concerned of local authorities concerned. Sheikh of Kuwait has already concurred, and High Commissioners for Iraq and Transjordan have been pressed for early reply, to be repeated to you direct. If their reply is favourable, you may inform Hejazi Government at once that permission is granted.

2. Air authorities will gladly grant facilities for supply of petrol, &c., in Iraq and Transjordan but propose Hejaz Government will themselves arrange for necessary supply of petrol and oil between Mian and Jedda.

3. Air authorities are further prepared as matter of courtesy to provide a Royal Air Force pilot to take fourth aeroplane from Darin to Jedda, but it will be necessary for Hejaz Government to make suitable arrangements for his accommodation and subsistence while in Hejaz-Nejd territory, and also for his return to Iraq.

4. Proposed modification to Ibn Saud's aeroplanes could be effected at Hinasid in about eight days.

(Confidential)

Air Ministry are anxious that opportunity of grant of these considerable facilities should be taken to ask for some return from Ibn Saud in form of permission to select, mark out, and if necessary utilise emergency landing-grounds on Hasa coast. I am not unmindful of considerations urged in your telegram No. 65 (of 22nd May), and in penultimate paragraph of your telegram No. 81 (of

155

14th June), and of sensitiveness of King and Government, see last paragraph of your telegram No. 76 (of 11th June), and am prepared to leave it to your discretion whether to revert to question of Hasa coast to an emergency landing grounds in connexion with present facilities or defer further representations until you consider psychological moment has arrived. You will, however, bear in mind that matter is of some urgency, and that Air Ministry are anxious that question of obtaining *quid pro quo* should not be indefinitely deferred.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Bushire.)

(E 3443 2 91)

No. 142

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 27)

(No. 92)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, June 26, 1930

YOUR telegrams Nos. 90 and 91.

Using discretion kindly allowed me, I took, on 25th June, following action, which seems to me to go further possible to meet the wishes of Air Ministry without danger of deadlock, in which attempt at bargain would almost certainly land us —

I sent to the King, under covering note to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, letter informing him of consent of all authorities concerned to proposed flight. I embodied paragraphs 2 to 4 of your telegram, with slight amplifications, including most of the arrangements for accommodation, &c., and return journey of Royal Air Force pilot, and asked to be informed of approximate date of start from Darin. I added the two paragraphs paraphrased in condensed form in my immediately following telegram No. 93. The whole form continues communication which I described as made under instructions of His Majesty's Government.

I had sent the letter before receiving copy of Bushire telegram to Colonial Office, No. 62. I mentioned the accident to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in a telephone conversation this morning.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Jerusalem, No. 129)

(E 3428 906 91)

No. 143

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 27)

(No. 93)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, June 26, 1930

FOLLOWING is paraphrase referred to in my immediately preceding telegram —

Your Majesty will appreciate the great goodwill shown by His Majesty's Government in this as in other matters affecting the Air Force. They are confident that the question of flights over Hasa, on which I consulted you on 12th June, will be studied with equal goodwill. Experimental pearling flights this year, if possible to organise, would confer great benefits on important industry and provide experience in flying over the coast, yourself in future development of that region. All that would be necessary would be that you should sanction certain number of flights by Royal Air Force aeroplanes at regular intervals and arrange for marking out one or two emergency landing grounds. These need not be equipped with stores. They would merely be known places where aeroplanes could land if necessary. Air Force might mark them out before leaving, unless you would prefer to enlist British assistance.

I explained to your Majesty, on 12th June the desire for collaboration between friendly Powers which animates His Majesty's Government in considering such projects. You promised to consider the matter in a similar spirit, though naturally wishing to study all its aspects. I trust you will be able to inform me of your conclusions in the near future.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Bushire, No. 130.)

No. 144

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 14, 1930.)

Reinst. December 19, 1929.

[illegible]

the expression of their renewed activity is that they are endeavoring to revive French influence in the Near East. Since the 19th, no nation could have so rapidly and so completely recovered its position as France. As the official version of the story is that the French officials at the conference were so completely out of the picture that it was possible to assume that a paper on the article, he was being extracted from the ground. But it is very likely that M. Poincaré's attitude is not so very different from that of the other powers. He is probably continuing to pay attention to the fact that the socialists will be first. I have recently had two conversations with him in which matters bearing on the future of Syria were mentioned. In the first conversation, he said that the question also took part, to the effect of the form of government best suited for a Modern State. The view then taken by him was to the effect that a monarchial form of government was most in keeping with the traditions and mentality of the Moslem peoples, and a good deal was said on the subject that M. Poincaré might be said to have said in the past. The possibility of introducing some form of government in Syria is a subject which was not mentioned when M. Poincaré was discussing the effect on the situation in the Near East of the late Prime Minister, the not very novel conclusion was reached that the leaders of the mandated territories in the Near East do not really know what they want save that they wish for the disappearance of the foreigner and that the more they are given the more they will demand.

3. There seems reason to believe that the Syrian Nationalists, if they do not succeed in obtaining from the British High Commission a concession which they regard as essential, may perhaps send a delegation to Paris and possibly also to Geneva to plead their case. The probability will be to no avail for the extension of the disputation. Attempts made to collect money for the purpose are said to have had but little success.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Damascus and Jerusalem.

H. E. SATOW.

Consul Monck-Mason to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 1.)

(No 18.)

511.

Alleppe, January 23, 1980.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 89 of the 18th December, 1928, I have the honour to report that the Syria-Turkey Frontier Commission has terminated its labours and that the Commission's report is now at Aleppo awaiting the nomination of a Turkish naval expert to assist the already appointed French expert in the demarcation of the water boundary of the River Tigris. The French authorities are most anxious that the work should be completed as soon as possible. The general himself is heartily tired of his dealings with the Turks, who, he states, hinder progress at every turn, his treatment at their hands contrasting very unfavourably with the courtesy and hospitality the French

2. The district of the Jezireh may be expected to settle down to a few acts of property as soon as the boundaries are definitely fixed, owing to the increasing number of the population by immigration, and the consequent pressure from Turkey. I have been informed, however, that the Turkeys have been too busy with their own wars to prevent any serious invasion of the district, and that the Turkish and British will be able to maintain the present state of the district, at least for a few years. The present passing interest to Tell Zriwan, which point the line is expected to reach the

8. There are two other places which may be expected to rise into prominence in the near future. One is Kaniun, the eastern terminus of the railway, and the other is Hama. This spot has the advantage of being centrally situated in the valley of the Euphrates in the vicinity of the railway line, and is only about 40 miles south of the place. The French are also the proprietors of the station at Hama, and are engaged in the construction of a railway line from Hama to Endivar, immediately opposite Djezair, which is a Syrian frontier town, and there is every reason to suppose that the latter town will become a great Syrian trade emporium, owing to the Syrian side of the frontier. This is indeed the intention of the French.

4. According to a map given me by Lieutenant-Colonel Anfré, the Chief of Staff at Aleppo, the actual line of the frontier has been traced as follows, north of Mosul: south of Erbil in Iraq. It starts from the Azrakah, proceeds in a straight line to Jeresh, where it turns south, the track, to a point a little east of a mill just south of Bayard, thence in a straight line to Kharrab Raze (in the Izzeeddin Dagh), which remains in Turkey, from here nearly straight, passing south of Tell Arit and Qhatani, and the turning off east, due east to reach Rabit in Turkey. Thence north-east, the frontier passes just south-east of Guirgior and Dombouha, and afterwards north-east, following the track, which, with Kamsup, is left in Turkey. About 12 kilom. north-north-west of Andiwar the line turns north-north-east, and follows the second wadi south of Jezreh-biu Omar until it reaches the Tigris. The map on which Lieutenant-Colonel Anfré marked these indications for me is now in my library, and dated June and July, 1920. It is based, as to its northern part, on the studies of the Frontier Commission.

5. The line of the route followed or to be followed by the railway is shown definitely on the same map. It runs thus: 1st part 1 of 100 km. (about 20 km. due east of Nisibin). From there straight to a point 1½ kilom. due north of Dakehurié, and passing through Tell Ziwan, thence practically straight to the Wadi Katram, leaving to the south a small tell 1½ kilom. west of the Wadi, after crossing which the line works in a direction a fraction more southerly, leaving two small tells to the south-east, straight to a point just a kilom. south of the old German colony which is 10½ kilom. almost due south of Desmir Kapon and on the left bank of the Wadi Remouele.

6. In slight correction of my previous despatches, written without maps, the true position of Nisibin, Kameshlie and Mahamakie should be noted. Mahamakie is a fraction over 2 kilom due east of Nisibin. Kameshlie is 2 kilom south-south-east of Nisibin, the fort being about 500 yards nearer to Nisibin.

7. I am sending copies of the despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad, His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, His Majesty's consul-general, Beirut, and to the British liaison officer Beirut.

I have, &c

A. MONCK MASON

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 39. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 1, 1930.

Sir, WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 99 of the 22nd October, I have the honour to report that M. Eddé's Ministry ~~came to an~~ ^{came to an} untimely end on the 20th March. As you are aware, his programme of reform had aroused dissatisfaction in various quarters and was ~~not~~ ^{not} readily accepted by the M. L. community to be specially harmful to its interests. It is needless to enter into details as to the various intrigues and combinations which preceded the vote of non-confidence given against him at the sitting of the ~~Assembly~~ ^{Assembly} on the 19th March and it is sufficient to record that at that sitting a motion of no confidence against ~~his~~ ^{his} Ministry was presented and voted by twenty-seven out of the thirty nine Deputies present. Apparently, M. Eddé's partisans objected to some of the members of his Cabinet, and hoped that the result of their action would be that he would be asked to form another Ministry in which the objectionable Ministers would not figure. This expectation was not wholly realised, because, although M. Eddé was ~~asked~~ ^{asked} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~agreed~~ ^{agreed} to reconstitute his Ministry, he finally decided not to accept to do so. ~~His~~ ^{His} ally, Auguste Pasha A. has consented to form a Ministry, which is composed as follows:—

Presidency of Council, Finance and Agriculture: Auguste Pasha Adib.
Interior and Public Health: Moussa Namiour.
Public Works: Hussein-el-Ahdab.
Justice: Ahmed el-Husseini.
Education: Gabriel Tuoni.

Auguste Pasha, who is an elderly gentleman with a damaged leg, formed the first Lebanese Ministry in 1926. Of his 11 Ministers, three are a legacy from M. Fakhri's Cabinet. The fourth, Tuani, is the proprietor of the "Al Ahrar," the most widely read Beirut Arabic newspaper. It is apt to be violent and has a Nationalist complexion, which may, however, be a matter of sales policy.

2. The new Ministry is the seventh since the formation of the Lebanese Republic in 1926. That it will last even as long as some of its predecessors seems doubtful. It is interesting to note that after nearly four years of a parliamentary regime the Lebanese is now back at the starting point. Presumably in a few months the late President will have to be succeeded by one of the other ex-presidents of the Council who have all since tried and failed. As the result of what has happened, the parliamentary regime is now the only one tried. M. de Jouvenel did the country no service in introducing it. It brings out a fact as worst in the Lebanese, whose main weaknesses are just hunting and interference. The small group of politicians who play their parts for the moment are the interests of their own, while the constant changes render impossible any settled policy of administration. They have to be left to their own devices, which there are however no present signs that any change will take place. It is somewhat regrettable that the French High Commissioner might intervene and that, if he does, it is because he is riding the Lebanese Government for a fall. It is much more likely that knowing his intervention would only unite all parties in opposition to the French, he is allowing them to work out their own salvation.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW

[E 2178/23,89]

No. 150

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 26)

(No. 44.)

 ≥ 15

Beirut, April 7, 1930

Sir,
WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 30 of the 1st April, I have the honour to report that A. J. G. F. A. Addl. Secy. has appeared before the Chamber on the 24th April and read his ministerial declaration. The programme of the new Ministry which will probably never be carried out, is on its main lines similar to that of its predecessor. Only such alterations of detail and such minor amendments of

M. Eddé's schemes as soon necessary will be effected. A motion of adjournment to start the programme was declared by Auguste Pasha to be unnecessary. He said that the Government had no intention of doing anything but to carry out the programme of the National Assembly. A vote of confidence in the Government was taken and 27 votes to 11 were given to the Government.

A law annulling the system of "decrets-lois" was the first measure adopted and carried out. The last law was a law of 1954 which authorized the

I have, &c
H E SATOW

E 2289 66 891

No. 151

Consul Monck Mason to Mr A Henderson.—(Received May 5)

(No. 28. Confidential)

Sir,

they may be of interest
at facts

and cheap credits, the illiteracy, ignorance of the value of man power by disease. These questions are not

The River Khabour is calculated to be able to provide water

[illegible]

Four hundred and fifty families, of which 250 Moslems (Kurds
and Arabs) and 200 Christians (Catholics and Protestants) are
Armenians.

7 *Demir Kapu*.—Here the population is largely Kurdish, with a few Christians. Notanda are establishing villages in the most fertile parts of the country.

all Kurdish-speaking from the Diarbekir, Seirt, Kharpout and Mardin districts. They are a peaceful, hard-working people, the ill-treated, they are independent and anxious to work, and in the event of their being made prisoners of these

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prophecy—Governments have been formed, monarchies founded, treaties have been signed, and Presidents have succeeded Presidents in the realms of speculation. In point of order, I believe that you have exceeded time, and this intervenes as an absolute bar, and Mr. [unclear] must stop, the point of order being reached.

It is moderate in tone and in no sense an ultimatum, and seems to be conceived more in weariness than in anger. It is at least doubtful if anything will come of it. Nothing in Mr. Roosevelt's attitude suggests that a settlement is barred, or, indeed,

is promulgated in the near future, the date being given accurately as the 17th, 18th,

I have, &c
E. C. HOLE

No. 152

E 2656 231 89

No 158

Lord Tyrrell to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 24.)

54 564

515

[illegible]

2. It will be remembered that in Syria M. Ponsard has been seen in 1922 with a Constituent Assembly respecting the drafting of a Constitution since 1922. His uncompromising attitude of the Assembly which is not in the spirit of the Constitution of a number of articles which the French held to be inconsistent with the terms of the mandate resulted in the Assembly's refusal to accept the French proposal. The Assembly's refusal to accept the French proposal was a result of the fact that the Assembly was not in the spirit of the Constitution of a number of articles which the French held to be inconsistent with the terms of the mandate.

3. The Syrian Constitution now promulgated is that originally drafted by the Assembly, though it contains an additional article providing that the Council of Ministers shall interfere with the exercise of the rights and duties which the mandatory power holds in virtue of the existing international agreements. My Government is of the opinion that this article "will probably operate until the conclusion of a regular Convention for the revision of the treaty, which will determine again with reference to the League of Nations, the conditions of the execution of the mandatory powers." The text of the relevant portion of the article in question, No. 116,

4. In addition to the Constitution of the State of Syria the organic law forwarded by M P on the composition of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Syria of the 2^d May, 1924, and as last revised on the 8th May, 1929, the organic law of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Egypt of the 27th March, 1926, the Joint Draft and an arrangement respecting the discussion of matters interesting all these States in common.

I have, &c.
TYRRELL

* Not printed

7 During the last six months a constant stream of submissions has flowed through M. Ponsot's offices, each with its attendant eddy of hypothesis and

Enclosure 1 in No. 153.

Extract from the "Temps" of May 23, 1930.

LE STATUT DES ETATS SOUS MANDAT FRANCAIS.

M. PONSOT, Haut-Commissaire de la République, dans les territoires du Levant
L'Honorable M. PONSOT, Haut-Commissaire de la République, en vue de leur communication
constitue le statut organique des Etats sous mandat français :

L'honneur d'adresser en joint à votre Excellence, en vue de leur communication
constitue, suivant les provisions de l'article 1^{er} de l'acte de mandat, le statut organique
des Etats sous mandat français.

France doit aider le développement, favoriser et consolider l'évolution,
s'adapter à cette évolution, soit par le jeu des moyens ou
entre les Gouvernements intéressés sous l'égide de la Puissance mandataire.

1. Le premier en date de ces textes est la Constitution de la République
M. PONSOT, Haut-Commissaire de la République, en vue de leur communication
abandonne quatre années de vie constitutionnelle régulière.

L'Etat de Syrie et le Sandjak d'Alexandrette, le Gouvernement de Lattaquié et le
Gouvernement du Djebel Druse. Ils sont complétés par le règlement organique de la
coopération des intérêts communs.

Le texte qui avait été élaboré par le Comité de Rédaction de l'Assemblée constituante au
cours des mois de juin et de juillet 1928, et qui avait été pris en considération par cette
Assemblée le 7 août suivant.

Les seules modifications de principe apportées à ce texte ont eu pour objet de

Puissance mandataire tient des accords internationaux en vigueur

Le statut organique des Etats sous mandat français

Le statut organique des Etats sous mandat français

Le statut organique des Etats sous mandat français

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Le statut organique des Etats sous mandat français

conditions dans lesquelles les Etats et les Gouvernements intéressés, les pouvoirs et les
intérêts locaux seront appelés à assister le représentant de la Puissance mandataire dans
la gestion des intérêts communs aux territoires sous mandat français.

Rapprochés dans un contact direct sous l'égide de la Puissance mandataire, ces
Gouvernements auront affirmé chaque jour davantage l'esprit de solidarité qui doit
harmoniser leur action pour la sauvegarde et le développement de leurs intérêts
généraux.

Enclosure 2 in No. 153.

Relevant Section of Article 116 of the Syrian Constitution (text extracted from the
"Temps" leading article of May 23, 1930)

AUCUNE disposition de la présente Constitution n'est et ne peut être en
opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie,
particulièrement envers la Société des Nations. Cette réserve s'applique spécialement
et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures. Pendant toute la durée des
obligations internationales de la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie les dispositions
la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à les affecter ne seront applicables
dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervenir entre les Gouvernements
français et syrien. En conséquence, les lois prévues par les articles de la présente
Constitution, dont l'application pourrait intéresser ces responsabilités, ne seront discutées
Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du
Gouvernement français ne pourront être modifiées qu'après entente entre les deux
Gouvernements.

E 3289 66 89,

No. 154

Acting Consul Meads to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 19)

(No. 43. Confidential)

WITH reference to Mr. Monck Mason's despatch No. 21 of the 6th February, I
have the honour to report that General Ernst and Captain Lunn, respectively
president and secretary of the Turkish-Syrian Boundary Commission, left Aleppo on
the 4th May, the relative convention having been signed, according to my Turkish
colleague, on the 3rd May

2. In a statement to the press General Ernst remarked that the work of the
commission, which had lasted four years and which had not been rendered easy by
either side, was at last terminated and that the frontier between the Mediterranean
on the one side and Iraq on the other had been marked out with 1,620 boundary
stones. The allotment of the islands in the Tigris had been resolved
by Turkish naval experts.

It is stated that the Turkish-Syrian Boundary Commission has been
unable to give satisfaction to any
Turks have not even now given up
Aleppo, and it is certain that a large section of the
Turkish. The Bezzant-Alep-Nisbin and Prolongements
Indeed, the present line would seem to be neither geographical nor ethnical, and it
appears to be generally considered that M. Franklin Bouillon is scarcely to be
congratulated on the result of his negotiations in this connexion

4. The security on the frontier is stated to be improving, though far from
perfect as yet, while accounts of minor frontier incidents, which may or may not
have taken place between French and Turkish posts, occasionally find their way into
the local or Mosul press.

5. I am informed on reliable authority that the French military authorities
are making the necessary preparations to occupy the frontier posts in the north-
eastern section of Syria towards the end of this month

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, the acting British consul-general at Beirut and to the British liaison officer at Beirut.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.

[E 3485/66/89]

No. 155.

Acting-Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, June 5, 1930.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 43 of the 13th May, I have the honour to report that consequent on the signing of the Turco-Syrian frontier agreement on the 3rd May the French, on the 3rd June, occupied new posts, notably in the Duck's Bill, where the main forces, said to exceed 8,000 men, were concentrated.

2. In the course of a conversation I had yesterday with M. Lavastre, delegate of the High Commission, he volunteered the statement that the occupation had taken place to the best of his knowledge without a hitch, thus giving the lie to the rumours which had spread locally that trouble was expected and that preparations had actually been made in Aleppo to receive the wounded. If the Turkish soldiery may be judged by the wretched specimens I saw recently at Nisibin it is indeed unlikely that any resistance could be afforded.

3. It is, of course, possible that the French consider that by this show of strength in the Duck's Bill they will render more difficult any delimitation of the Iraq frontier on a line to the west of the present *de facto* boundary. Again, they may wish to impress the Kurds at the very outset with a display of force calculated to inspire respect among any unruly elements.

4. The movement was undoubtedly well prepared, M. Fesset himself visiting the district on the 25th May, while General Bigault de Graucourt, commander-in-chief of the French troops in the Levant, is said to have been present on the 3rd June accompanied by two other generals.

5. It is also possible that this display was partly meant for the benefit of the Beduin tribes of the Sanjak of Deir-er-Zor, who appear to resent French methods of colonisation with the frequent interference and bullying on the part of French officers and non-commissioned officers, who are all too ready to beat them and call them liars, a great insult to the Bedu. I am informed that an attempt to make all members of these tribes, sedentary or nomadic, obtain an identity card has caused much dissatisfaction.

6. Security, however, is the order of the day, and for this the natives are thankful enough, as they are for the fillip to agriculture and trade generally which tends to accompany the presence of the troops.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, to the acting British consul-general at Beirut and to the British liaison officer at Beirut.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.

[E 3486/231/89]

No. 156.

Consul Hole to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 30.)

Sir,

Damascus, May 27, 1930.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 27 of the 29th April, I have the honour to report that on the 22nd May the French High Commissioner promulgated, *inter alia*, a Syrian Constitution.

2. The text is broadly that of the draft prepared in 1928 by a committee of the Constituent Assembly: some modifications have been introduced in articles dealing with nationality, currency, official language and the term of office of the President of the Republic. An article is added formulating the reserves of the High Commission, which was refused by the Nationalists in February 1929. (Cf. my despatch No. 26 of the 14th February, 1929.)

3. The effect of this procedure is to endow Syria with a very liberal Constitution, which cannot fail to earn applause at Geneva, and will remain inoperative at the High Commissioner's pleasure.

4. By a further *arrêté* bearing the same date as the Constitution, but published a day later, the High Commissioner dissolved the Constituent Assembly. This *arrêté*, the preamble of which is not without interest, is enclosed.

5. The Constitution was received with the utmost indifference, though a meeting will be held by the Nationalists to decide on their future attitude. The opinion is gaining ground that too much attention may be paid to politics, and that the real solution of the question is in the economic sphere.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

Enclosure in No. 155.

Arrêté No. 3116 du 14 Mai 1930 portant dissolution de l'Assemblée chargée d'élaborer la Constitution de l'Etat de Syrie.

LE Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu les décrets du Président de la République française en date du 23 novembre 1929 et du 3 septembre 1926;

Vu l'arrêté du Président du Conseil des Ministres de l'Etat de Syrie No. 18 du 10 mars 1928 portant convocation des collèges électoraux;

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 1969 du 10 août portant convocation des candidats proclamés élus, à la suite des opérations électorales des 24 et 27 avril 1928, en vue de procéder à l'élaboration de la Constitution de l'Etat de Syrie;

Vu les arrêtés du Haut-Commissaire No. 2063 du 10 août 1928, No. 2195 du 5 novembre 1928 et No. 2385 du 5 février 1929, portant ajournement à trois mois et ajournement *sine die* de l'Assemblée chargée d'élaborer la Constitution de l'Etat de Syrie;

Attendu que depuis cette dernière date, le Président de l'Assemblée a, par ses manifestes des 11 août 1929, 31 octobre 1929 et 15 avril 1930, affirmé publiquement que le point de vue du Bureau de l'Assemblée demeurerait invariable, éloignant ainsi tout espoir de voir l'Assemblée mettre elle-même en harmonie le texte du projet de Constitution pris par elle en considération le 7 août 1928, avec le droit public défini par l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et par la Déclaration du Mandat du 24 juillet 1922;

Attendu, d'autre part, que les travaux de l'Assemblée et de ses Commissions ont représenté dans la plus large mesure la consultation des autorités et populations, visée par l'article 1^{er} de l'Acte de Mandat, puisqu'ils ont abouti à l'élaboration d'une Constitution que la Puissance mandataire promulgue aujourd'hui en la complétant par l'article des réserves de Mandat destiné à mettre son texte en harmonie avec les principes rappelés plus haut;

Attendu que, si l'Assemblée n'a pu dans ces conditions achever entièrement sa tâche, elle n'en a pas moins participé effectivement à l'élaboration de la Constitution, et que la promulgation de celle-ci met aujourd'hui fin à sa mission;

Pour ces motifs:

Arrête:

Article unique.—L'Assemblée réunie le 9 juin 1928 pour procéder à l'élaboration de la Constitution de l'Etat de Syrie, et dont les travaux sont suspendus depuis le 11 août 1928, est dissoute.

Le Haut-Commissaire,
HENRI PONSOT.

Le Secrétaire général,
D. TETREAU.

Beyrouth, le 14 mai 1930.

[E 3434/231/89]

No. 157.

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, June 8, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 22nd May last M. Lavaistre, delegate of the High Commissioner in Aleppo, called a meeting of the representatives of the local press and declared to them that the Syrian Constitution had been promulgated. The secret of this move had been well kept, and yet it scarcely made any impression either in Aleppo or in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, to which latter district it guarantees administrative and financial autonomy.

2. The Constitution was received with great satisfaction until article 116 was perceived, which is generally held to stultify the rest. "Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus" is the usual saying, while the Constitution is derisively nicknamed the "Constitution."

3. Although it may safely be said that the commercial-minded Aleppine or native of Alexandretta takes little interest in politics, considering them to be detrimental to his commerce, in which in view of the prevailing crisis he is utterly absorbed, nevertheless Nationalist meetings took place both in Aleppo and in Hama. The object and result of these meetings have been kept secret, but it is generally thought that Nationalist agitation is caused not so much by article 116 as by the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, which contained a Nationalist majority.

4. It is also rumoured that M. Ponsot has agreed to urge the acceptance of the six controversial articles of 1928 which led to the adjournment and subsequent dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, and which have been inserted, howbeit in a modified form, in the recently promulgated Constitution in return for a promise of good behaviour from the Nationalists during the coming elections.

5. It may be noted, however, that amid the general feeling of indifference or disillusion which has greeted the Constitution, an atmosphere of satisfaction is prevalent among the Christian elements, who are very apprehensive of their position under a Syrian Government which should not be well bridled by the mandatory Power.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, to the acting British consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.

CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 136/41/93]

No. 158.

Mr. A. Henderson to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 69.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 8, 1930.

THE French Ambassador called upon me at the Foreign Office to-day. Referring to the aide-mémoire which he had communicated to the Foreign Office on the 20th December in regard to the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations in 1932, M. de Fleuriau warned me that M. Briand would probably raise the question with me when I met him at Geneva. I told M. de Fleuriau that the aide-mémoire was under consideration, and that I should be happy to discuss the matter with M. Briand at Geneva.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 1932/1932/93]

No. 159.

Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 114.)

Sir,

Angora, April 8, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Ja'far Pasha-el-Askari spent the inside of last week here on his way back to Bagdad. He met with a very warm reception. The Turkish Government wanted him to be its guest, but he preferred to stay with the Irak Minister. The banquets which were arranged in his honour were much more intimate than those which are the lot of most foreign statesmen here. He was greeted everywhere as an old friend and an old comrade in arms. He seems nowhere to have met with any sign of the resentment which a soldier who had changed his allegiance during hostilities might have expected.

2. Ja'far Pasha told me that in the course of a long private conversation with him the Ghazi confined himself mainly to war memories and carefully avoided politics. Tervik Rüstü Bey, in his official talk with the Pasha, seems to have abounded in friendly sentiments towards Irak and to have coupled them with an earnest plea for most-favoured-nation treatment in judicial matters. Thanks chiefly to Ja'far Pasha's own personality, this brief visit was a great success, and will doubtless prove to be of great value to the relations of the two countries.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 2553/1511/44]

No. 160.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir R. Clive.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, May 17.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 20, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your despatch No. 57, dated the 16th April, 1930, in which you informed me of a conversation which you had had with his Highness the Minister of Court concerning Kurdish Nationalist activities and his Highness's suspicions that British officials in Iraq were sympathetic towards the movement for an independent Kurdistan.

2. I suggest that, if his Highness should refer to this matter again, you might point out to him that, in consequence of the recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations at the time when their decision was given in regard to the Mosul frontier dispute with Turkey, His Majesty's Government have an obligation to see that certain special privileges, such as the official use of their own language, are safeguarded for the Kurds in Iraq. It naturally follows that British officials in Iraq are concerned to see that this obligation is properly discharged.

[22271]

3. Far, however, from encouraging the ideas of Kurdish autonomy which are held among certain extreme Kurdish Nationalists, British officials in Iraq, including both of my immediate predecessors, have, as you are aware, taken special care to prevent Iraq from becoming a centre for Kurdish Nationalist intrigues aiming at creating unrest and disturbance among the Kurds in the territory of limitrophe States. Details of the measures adopted to this end in 1928 were communicated to you in the enclosures to Sir Henry Dobbs's confidential despatches No. 1633, dated the 14th July, and No. 1625, dated the 10th August, 1928. The Minister of Court might, perhaps, be reminded in particular of the incident described in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the former. Moreover, it was as the direct result of the special representation made from this High Commission that His Majesty's Government issued to all passport officers in February 1929 a special list of Kurdo-Armenian Nationalists to whom visas for Iraq should be refused.

4. I think that if his Highness the Minister of Court is reminded of these facts he will have little reasonable ground for continuing to entertain the suspicions which he has expressed regarding the attitude of the British authorities in Iraq towards the movement for an independent Kurdistan.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS,

High Commissioner for Iraq.

CHAPTER IV.—PALESTINE.

[E 2584/400/65]

No. 161.

Extract from Final Minutes of the 4th Public Meeting of the 59th Session of the Council of the League of Nations, held on May 15.—(Received in Foreign Office, May 20, 1930.)

2639. *Palestine: Designation by the British Government of the Commission entrusted with the Final Settlement of the Question of the Wailing Wall.*

MR. HENDERSON asked the Council's permission to make a brief statement in regard to the situation in general in Palestine.

As the Council was aware, the Commission of Enquiry into the disturbance of August 1929 had presented its report, and copies had been in the hands of the public for some time. The report would be discussed by the Permanent Mandates Commission, and a full statement would then be made by the British accredited representative, but Mr. Henderson begged to be allowed to anticipate certain aspects of that statement which would be of especial interest to the members of the Council. Before doing so, however, he would refer to the evidence given before the commission. It was of vast bulk, and would, he gathered, amount to approximately 1,000 large pages of two columns each. Every effort was being made to accelerate the printing, but so far the printers had been unable to guarantee a date earlier than the middle of June. The evidence (except that given *in camera*) would be published as soon as it was ready, and would be simultaneously handed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for distribution to the Permanent Mandates Commission.

As regards matters arising out of the report, Mr. Henderson wished to refer first of all to the primary duty of the mandatory, as of any Government, namely, the preservation of order. In the first place, His Majesty's Government had increased the British military forces in Palestine. It had under consideration with its expert advisers the question of the garrison permanently required in that country, and, pending a clear decision on this subject, it did not propose to make any reduction in the present force. A highly qualified police officer, Mr. Dowbiggin, of Ceylon, had been sent in January to consider the reorganisation of the police. His full report had not been received, but certain interim recommendations for the better protection of Jewish colonies had been adopted and were being put into force. The British section of the police had been increased by 400 men, and a further increase of seventy-nine men was now being made.

The commission, in its report, had laid special emphasis on the problems relating to land and immigration. His Majesty's Government was impressed with the importance of these problems, and had selected Sir John Hope Simpson, whose name and abilities were well known to the members of the Council in connexion with his work as vice-president of the Refugee Settlement Commission at Athens, to proceed forthwith to Palestine to confer with the High Commissioner and report on land settlement, immigration and development.

Mr. Henderson wished to refer next to the presence in England of an Arab delegation from Palestine, with whom discussions as to future policy in that country had taken place. It was enough to say of these discussions that they had placed His Majesty's Government in full possession of the views of leading Arabs regarding the interests and aspirations of the Arab community.

The British Government was now engaged upon an examination of the problem of devising means, within the framework of the mandate, of satisfying legitimate aspirations and of removing any apprehensions that might still be entertained.

Finally, he would add that he proposed to submit for the approval of the Council, in private session, the names of three gentlemen who had been good enough to intimate that they would be prepared to serve on the commission to deal with the Wailing Wall. His Government regarded this matter as of great importance, and was much gratified by the prompt agreement of the Council to its proposals made in January last.

M. Procopé, *rapporteur*, attached great importance to the statement made by the representative of Great Britain, for it shed light on the situation in Palestine.

and strengthened the Council's confidence in the action of the mandatory Power with a view to the just execution of the obligations incumbent upon it under the terms of the mandate for Palestine.

The Permanent Mandates Commission, whose duty it was to give expert advice to the Council on the matter, and which would shortly consider the question, would certainly take into consideration the various points raised in Mr. Henderson's statement. M. Procopé felt sure that the British Government would furnish the Mandates Commission with all the information necessary to enable it to form an opinion as to the policy which that Government intended to pursue in the territory in the future.

M. Procopé thought that his colleagues would agree with him in considering that the report which the Permanent Mandates Commission would forward to the Council would make it possible for the latter to obtain a better view of the situation in Palestine than was possible at the moment.

He would propose therefore that the Council should take note of the statement made by the representative of Great Britain.

The proposal of the rapporteur was adopted.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 2488/598/65]

No. 162.

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 40.)

Sir,

Aleppo, May 6, 1930.

WITH reference to Mr. Monck-Mason's despatch, No. 28 of the 27th February, I have the honour to report that in the course of a recent conversation with M. Audouin, director of the Bozanti-Alep-Nisibin and Prolongements Railways, he stated that he was confident that by the end of the year the railway line would have been prolonged by 11 kilom. to Tell Ziouane. This will have the advantage of bringing the terminus into Syrian territory although, M. Audouin stated that, apart from certain initial difficulties when cars were not allowed to cross the frontier, he had no complaint to make against the Turkish officials. If anything they had been more obliging than the Syrian.

2. Regarding the 1931 programme, he informed me that although credits had not yet been allotted it was expected that the line would be extended by 17 kilom. to a point 3 kilom. south of Kuhn-el-Bid. The line would then cover approximately half the distance from Nisibin to the Iraqi frontier and eliminate what, owing to the nature of the soil, is perhaps the worst stretch of road between Nisibin and Kirkuk.

3. M. Audouin stated that he was looking forward to the junction of the Bozanti-Alep-Nisibin and Prolongements and Iraq Railways, and hoped that his eagerness was shared in Iraq. He regretted that the Iraq railway system was not on the normal gauge and in this connexion uttered the hope that it might be found possible either to link up Mosul and the Syrian frontier by a normal gauge line or alternatively to lay a three-rail line so as to obviate the necessity of transferring passengers and goods from one train to another at a desolate frontier post.

4. He then touched on the possibility of the Tripoli-Homs Railway line being prolonged through Palmyra to Deir-er-Zor. Competition would then have to be expected from this direction, but he did not anticipate any early realisation of the project which was connected with the still nebulous question of a pipe-line from Iraq to a Mediterranean port.

5. In conclusion, M. Audouin stated that he was most optimistic regarding the future developments of his line. The number of passengers who had made use of the railway between Aleppo and Nisibin had exceeded all his expectations: there had been travellers to Iraq coming not only from Turkey and Europe but also from Southern Syria, Palestine and even Egypt who preferred the comfort of a sleeping-car to the fatiguing monotony of the Damascus-Bagdad desert service.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, the acting British consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.